Summary of Key Findings

- Evidence from the systematic review of published studies to date suggest there is an indeterminate and inconsistent relationship between inequality and radicalisation but that there is a more consistent relationship between subjective (perceived) than objective inequality and radicalisation.
- There is a relationship between perceived socio-political and socio-economic inequalities and injustices and pathways to extremism, but it is neither linear nor consistent. Radicalisation outcomes are mediated by a constellation of situational and affective factors as well as individual agency.
- Perceived socio-political inequalities are more readily articulated as drivers of radicalisation than perceived socio-economic inequalities. The perceived socio-political inequalities experienced by actors in both RWE and ISE milieus are expressed as a series of reciprocal grievances, which contribute more profoundly to milieu-specific disaffection than perceived socio-economic inequalities.
- The link between perceived socio-political inequality and radicalisation is context-dependent, if not case-by-case dependent. Perceived socio-political inequality does not consistently explain radicalisation, but is useful for examining how feelings of victimisation, a sense of injustice and lack of human rights protection may also play a role, both at individual and group level.
- Experiences of detachment and a desire for rootedness can play a key part in the (non)radicalisation trajectories of individuals.
- Individuals who experience perceived injustices/inequalities may hold radical views but usually do not translate them into extremism. This makes it imperative to study trajectories of non-radicalisation alongside those of radicalisation where those taking both paths experience similar circumstances.

The DARE Research

This research briefing is based on qualitative data collected and analysed as part of the DARE (Dialogue About Radicalisation and Equality) project. The project focuses on young people (loosely defined as those aged 15 to 30 years) and on two strands of extremism, which we refer to as ‘Islamist’ extremism (ISE) and ‘right-wing’ extremism (RWE).

The DARE project uses a mixed-methods approach and has multiple research strands. In this research briefing, data are drawn from:

- 19 milieu-based ethnographic case studies (10 of ISE milieus, 9 of RWE milieus) in 12 countries including just under 400 semi-structured interviews;
- A systematic review of published quantitative studies and a meta-ethnographic synthesis of qualitative studies on the relationship between inequality and youth radicalisation as well as the analysis of existing European survey datasets on this relationship.

We cannot do justice to the complexity and contentious nature of many terms used in this briefing. For brief conceptual definitions, see: http://www.dare-h2020.org/concepts.html. For critical discussion and contextualisation of these terms, please consult the individual research reports: http://www.dare-h2020.org/research-reports.html

Further information on the project and participating institutions can be found at the end of this briefing.
What does attention to perceived inequalities tell us about radicalisation pathways?

While all extremists have grievances, not all people with grievances become extremist. This research briefing draws on the systematic reviews and ethnographic studies conducted within the H2020 DARE project to illuminate the relationship between inequality and radicalisation.

In practice, disadvantages arising from social stratification, such as low group status or discrimination, based on membership of a social group (e.g. as ethnic or religious minorities) reflect the intersection of socio-economic and socio-political inequality although among research participants they are often articulated as ‘political’ in as much as they are seen as systematically reproduced through political and legal institutions and practices.

This briefing uses ‘inequality’ and ‘injustice’ interchangeably unless referring to specific, objective instances of inequality.

Establishing the baseline: what do we know about the relationship between inequality and radicalisation?

The DARE research started by conducting a Systematic Review (SR) of published quantitative empirical studies and a Meta-Ethnographic Synthesis (MES) of qualitative empirical studies on the relationship between inequality and radicalisation (see: Franc and Pavlović, 2018; Poli and Arun, 2019).

The key findings of those reviews, for the purposes of this Research Briefing, are:

- When analysing the relationship between inequality and radicalisation, we need to distinguish between objective and subjective measures and consider the significance of both.
- In qualitative studies of radicalisation trajectories, subjective inequality appears more important than objective inequality. The role of subjective economic inequality is under-researched in quantitative studies.
- Evidence from both quantitative and qualitative studies demonstrate an indeterminate and inconsistent relationship between inequality and radicalisation but a more consistent relationship between perceived than objective inequality and radicalisation.
- Socio-political factors (e.g. civil rights and liberties) play a key role in trajectories of radicalisation. This challenges the idea that socio-economic inequality is the dominant factor in radicalisation. Subjective socio-political factors (e.g. feeling ‘silenced’ or denied a political voice) are found to be important factors in qualitative studies.
- Inequality at the individual level does not consistently explain radicalisation. The link between inequality and radicalisation appears context-dependent if not case-by-case dependent.
- A complex and interlocking set of personal, group and environmental or situational factors shape (non)radicalisation outcomes, even at the individual level.
- Radicalisation is not ‘done to’ individuals but involves a process of subjectivation as experiences of individual or group injustice are transformed into social criticism and action.
The findings from the DARE country-level ethnographic research broadly align with the conclusions found in the MES and the Systematic Review. No verifiable or consistent findings relating to the relationship between either objective or subjective socio-economic inequalities could be identified although a relationship between radicalisation and perceived socio-political inequality was articulated. Among both RWE and ISE respondents, socio-political grievances appear to carry more weight than socio-economic factors in terms of perceptions of inequality and injustice experienced at individual, group and structural levels.

**Socio-political and socio-economic grievances and radicalisation pathways**

The ethnographic case studies explore what experiences of perceived injustice and inequality draw people towards pathways of radicalisation and what factors encourage or discourage the crossing of the threshold into violence. Since in the majority of milieus studied, actors did not themselves cross the threshold into violent extremism, our findings relate primarily to cognitive radicalisation but also inform our understanding of the relationship between radicalisation of ideas and action.

Our research found that perceived socio-political injustices appeared in the narratives of milieu actors more consistently than socio-economic injustices. However, in practice, grievances are articulated in ways that demonstrate the complex interlacing and layering of injustices, making it difficult to categorise them neatly. Ostensibly socio-political inequalities – such as urban ‘ghettoisation’ or discrimination in employment or education - may have socio-economic dimensions or produce the conditions for socio-economic inequalities to develop.

Figure 1 illustrates how such grievances intersect and relate to what we categorise as **systemic**, **ideational** and **contextual** injustices.

![Figure 1: Types, levels and intersections of grievances](image-url)
Perceived inequalities are experienced at individual, group and institutional levels and induce feelings of isolation, dislocation, alienation and frustration. Milieu actors reported experiencing such inequality: during interactions in public (in leisure time, on public transport); in contact with the authorities; in the media and public discourse; in housing and urban public space; at work or at school; in private lives (e.g. among family members or friends who do not accept their religious/political affiliations); and in terms of identity and belonging.

**Perceived injustices: Systemic, ideational and contextual**

RWE and ISE respondents articulate mirrored milieu-specific grievances underpinned by perceived and experienced inequalities and injustice that contribute to parallel indirect radicalisation trajectories. These perceived injustices have *systemic, ideational and contextual* dimensions. *Systemic* injustices are those perceived and experienced by milieu actors as rooted in structurally reproduced inequality and injustice and encountered mostly in interactions with political and social institutions. Grievances of an *ideational* nature are those arising from perceived injustices in relation to how milieu actors view the world, their values and the meaning they attach to symbols of importance to their identity. *Contextual* injustices relate to a range of environmental or situational factors that impact and influence respondents’ and their peers’ lives.

![Diagram showing the subjectivation process of (non)radicalisation in RWE and ISE milieus](image-url)

**Figure 2:** The subjectivation process of (non)radicalisation
Figure 2 illustrates the *subjectivation process* of radicalisation (Poli and Arun, 2020: 67) whereby experiences of individual or group injustice are transformed into social criticism and action. It illustrates the overlapping nature of systemic, ideational and contextual injustices perceived and experienced by respondents across both RWE and ISE milieus and how the differentiated nature of these experiences leads to milieu-specific grievances that often mirror one another.

Of course not all those who experience injustice follow a radicalisation trajectory and Figure 2 captures the important mediating factors that shape pathways towards and away from violent extremism. For example, in the French ISE milieu studied, pathways of radicalisation and non-radicalisation are distinguished by situations and interactions that appear to be ‘almost nothing’ but turn out to be ‘almost everything’ (Conti, 2020: 4). In the UK RWE milieu, a hangover that led to a missed meeting with a now prohibited group marked the difference for one research participant between crossing the threshold into violent extremism and not. A range of such situational factors (including unforeseeable events and interactions) and affective factors (feelings of alienation, isolation, frustration and marginalisation) thus shape the social circumstances in which radical(ising) messages are encountered and responded to and facilitate or discourage pathways of radicalisation.

Below the experience of systemic, ideational and contextual injustices reported by milieu actors in our study are considered in turn.

**Systemic Factors**

Actors in both milieus discuss structurally reproduced inequality and injustices they experience. For both groups, moreover, it is state institutions that are seen as the source of such injustice.

Respondents from the ISE milieu are aggrieved over perceived structural socio-economic inequality, which they experience in relation to employment opportunities and wage inequality. Many ISE respondents express resentment over their experiences of spatial confinement and lack of economic mobility which they attribute to racial or ethnic disparities in opportunity.

In contrast, socio-economic grievances tend not to be expressed by RWE respondents as structural inequalities; rather, many respondents argue that socio-economic inequalities are a natural part of life. In the Greek and Russian cases, some research participants even felt that it was wrong to challenge inequalities ordained by God.

Rather, RWE respondents direct their expression of socio-economic grievance at liberal/leftist regimes that seek to ‘address’ inequality, which leads to others’ needs not being prioritised. This expression of grievance highlights the intersection between socio-economic and socio-political factors. Structural grievances such as state corruption and poor distribution of resources are directly linked to the assumed socio-economic impacts of privileging of immigrant communities over ‘natives’. For example, the Malta RWE milieu case study found that membership to the extreme-right was often associated with a reaction to perceived structural socio-economic inequality, which played out in terms of individuals’ employment opportunities and wage equality.

RWE milieu actors also recounted economic consequences – through loss of employment – of what they perceive to be systemic injustice meted out to them because of their political views. This is expressed below by Dan (UK, RWE).
Dan, a respondent from the UK RWE milieu voices his annoyance over what he perceives to be an unfair dismissal from his place of work for attending a right-wing rally in his spare time:

‘The last sacking I got before the job I’m in now, I got sacked for, on me day off. I went to Manchester last year, UK Against Hate. It was on me day off. And I was seen. There was a picture of me on the front page of the Daily Express, The Daily Star and the Sun. And me boss seen it in work. Was on me day off, like I said...Calling me...they were calling me a racist then, in work. Sacked me. Which is wrong again, you know, you should be able to go on a march. Doesn’t matter what the march is about. Shouldn’t...as long as you don’t bring it...I’ve always said that, as long as you don’t bring it into work, then shouldn’t be a problem. But it always follows me in work, like...’

The criminal justice and legal systems are also perceived as stacked against ‘us’ in both milieus.

RWE respondents frequently cite examples of being unfairly treated in comparison to immigrant populations or left-wing political activists. Lee (UK, RWE) states: ‘...that video i showed you there, there was a lad on that video kicking a shield right. And he were from the other side. And he didn’t get jailed; he went to court but he didn’t get jailed. He’s got a dodgy past and that as well, but he didn’t get jailed...And then the judge adjourned it for mental health reports...’

Similarly, John, a Corsican respondent from the French RWE milieu states: ‘We know very well that for the French justice system, it’s better to be an Islamist terrorist than a Corsican nationalist. It’s unfortunate...’

Mirroring the perception of the RWE milieu actors, some ISE respondents assume the state grants less preferential treatment to Muslims than ‘native’ citizens or those of other ethnicities. For example, Anissa (France, ISE) is reminded during our interviews of an altercation with the police.

‘They let me go because they thought I was Portuguese. If they knew I was Arab they would have made me put my head in the dog’s cage.’ (Anissa, France, ISE)

Respondents from the ISE Russian milieu reference being persecuted by the authorities for having the ‘wrong appearance’ due to the perception on the part of the authorities that they are sympathetic to the violence going on in Iraq and Syria. This feeling that injustice and inequality is entrenched throughout state institutions is particularly intense amongst the Kurdish minority population in Turkey. The Kurdish respondents assert that the very foundation of Turkish nationalist identity and nationhood is built upon the criminalisation of Kurdish society and the symbolic violence that Kurdish youth experience through their encounters with the state, state institutions and educational institutions all too readily can be be turned into violent resistance on the part of young Kurds.

Another key systemic injustice cited by respondents across RWE and ISE milieus is the sense of alienation and marginalisation that accompanies feeling silenced, not listened to or denied a political voice.

This grievance is voiced particularly strongly by RWE respondents who believe attempts to shut down spaces for free expression is a key driver of radicalisation.

CRAIG (UK, RWE)

‘If you take away people’s political voice, on both sides, it becomes cancerous and it basically becomes something very, very malevolent very quickly. And that’s, I think that’s one of the biggest dangers that we’re facing. Not that there’s anyone sinister in these groups. But if a political voice and a political analysis is not allowed, because it’s deemed to be too extreme or whatever, where do those people go and what do they do if they’re not allowed a political voice?’
At the individual level, respondents talk about feeling that they cannot be open about their personal views for fear of being rejected or ostracised:

‘I do not share my opinions on Facebook, I would be shot, that’s obvious! For example the Catholic view on homosexuality, for me that is self-evident but I wouldn’t express it, you’d be shot. I cannot go public about it... not with friends either (...) I understand that, I see that some viewpoints are radical. If I find someone I can share my thoughts with, it is a relief to discuss my ideas... but, in reality, it is not easy to find someone willing to listen’ (R6, The Netherlands, RWE)

At the institutional level, a member of the UK RWE milieu complains that right-wing voices are silenced when officially sanctioned demonstrations are shut down by counter-protestors. The perceived institutional silencing of RWE is evident in this example from Dan, a member of the UK RWE milieu, who criticises the police and legal system for suppressing their right to express their political views through peaceful demonstration: ‘...the other week I tried to hold a peaceful demonstration for Brexit because...our mayor and the socialists and Labour held a Stop Brexit march. So a week or two later I held a Brexit march. And they surrounded us, attacked us, and didn’t let us march. Which is wrong, like I said.’ (Dan, UK, RWE)

Amongst ISE respondents, the feeling of being silenced is coupled with a sense of fatalism and uselessness that contributes to the de-valuing of the self. Although there is much variation in the respondents’ case studies, many of those who feel humiliated, stigmatised and degraded at the hands of the authorities or as a result of their interactions within society (employment, education, housing) discover in radical Islam – particularly in jihadist movements – the possibility of reversing this relationship of domination. For example, in the Turkish case study, young men who are in need of housing are offered dorms or rooms to stay in, as well as all kinds of other support, by radical organisations. They fill the void created by the lack of state infrastructure or welfare support. Others, as discussed above, find purpose in the narrative of fighting for justice for the global Ummah.

Ideational Grievances

Ideational grievances emanate from perceived injustices in relation to how milieu actors view the world, their values and the meaning they attach to symbols of importance to their identity. These grievances are usually articulated as the need to defend individual and group identity, culture, tradition, religion or ideological affiliation from perceived threats to it. Individuals who feel alienated or socially disenfranchised are sometimes drawn towards groups that offer a shared understanding of their experiences and vow to preserve, protect and promote that which is perceived to be under threat.

For many RWE respondents, preserving a strong sense of collective identity based on shared values, attitudes and symbols that privilege cultural and ethnic homogeneity is an ideational aspiration. Racial diversity is considered a key threat to society and the ethnic homogeneity of society (white European) an asset. Therefore, many respondents from RWE milieus felt particularly strongly about their respective country’s immigration policies; they believed that their national and cultural identity was under threat due to an influx of immigrants and refugees – particularly Muslims – who they perceive to be transforming their society by imposing foreign cultures and customs among the wider population.
The parallel study in Greece, reveals the interactional nature of ideational grievances. The experience of Dimitris, a Muslim respondent from the Greek ISE milieu, who became involved with a radicalising actor in the local area, shows how anti-Muslim sentiment can inadvertently create the conditions that facilitate or encourage individuals to turn to radical pathways as a response or a push back against the perceived threat that they are said to present:

‘...That is to say, instead of going through the Ministry of Education, we go through the Ministry of Citizen Protection. That is wrong from the beginning. A young person may take this in a different way. This is inequality and its one of the major forms of inequality that a Muslim should be under surveillance by the Ministry of Citizen Protection. That is, that you are automatically dangerous, right? This is one of the first forms of inequality that I have experienced very strongly and badly... it is one of the causes of radicalisation. When someone perceives you as a threat to the defence of his country from the beginning, then the other [Muslim] starts to live and behave that way [as a potential threat]. This kind of state behaviour, implying that the country is in danger [from Muslims] could lead some [Muslims] to feel ok with this [and become radicalised].’

The impact of creating and preserving a sense of self in relation, or in opposition, to a perceived enemy propagates and determines the construction of a perceived ‘Other’. For example, in Greece, anti-Muslim RWE respondents draw on well-established anti-Turkish tropes to construct Islam and Muslims as intrinsic enemies of Christianity, suggesting that Muslims are attacking Christian nations through migration and terrorism in order to Islamise them. Conspiracy theory and the metaphor of war are employed to construct Muslims and immigrants as enemies of the faith and of the nation thereby integrating Greek-Orthodox anti-Muslim/anti-immigrant radicalism with far-right political forces and agendas.

Front page of the newspaper ‘Eleftheria tou Typou’ (Freedom of Press) stigmatising Muslims as terrorists. Translation: ‘Mosques of hatred in Attica. The police has put under its microscope three (of the 80 monitored) places of Muslim cult (sic) where extreme speeches were given’

The most referenced ideational factor motivating ISE respondents towards radical trajectories, however, relates to the notion of defending the global Ummah. The plight of the global Ummah is a powerful symbolic and collective experience of injustice that young Muslim respondents harnessed to transcend their own personal experiences of discrimination and rejection. Respondents from Greece, France, Turkey, The Netherlands, Norway and the UK all voiced some level of concern about their duty to protect the Muslim Ummah in the perceived war against Islam. For many respondents, dedicating themselves to the defence of the global Ummah provides an opportunity to enter a more meaningful pathway
in life. This idea hinges on the imagined concept of an egalitarian, idealistic, utopian society free from the inequality and injustice that have accompanied the lives of these young people, and their Muslim brothers and sisters across the world. For milieu actors in the French case, the opportunity to commit oneself to the struggle against the injustice enacted upon Muslims provides a reversal of power relations as they feel they have made a valued contribution to a cause perceived as ‘just’ by leaving the oppressive and corrupt society of France to join a world of virtue. This process may ease the worries and sense of injustice and powerlessness felt by these individuals by providing a sense of catharsis and restoring self-esteem.

**Contextual injustice**

Respondents from ISE milieus voice a broader range of environment based experiences perceived inequality than RWE respondents. These are reported as experiences of injustice in the form of racist/discriminatory interactions with members of the public, living in impoverished neighbourhoods, lack of access to employment or education opportunities and negative representations of Muslims, immigrants and refugees in media or public discourse. The lives of respondents in the ISE milieu are often also characterised by a sense of physical, social and symbolic confinement. It is precisely this feeling of constraint that pushed some respondents towards radical pathways as a means to escape their circumstances.

The respondents from the French ISE milieu describe their existence as first and second-generation French citizens. Many of the French respondents came from impoverished and socially marginalised communities that they referred to as ‘ghettos’ reflecting their experience of physical, social and symbolic confinement from growing up in one of these neighbourhoods. The French ISE respondents identify a collectively shared experience of spatial marginalisation, which created a sense of injustice.

**ADIL (FRANCE, ISE)**

‘Before, I never had the opportunity to get involved, and then it just happened naturally, spontaneously. A natural way of participating to go out and help Muslim people. I had to take responsibility...Rebuild Islam from scratch; this idea transcends differences, like those between rich and poor, between people from different countries. It covers everyone because this idea has no borders... I left in 2013 to fight the regime of Bachar al-Assad and to aid Muslims. A question I always get asked is what if it hadn’t been Muslims? No, then I wouldn’t have gone. I wouldn’t have made that commitment for people of other faiths...I went to fight the injustice done to Muslims.’
R2 (NETHERLANDS, ISE)

A Muslim respondent from The Netherlands similarly voiced their experience of how perceived ethnic profiling and anti-Muslim attitudes generated a sense of injustice:

‘During my studies, it was difficult to find an internship. In 2001, I was looking for an internship in my final year of school. I consciously started to focus on religion, did little with it before, I got deeper into it, reading texts, books etc in order to go through life as a better Muslim, growing a beard ... that did mean that I had to redo a semester. I could not find an internship ... I was offered an internship at a research agency, but the opportunity didn’t work out, because the teacher who offered it said: ‘you are not going to ask for a place to pray are you?’... I said I would do it in my free time. But they found someone else instead... Eventually I did find something, it was good. But it was unequal treatment, ethnic profiling. I did not feel it as discrimination then, I did not think about it ... Well, now that you ask that question, it was a loss of another six months - I had never experienced anything like it.’

Conditions of spatial segregation and ethnic profiling produce feelings of **stigmatisation** and **alienation** from society. Experiences of economic, social and symbolic confinement and constraint experienced by both respondents generate frustrations of feeling trapped in the stigma where they can envisage no way out.

The feeling of stigma is experienced by Muslim respondents in different ISE milieus. This stigma is often transgenerational which makes it even more difficult to shake off. For example, our study in Russia showed that urban second generation Muslims from the North Caucasus living in St Petersburg and Moscow, have encountered racialised, socio-economic and logistical/situational issues that generate both socio-economic inequalities and socio-political injustices. A situation of ‘double exclusion’ is often experienced by these individuals: from society and from limited social connections. They are confronted with xenophobia and ethnic discrimination which limits their access to jobs and education or good accommodation on the one hand, and on the other their lack of social connections also restricts their social and economic advancement towards higher status positions due to a prevailing culture of nepotism. Radicalisation can be considered as a response to the situation of double exclusion; the transition to radical ideas and joining communities with such ideas allows the young men to build alternative models of self-realisation and to overcome structural constraints on a symbolic level.

Examples of social discrimination in relation to employment were quite common among respondents from RWE milieus as being the key sources of contextual or environmental injustice in their lives. Among RWE respondents, employment discrimination was viewed as a consequence of activism (being fired) rather than discrimination (not being hired).

Uschi (Germany, RWE) recounts that, if you mention you are from her district of the city, ‘you’ll immediately be associated with the shaven-headed (Glatzen) or skinheads’. Talking about the same district, Camilla (Germany, RWE) says it is perceived as an anti-social (‘assi’) area while the Marksmen’s club is seen as full of people who like to booze.

‘When I started my apprenticeship [people would say], “Ah you come from [names city], where in [names city]?” Then you tell them and you get back, “oh, from [names district] so, assi and so on”. And if you say you are from the Marksmen’s
club, then you’ve hit everything you can. Because it’s: “Ah ok, marksmen booze and the district is assi”’. (Camilla, Germany, RWE)

For Camilla, however, the prejudice is encountered whilst working as an apprentice – her place of residence does not prevent her from being accepted onto the apprenticeship.

RWE milieu actors also talk frequently about their area of residence being ‘rough’, lacking infrastructure especially for leisure activities for young people, and being characterised by high rates of drug and violent crime. For Paolo (UK, RWE) this meant early socialisation into handling himself on the street:

PAULO (UK, RWE)

‘[...] growing up where I grew up; if you wasn’t a scrapper and you didn’t do certain things, you were a target. So you had to do things early on. So I was knocking about in stolen motors at the age of seven. It’s just the environment I grew up. I was never driving them, but I was with like older eighteen-year-olds that were driving round and I was sitting in the back. They’d have me sat on their lap on the steering wheel, just messing around sort of thing.’

RWE milieu actors also talk about the racialised segregation of the towns or cities in which they grew up. Lee describes how the racialised segregation of the town into what he calls ‘White British’ and ‘Pakistani, Bangladeshi Muslim’ districts, was reproduced in school and ritualised fighting between these groups was part of everyday teenage life:

LEE (UK, RWE)

‘[...] where I went to school in [names town], basically, it’s very, very segregated [...] each area is set, set, kind of, people and the school I went to, up the road there [...] it was very, very split down the middle. When I were there, like fifty percent white British kids, fifty percent Pakistani, Bangladeshi Muslim lads and we used to, we used to clash. You see with stuff out of school, being brought into school, lads from different areas and things like that. And it, it got that bad in the school that they had riot vans down the middle of the yard.’

Detachment and rootedness were found to play a role in trajectories of radicalisation and non-radicalisation among ISE milieu actors. The experience of detachment can manifest as a sense of rejection or ostracism as a result of their choices and worldviews, which made respondents feel isolated and alienated from existing friendship circles or colleagues. These experiences pushed them towards alternatives thus contributing to their detachment from their existing lives and towards pathways of radicalisation. This process can take place through recruitment or happen more indirectly. For example, the Turkish case study explains how recruits were encouraged down a ‘salafi pathway’ by removing them from their social environment which was presented as a negative influence, and reconnected them to an imaginary community of the Ummah. The French case study suggests that the discourse of radical Islam may have provided multiple ‘resources’ to respond to the individual’s need and desire for escape, success and to raise self-esteem; in this way, radical Islam constitutes a path of emancipation. The importance of detachment in paving radicalisation trajectories was also referenced in The Netherlands ISE report. Those who were disconnected from local religious authority or support became the eventual radicals. They would find affirmation and validation among each other, and on the Internet. However, those who were connected to their parents, school teachers, work or local religious authorities did not affiliate with extremist or hostile thought and actions. Their connections solidified a social/communal context that helped to root their identity formation process and to prevent the adoption of a worldview characterised by hostility. In this way, we could suggest that rootedness appears to be at the heart of non-radicalisation trajectories. Religion may offer an antidote to radicalisation as this process involves questioning both inequality and radical Islam and re-rooting oneself in the family, neighbourhood and Islam.
Among RWE respondents, a different sense of ‘uprootedness’ causing feelings of ‘detachment’ could be discerned. RWE respondents emphasised the changing landscape of their towns/cities as a result of liberal globalisation policies such as immigration on the one hand and the dilution of Christian values on the other. For example, Christopher a French RWE respondent felt that France as a country, and identity ‘is dead’. Similarly, two UK research participants, (Dan and Gareth) who had grown up together in the same part of the city, lament that differences in culture and behaviour of immigrants has ruined communities. They agree that the city is ‘going worse and worse and worse’. This is explained by the arrival of ‘low skilled economic migrants’ which is ‘killing this city’ because they are being housed in already poor areas and turning them into ghettos. In Greece and Russia, the cultural decline envisaged is seen in strongly moral and spiritual ways. As Thomas (GR) puts it, Greeks must remember ‘that Christianity originated in Greece, civilisation started in Greece when others were still in the trees’. This explicit connection of Greek spirituality with national superiority is found also in the narrative of Jacob (GR) who believes Greek Christian culture to be superior to all because it possesses purity and can civilise all people; it is because of this ‘superior culture’, he says, ‘the transnational centres of power want to destroy it’.

Similarly, Anita, a RWE respondent from our Norway milieu voices her concerns about the impact of pluralism and immigration and the importance of national identity: ‘...our roots have become so much more important these days...we are going back to our origins...Everyone feels sort of...either you are this way or that way, and if you are not one way, or the other then who are you? You have to identify yourself... And it is a fact that the borders are breaking...we have an open Europe, and religions are starting to divide people at the same time as they too are beginning to clash more than before... then it seems like we have to identify ourselves to know what we are standing for, in a way... [...] and when things are starting to clash, then we have a stronger need to find a way back to our own identity, to who we are to be able to hold on to something ...

A combination of structural constraints, ideational grievances and experiences of injustice or discrimination fuel frustration and potentially radicalisation. Some of these inequalities are objectively verifiable, others refer to experiences which are subjectively experienced as systematically unfair treatment. Such perceived inequality and injustice feel real and have real consequences and thus should be understood alongside objective inequalities to better inform our understanding of (non)radicalisation trajectories.
References


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