RADICAL MILIEUS IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT

France

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*Patterns of radicalisation within the French Islamist youth milieu since the 1980s*

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Executive Summary:

This report studies patterns of radicalisation within the French Islamist youth milieu since the 1980s in order to explore radicalisation in historic and spatial context. Based on the review and evaluation of existing literature and research data collected from the end of the 1980s to the middle of the 2010s, analysis is structured around two main sections: the first is dedicated to the historical background to the debate on Islam in the French context, with specific attention to the nature of the relationship between radical milieus, violent political groups and the broader social and political, including gender, environment; the second is focused on three research questions: i) What role do historical memory and ‘grievance’ or ‘humiliation’ narratives play within radical milieus and how does this shape radicalisation processes? ii) What roles have conspiracy theories and eschatological narratives played in radicalisation ‘waves’? iii) Under what circumstances have radical milieus contributed to escalation of violence?

Given the frequent association of Islam with behavioural traits, attitudes, ideologies and forms of difference which are marginal to French society, identifying and analysing the major models of radicalisation, means we are confronted with an important issue: identifying in the most precise possible manner the elements which distinguish Islam from radical Islam. We have therefore attempted to update, chronologically, a fresco of the imagined image of radical Islam in France by examining two perspectives simultaneously. The first analyses how radical Islam became an issue for discussion and research as debate converged around a series of correlations between extremism and Islam associated with social phenomena such as ‘intégrisme’, fundamentalism, Islamism and Jihadism, etc.). This analytic perspective focuses on the evolution of understandings of the actors and rationales of radical Islam. The second endeavours to contextualise references to radical Islam (or the threat which it constitutes) in the wider debate on Islam in France. The first section thus highlights the political and media treatment of Islam in France, along with key moments of dialogue but, above all, tension between the Muslim population in France and the state, in which various perspectives on radical Islam emerge. From 1980 to 2020 an evolution in the models can be noted that tends towards a break with rational choice theories. From this point of view Islamist radicalisation might be seen less as a strategy associated with socio-political aims in contrast to the models of the 1980s, 1990s and beginning of the noughties than but instead from the standpoint of explanatory schemes varying considerably and extending from an emotional register to rationales of social protest, possibly involving pathological forms. In the second section, some of the major models identified are tested against the three questions mentioned above. Regarding the first question, in contrast to the ubiquitous presence of issues of injustice and humiliation, the question of the historical past is rarely present in radicalisation models, whether in the actors’ narratives or in the analyses of researchers. The second line of questioning is the role of eschatological narratives and conspiracy theories. While the former seem to occupy a central place in the forms of appropriation of radical Islam for many young people, the latter are more a subject of debate. On the third issue – that of the much debated and multifaceted question of violence - we identify, in the most recent radicalisation models, a shift from the definition of violence as a transition towards violent acts, to a definition of violence as a prediction or risk, which brings together (within the same model) individuals who may have very different profiles with regard to their relationship with violence.
1. Introduction

Revisiting the major models seeking to explain Islamist radicalisation in France since the 1980s, they appear problematic for at least four intersecting reasons. These relate to: first, the demands of the national Republican narrative; second, the historicity of the category ‘Muslim’; third, the process of sedimentation of a number of wide-ranging public debates on Islam resulting in the relatively negative (Babès, 1997), or at least suspect (Cesari, 1997), image of the religion in France. The fourth reason lies in the fact that radical Islam has become a major focus of attention in France, both in public debate, in institutions and in the social sciences, all of which is reinforcing a saturation effect of information and data on the subject. It should be noted that radicalisation, as it has been understood in the French context, particularly since 2010, primarily refers to expressions of extremism mostly linked to Islam.

Although our routine interpretation of everyday life and of society reveals differences between individuals in terms of religion, ethnic or cultural origin, these are not accorded individual recognition in the public sphere as this would clash with the republican principles which render illegitimate any designation, evocation or affirmation of religious, ethnic or cultural difference in the public sphere.

This approach is long-standing. It is rooted in the depths of the democratic ideal which, as Tocqueville has clearly shown, breaks with castes and orders and asserts the equal dignity of all. Equality before the law, and the rule of law constitute the first assertion in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen in 1789: ‘Men are born and remain free and equal in rights’. The republican tradition conveys this idea politically and, aims, in keeping with the ideas of Rousseau, to construct a general will, based on the enlightened exercise of the political rights of the citizen, who are now equal before the law. This aim demands that the citizen be ‘dependent on him or herself’ and not be subject to any partial or local allegiance (Nicolet, 1982). No cultural, religious or social particularity is acceptable in this ‘community of citizens’ which, henceforth, seals the unity of the Nation on a foundation of this legal and universalist equality originating in the Enlightenment and which is defined regardless of any specific affiliation. (Schnapper, 1994). In social relationships this imperative indifference to differences redeploy an abstract equality defined in opposition to specificities and based on the idea of equal access of all to Reason (Cortésoro et al., 2013).

Since the 1980s, it is apparent that the strength of assertions of identity, be they ethnic, cultural or religious, has contributed a new depth and a new vitality to the question of Islam in French society. The relevance of the category of religious affiliation in relation to Islam has gradually become a key term in the construction of alterity (‘otherness’) in France.

How the question of immigration is addressed in the French approach to anti-discrimination plays a major role here and references a set of articulations and combinations between the social, ethnic and religious dimensions which have shaped the approach to difference in France. Since the 1960s – which witnessed the mass arrival of immigrants from the Maghreb in France – debates on immigration have focussed on various issues amongst in which Islam has been more or less explicitly implicated. For a long time, Islam was discussed as just one element of the issue of immigration; for a number of years now, however, political and media treatment of Islam has become central to conceptions of alterity. However, the three dimensions of origin, social aspects and religion remain closely intertwined and it is in the context of their discussion that we must consider the increased attention on the part of the government and public authorities to the issue of radical Islam.

While it is increasingly accepted in France today that sociological argument and the observation of the social world no longer excludes the consideration of the ethnic origin of individuals as a relevant variable in understanding social phenomena (Felouzis, 2008: 129), there has been much more resistance in taking into consideration religious practices as genuine social indicators and vectors of identification of population. However, as Felouzis recognises, there has been an evolution in the use of the categories in
sociological arguments and the gradual legitimisation of the approach in dealing with issues which were considered ‘unthinkable’ in the past (Felouzis, 2008: 130).

The fact remains that religious affiliation has long been a taboo subject and all the more so when Islam and Muslims are concerned.

The considerable expansion in recent decades of the public discussion of Islam in France, and the increasing social scientific literature identifying and analysing the major models of radicalisation, raises the important issue of how to locate most precisely the elements which distinguish Islam from radical Islam. Indeed, Islam has been so frequently associated, particularly in the sphere of politics and the media, with behavioural traits, attitudes, ideologies and forms of difference on the margins of French society, that the frontier between Islam and radical Islam constitutes a major issue. This leads us to include in our consideration the dynamics of state contestation of the integration of a population whose contours are poorly defined.

In France ‘Muslim’, as a category of self-identification (Barth, 1968) is ill-defined and highly controversial, leading to uncertainty about the reliability of statistical data. The absence of official statistical output from the census\(^1\) since the ban in 1905 on recording the religious denomination of the population means that any estimates of numbers, which rarely tally with each other, are based on an ‘arbitrary assignation’ (Kateb, 2004: 36). This raises not only the question of the representativity of the estimate but also that of their methodological foundations. Whether it be a question of studies by researchers (Boyer, 2006; Fregosi, 2009; Dargent, 2010) or the studies carried out by Opinion Polls\(^2\), the figures ‘in fashion’ (Tribalat, 2004b: 22) are estimated to be in the range of 4 to 6 million Muslims (depending on the authors and the periods) but this variation has no methodological foundation. As a consequence, we have to recognise that the ‘degree of reliability of these figures’ (Kateb, 2004: 33) is not only open to question but above all, contributes to portraying a population whose contours are ambiguous and elusive. As Gilles Kepel pointed out as far back as the 1980s ‘in addition to the imprecision of the figures we have the imprecision of the definition of the “Muslims” in question’ (Kepel, 1987: 13). The findings of the INED/INSEE inquiry ‘Trajectoires et Origines’ do qualify this figure when they provide, in 2010, an estimate of just over 2

\(^1\) On the basis of the laïcité principle, it is forbidden in France to ask a question concerning the religious affiliation in the official censuses. However, some exceptions do exist. For instance, the ‘Conseil Supérieur de l’Audiovisuel’ (Broadcasting Authority), carries out an evaluation every three years. Data is also obtained by religious organisations themselves. Since 2009, this authority has had an annual barometer conducted to assess the perception of diversity, which is a measurement tool that provides an objective assessment of the perception of diversity of French society on television. The barometer, which is conducted at regular intervals, reminds channels of the need to better feed their stations with programmes that are representative of diversity and not to do so in an event-driven manner. Over the years, in order to prevent the broadcasting of stereotypical views or confusing comments on the airwaves, the Commission has evolved its barometer by incorporating new quantitative criteria – such as precariousness or, for the first time in 2018, place of residence – as well as qualitative criteria, such as the positive, negative or neutral role of on-air contributors. Since 2012, the study has been led on an annual basis. The seven criteria currently indexed are: Perceived origin (perceived as ‘white’, perceived as ‘black’, perceived as ‘Arab’, perceived as ‘Asian’, ‘other’); gender (male/female); the socio-professional category (‘CSP+’, corresponding to the higher socio-professional categories, ‘CSP-’, corresponding to the lower socio-professional categories, ‘inactive’ and ‘marginal or illegal activities’); disability (yes/no); age (‘under 20 years old’, ‘20 - 34 years old’, ‘35 - 49 years old’, ‘50 - 64 years old’ and ‘65+ years old’); the situation of precariousness; and, for the first time in 2018, the place of residence. The role of the actor (‘positive’, ‘negative’ or ‘neutral’) has been indexed in the barometer since 2013. The method is based on the observation of programmes and the indexing of people who speak on the air. It is carried out per person and per programme. As a result, a person is indexed once, and only once, as soon as he or she speaks.

\(^2\) Opinion polls usually rely on small and not very representative samples because people are recruited in ‘areas known for their strong concentration’ (Tribalat, 2004b: 25).
million Muslims in France: ‘Muslims now form the largest minority religion with 2.1 million believers which seems very far from some of the estimates advanced in public debate’ (Beauchemin, Hamel and Simon, 2010: 124).

At the beginning of the 1990s, the example of the ‘Mobilité Géographique et Insertion Sociale’ (MGIS) survey (INED-INSEE, 1992) is in this respect revealing of the malaise experienced in dealing with religious questions in a context marked by ethnic indicators and criteria. Tribalat refers to the ‘reluctance to deal with this type of question’ (Tribalat, 2004b: 22) which neither enables an evaluation of the number of Muslims nor the development of a socio-demographic picture (Kateb, 2004). For their part, Brouard and Tiberj recall in their introduction to their study, published in 2005, on the relationship of French citizens of North African (Maghreb), African and Turkish origin to the political process that:

To this day, the religious affiliation and the religious practice of the French citizens of African and Turkish immigrant origin has very rarely been the subject of a systematic, rigorous and in-depth survey (Brouard and Tiberj, 2005: 21).

The prevailing definition, at least in quantitative studies3 is undoubtedly an ethnicised definition, given that geographical origin and filiation automatically lead to religion, with no thought of any sort of criteria of religious observance (Boyer, 1998: 230). Tribalat, for her part stresses, a conception of statistics which focuses on Islam (Tribalat, 2004b: 26), when tracing the contours of a population likely to be Muslim given its origins4 (Ibid.). However, she asserted, in the same article, that the debate about the presence of Muslims in France is therefore still mainly related to the North African population (Ibid.: 29), because it was associated more with immigrants, and moreover, immigrants of Maghrebin origin, than with the ensuing generations according to the statistical estimates5. The result is ‘an essentialist approach which considers that any person from a Muslim family or country can only be a Muslim, a characteristic independent of the will and convictions of the individual’ (Kateb, 2004: 37).

This essentialist approach is nevertheless nuanced by the statistical surveys6. These aim at exploring, again using random sampling, the relationship to religion of the population presumed to be Muslim. The data, which is collected by questionnaire, using a statistically significant sample size’, allows the differentiation between origin and cultural practices and to introduce complexity into the understanding of the practices themselves, consequently delegitimising the underlying essentialism in the estimates of the Muslim population. In 1992, for example, according to the MGIS survey, 30% of the 20-29 years age group of Algerian origin youth declared they had no religion (Tribalat, 1995), whereas results from the RAPFI7...

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3 With the exception of the study on the relationship of French citizens of North African (Maghreb), African and Turkish origin to the political process (RAPFi). The authors of this survey, Brouard and Tiberj insist on the fact that their ‘definition of the term Muslim is strictly religious. In our approach there is therefore neither a “sociological Muslim” (Venel, 2004) or a French citizen “of Muslim culture” who would not be of Muslim religion’ (Brouard and Tiberj, 2005: 21). As far as qualitative studies are concerned this tendency to consider as ‘Muslim’ all citizens of Muslim countries is less generalised, although not entirely absent – origin and religious affiliation being frequently used interchangeably.

4 Tribalat on the basis of data available on immigrants from countries of Muslim tradition and on affiliation indicators, estimated the figure to be 3.65 million (1.7 million immigrants and 1.7 million direct descendants and 300,000 grand-children); this estimate does not take into consideration converts, or very minority origins (e.g. Bosnia) and should therefore be raised by 10%. The results of the TeO suvey re-estimated the size of the Muslim population in France and estimated it to be 2.1 million persons.

5 According to Tribalat, Algerian-origin Muslims would account for 43% of the total, those of Moroccan origin, 28% and those of sub-Saharan African origin and from Turkey the remaining 8%.


7 The pioneer report, Rapport au politique des Français issus de l’immigration (rapfi) carried out by Sylvain Brouard and Vincent Tiberj in 2005, (The relationship of French citizens of North African (Maghreb), African and Turkish origin to the political process (RAPFI)), showed that there was little difference between the relationship of French citizens...
survey (Brouard and Tiberj, 2005) indicated that 59% of people originating from a majority Muslim country declared they were Muslim (66% of those from the Maghreb alone) and 20% had no religion. The findings of the inquiry also show that the proportion of people declaring they were Muslim remained stable at immigrant and first generation level, whereas a fall was observed at the level of the second generation. However, the data collected by Brouard and Tiberj contrast with the data collected by Tribalat 13 years earlier. The 20-29 years age group surveyed in 1992, were aged between 33 and 42 years in 2005 and the number declaring ‘no religion’ amongst these had dropped by over 35 points. Similarly, the 20-29 age group in 2005 who stated they had no religion had considerably dropped (at least 20 points) (Brouard and Tiberj, 2005: 31). These differences must however be read with caution in the light of the changes in context and social climate in which they were produced.

These scenarios concerning the Muslim population in France are always complex and polemical; they also concern, and even clash with, the question of radical Islam. Extremism, whether it be religious or not, has always been a minority phenomenon. Exploring its development means analysing both the way in which the public authorities, the State, and the Intelligence Services define it, in their attempt to counter it, and also the way in which the so-called radicalised actors recount it. These are the two dimensions which structure our analysis of the major models of radical Islam which have accompanied the public and academic debate over the past forty years. Our analysis is based on the contextualised and historical nature of research in the social sciences.

The various interpretations of radical Islam and the recurrent difficulty to distinguish between Islam and radical Islam call for a better understanding of the different models that follow one another, or cohabit, over time and are based more or less on the subjectivity of the people concerned.

In the time between the 1995 bombings to the 2012 Toulouse and Montauban shootings committed by Mohamed Merah, France was not directly concerned by attacks associated with radical Islam, despite the global dimension of this phenomenon and the growing participation of individuals or groups of French people in violent actions in foreign countries.

Our attention in this report will focus on four leading questions:

i) What role is played by historical memory and narratives of injustice or humiliation in radical circles and how do these fashion the processes of radicalisation?

ii) What are the roles of conspiracy theories and eschatological narratives in the ‘waves’ of radicalisation?

iii) In what circumstances have radical circles contributed to the rise in violence?

iv) What is the nature of the relationship between radical circles and the broader social and political environment? This transversal issue will be at the core of part 2. of this report, which deals with the association of Islam and extremism within the French society.

In order to answer these questions, we have had to review a whole segment of public and academic debates to gain a better understanding of the numerous uses and definitions of the expression ‘radical Islam’.

8 In the aftermath of 9/11/2001, Bruno Etienne evokes the ‘nomadism of concepts’:
‘Islamism is no longer the product of a complex historical process: it becomes an essential causality! Believers (al-Mu’imin), Muslims (al-Muslimin), Islamists (al-Islamyyin), radical Islamists, fundamentalists, fanatics, terrorists, Jihad/Holy War (al-Jihad/Just War), Harem/Forbidden Place, veil/Chador (al-Hijab) and bearded (Castro versus Bin Laden): words are bitter! All the researchers who have been working on this point for several decades agree: we had called “Islamism” the political use of Islam by the actors of an anti-modern protest perceived as damaging to identity:

8
the beginning of the noughties. Given the extent of the period and the scope of the study (see section 3.1 for details), the findings gathered in this report provide more a series of snapshots from a corpus of institutional, media and academic data than an exhaustive overview of these models. Given the increasing amount of academic literature on radical Islam, it is fundamental to unravel the epistemological bias at the core of each major model. The researcher’s stance of investigation, the nature of the field of inquiry, the context, the initial subject matter of the research are major elements in understanding the construction of these various models. For example, some approaches start with a perspective based on the subjectivity of the actors (Khosrokhavar, 1997, 2004, 2006, 2015, 2016; Crettiez and Seze, 2017; Truong, 2017; Micheron, 2020) while others begin with institutional data (Bonelli and Carrié, 2018), or rely on both these perspectives (Puaud, 2018). The starting point for some authors is ideology and religion (Kepel, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2015; Marret, 2005; Amghar, 2006; Caillet and Puchot, 2017; Bentran and Zanna, 2019; Rougier, 2020), while other researchers focus on public policies and institutions (Galembert, 2016; Limam, 2016; Jossin and Megie, 2016) or again on young people (Roy, 2014, 2015; Cortéséro and Marlière, 2016; Fize, 2016; Marlière, 2017; Galland and Muxel, 2018). Although these are only a few examples of how the field of study on radicalisation in France is configured, we might also note the significance of fieldwork conducted into prison as a milieu (Crettiez, 2017; Khosrokhavar, 2004, 2015) or even enclave (Micheron, 2020) of radicalisation (Galembert, Béraud and Rostaing, 2016).

Furthermore, the one-upmanship in evaluating and explaining Islam in the light of the laïcité, but also in relation to the frontier between Islam and radical Islam, means that one has to constantly move between two major modes of production of models of radical Islam in France. The first refers to the research which starts with radical Islam, or at least deals with it directly – by reviewing the range of terminology used to describe it. The second is more disparate, consisting of aggregate studies, research and discussions on various social topics which by elision or by proxy reference the role of radical Islam.

The exploration of models of Islamist radicalisation in France alerts us the complex web of terms that have emerged to describe the phenomenon and what makes it distinguishable from Islam. This leads us to start with the relative opacity of the category Muslim man/woman which we have to envisage at least as much as from the social and political issues discussed in the public sphere in France throughout the 1990s particularly in relation to secularism (laïcité in French), as also in relation to ideologies, orientation and specifically Islamic influences (Tietze, 2019: 268). These are all elements which render the definition of radical Islam unstable and relatively varied, including in the cases of people convicted for terrorism. For instance, in his book Farhad Khosrokhavar (2006: 36) stresses the tenuousness and fragility of the process of identification of radical Islam on prisoners.

This work on the historicity of the major models of radicalisation, from the 1980s to 2020, is intended to provide an up-to-date overview of the main themes over the period. We are witnessing an ever-increasing attention paid to radical Islam in the political and media debate. We are also witnessing the porosity and the attempts to distinguish between Islam and radical Islam.

“westernization” and not Westernization, as some say too easily’. Bruno Etienne, ‘Integrists, you said fundamentalists?’, Le Figaro, 26 September 2001.

9 ‘Islamist’, ‘intégrist’, ‘fundamentalist’ ‘terrorist’, ‘radicalised’, ‘Jihadist’, ‘terrorist’: since the beginning of 2004, the list of terms which have succeeded one another or co-habited to discuss the phenomenon which we describe as radicalisation is relatively long (Khosrokhavar, 2014).
2. Setting the scene: Historical background to the debate on Islam in France

Islam, in its various iterations including radical Islam, as well as what ‘being Muslim’ means in practice, can only be understood in the context of its French colonial heritage and its present post-colonial reconfiguration. On one hand we observe the inauguration of the construction of the category of ‘Muslim’ as an assigned alterity and, on the other, the emergence of a Muslim problem within French society. While at the end of the Algerian War Islam was closely associated with the discussions on immigration and the integration of populations of North African origin, from 2000 onwards the discussion moved to focus on the fundamentalist drift and the security threat that Islam represented regarding national identity.

2.1 The opacity of the category ‘Muslim’

Islam as a social and societal issue is not new but goes back to the colonial period and more specifically to the Algerian question when the Muslims were conceived of as a minority, in other words as a demographic category of difference. The term ‘Muslim’ was used during the French colonial rule in Algeria to differentiate the autochthonous population from other populations whether they be Europeans, or autochthonous Jewish populations (before the Crémieu Decree signing their naturalisation in 1870) (Kateb, 2003). The religious affiliation was rendered homogenous and objective, and a whole segment of the population was ethnicised in a process of unequal identity categorisation which served as a justification for colonial domination and exploitation. Until the outbreak of the Algerian War, a certain terminological confusion reigned around the most common designations of the colonised subject: ‘Muslim’ and ‘native Arab’ were used synonymously, although as from the beginning of the 1940s, the accepted expression in political and official language was ‘French Muslim’.10

The Algerian War installed in France the political, social and police control of the colonised population henceforth usually referred to only by their religion – ‘the Muslims’ – who, because of an alleged ‘Muslim mentality’ were to become the target of exceptional measures and were subject to specific monitoring (Brissot, 1959). The recognition of a ‘Muslim mentality’ marks a major step in the essentialisation of religion on the basis of a set of stereotypical and disparaging moral and behavioural properties (Berthelier, 2007).

After the Algerian War, the term ‘French Muslims’ was only used for the ‘Harkis’, (the auxiliary Algerian-origin troops) and members of their families. The former French Muslims of the colonial period became ‘Algerians’, ‘North African workers’, or again ‘immigrants’.

In post-colonial France the debate around the presence of Muslims was, in the first instance tacitly, then openly, associated with the waves of migration from the former colonies and with the process of integration of these new migrants. State consideration of Islam dates from 1976 when Paul Dijoud, then Secretary of State for Immigrant Workers inaugurated a series of measures to facilitate the practice of this religion. But these arrangements had no significant political and media impact (Cesari, 1994).

Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the question of Islam only appears occasionally in public discussion. This is understandable as until 1981, the claims linked to immigration, and more generally to ethnic differences constituted a secondary and auxiliary demand in more global political debates. The themes of reduction of inequalities and injustice, of increase in salaries and nationalisations, of unemployment and

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10 For example, in June 1943: The Service for North African Muslim Affairs (AMNA) replaced the AINA and in 1944 a decree announced that ‘The French Muslims in Algeria enjoy all the rights and are subject to all the duties of non-Muslim French citizens’.
rise in prices are much more prominent in electoral issues than themes linked to the living conditions of
immigrant workers or immigration policies.

The focus on the figure of the immigrant worker in the 1970s tended to mute references to ‘Muslims’.
However, these reappeared at the beginning of the 1980s, both in public discussion and in scientific work,
as perceptions of immigration from the Maghreb as a temporary phenomenon gave way to a vision of it
as a permanent feature and one in which second generation immigrants became visible for the first time.

2.2 The 1980s and the emergence of the ‘intégrisme’ threat

2.2.1 A de-situated11 Islam

Current events and, in particular the Iranian revolution in 1979, contributed to the construction of Islam
as a central issue in polemics in French society. The attention paid by the media to both the international
and national scene at the same time – the strikes of the unskilled workers between 1982 and 1984 –
tended to encourage the association, one might even say the amalgam, of the two. In relation to the
workers’ strikes, Gérard Noiriel demonstrates the extent to which the editing and use of images played a
part in creating the religious nature of these strikes as an objective fact:

By juxtaposing the images of Islamist terrorist in Teheran and the images of Muslim workers
shouting in Arabic on the shop floor in the Talbot factories, television only suggested the link
between the two phenomena (Noiriel, 2007: 613).

The reciprocal resonance between Islam and fundamentalism (intégrisme in French) was thus to be played
out in the workers’ strikes in the car industry at the beginning of the 1980s:

The correlations established between the strike activities and the religious characteristics of
the actors, which was conveyed by the description of ‘holy strikes’ used by several
commentators, signalled the displacement of the interpretation of the social world. The
issues involved were the interpretation of the strikes and the Muslim religion, both of which
were disparaged and discredited in the media, the one reinforcing the other (Gay, 2020: 111).

In the prolongation of the Iranian civil war, propaganda movements appeared in prayer halls and mosques
in France. However, as Gilles Kepel notes, the anti-French discourse was so extreme, that those in charge
of the venues shared the documents with the French administrators who, in turn, passed them on to the
authorities (Kepel, 1991: 252). The synergy which operated between the opening of the policy brief on
Islamic fundamentalism in France and social conflicts in the automobile factories, despite the fact that the
issue of Islam found little resonance there, sustained numerous amalgams in political discourse by the
end of 1982. At the beginning of 1983, the affair of the ministerial statements on fundamentalism
revealed the gaps in knowledge about Islam within the senior management in public administration (ibid.).

The reduction of Islam to radical Islam is clear. The expectations related to the recognition of Islam which
are expressed in this period, in the factories or at the local authority level, are mainly perceived as a
politico-religious instrumentalisation from foreign countries (such as Iran for instance). As Cesari reminds
us, the statements by the Minister for Home Affairs and the Prime Minister concerning the immigrant
workers on strike at Peugeot effectively equated them with fundamentalist Shia Muslims in Iran (Cesari,

In the same vein, Deltombe and Rigouste (2005: 44) stress that the new visibility of Islam, associated with
the Iranian revolution, was conveyed on French television by an unprecedented emphasis on topics which

11 By ‘de-situated’, we would like to stress both the relative de-contextualised perspective on Islam in the French political debate, and the lack of situated knowledge on Islam in France in this period.
focused on ‘differences’; one of the most recurrent themes being ‘the cultural incompatibility’ of immigrants. The authors rightly assert that: liken

(...) at the point where the stated intention was to ‘integrate’ the immigrants, Islam became increasingly visible on television. And increasingly ‘foreign’ (Ibid.: 57).

The media were not the only stage which simultaneously set out Islam and Muslims as a national problem, and associated Islam in France with fundamentalism in foreign countries. From 1986, conflict in several Muslim countries reinforced this perception of Islam as an issue in the relations between France and several countries. Thus, the Rector of the Mosque in Paris was considered by the government as the representative of the Muslim population and, as such, implicitly responsible for ensuring that Islamism was not propagated while Algiers was beginning negotiations with Tehran for the liberation of French hostages in Lebanon. Until 1979, questions related to Islam were primarily considered to be foreign issues (Cesari, 1994: 142).

At the end of the 1980s however, a further step towards the political acknowledgement that Islam was a component of French society, was the move towards federating the Muslim populations in France. In March 1990, a commission of Muslim representatives became the Council for Reflection on Islam in France (Conseil de Réflexion sur l’Islam de France), the (CORIF). This was created within the Ministry of the Interior by Pierre Joxe. Designating the Minister of the Interior as a central political actor in relation to the issue of Islam in France was motivated by several issues: the Rushdie affair, the headscarf affair, which was accompanied by the mobilisation of associations in conjunction with Islam, and the placing on the political agenda of the question of Islam within French society.

Towards the end of the 1980s, the first academic publications addressing the subject of Islam in France appeared. The research of Olivier Roy, Gilles Kepel and Catherine Wihtol de Wenden gave rise to several collective publications including the special issue of the Revue Française de Science Politique in 1987 and Gilles Kepel’s book Les Banlieues de l’Islam. Naissance d’une religion en France, amongst others. These publications intentionally broke with the essentialist approach to the Muslim population, still bathed in the imagined colonial world. Instead they focussed on the emergence of religious practice in the public sphere, as well as its political articulations, and Muslims as social actors. This research was to open the field to a series of studies on Islam, Muslims and the issues which they raised for French society. As from 1985, Wihtol de Wenden and Leveau (1985) put forward, one might say retrospectively, a visionary approach but for which the study was delayed:

(...) the reference to Islam, in the firm or in the city, even if it is not very conflictual and is more akin, in everyday life, to a sort of ‘force tranquille’, refers to the question of the political resolution of the Maghrebian immigrant presence in France and, as a result, is located on the political terrain, disrupting the game of various French actors. For a long time the political attitudes of the Maghrebian immigrants in France did not mention the pious Muslim. Today it can be considered that, for the immigrants, Islam is a way of entry into politics in so far as one witnesses, as a result of their quasi-definitive settlement, the negotiation of a new form of relationship defining the values with which the immigrant Muslim communities enter the dominant system (Ibid.: 82).

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12 To give only a few examples: Pierre Mauroy, a former socialist Prime Minister, stated in 1983 that the conflicts in the automobile industry had little to do with social realities in France, as they were the consequence of the action of religious and political groups. The former Secretary of State for the family, population and immigration, declared in 1984 in an interview with Les Temps Modernes: ‘They came from the Maghreb, often from rural regions and they were Muslims. This is one of questions which, today, means that their integration poses problems which other immigrant communities did not pose.’
At the same time, several research studies, sometimes by the same authors as we have just quoted, maintain a confusion between the terms Muslim and Maghrebian, resorting to one or other of these terms to name the same so-called ‘immigrant’ population. In all cases, the dossiers of journals specialising in immigration began to take an interest in Islam as a specific element of the new waves of migration. There are two main approaches taken by academics during this period: one, more political, which refutes the use of the term ‘Muslim’ and stresses instead the social elements: immigration, work, exclusion; the other which maintains a degree of ambivalence and uses everyday and media language.

We have to bear in mind here, as noted by Lapeyronnie, that the experiences of the young people in the second generation Maghrebian immigration have, since the end of the 1980s, mainly been studied by sociologists of deviance and marginality ‘defined, too frequently as pure objects’ (Lapeyronnie, 1987: 288), considering that very frequently ‘young immigrants’ or ‘young people of immigrant origin’ refer to male experiences.

The ‘problems’ encountered by these young people are either interpreted from the point of view of the culture specific to each ethnic group (cultural duality, behaviour in defence of a community faced with modernisation, the product of a crisis in values, norms and integration within the culture of origin), or considered as problems of social class, or they are associated with discrimination, exclusion and the segregation to which they have been subjected. These three major approaches afford little space for the analysis of collective action, even if one can portray it in each case by deduction. The issue which we wish to stress here is that the models for action have been more inclined to reflect on the basis of the effects of a situation and less to analyse a process of interaction between groups and social actors.

The relative lack of interest in the collective action of migrants is, however, not the only weak point of the studies on the mobilisation of minorities. Research putting religious affiliation and the modes of political participation into perspective (Cesari, 1994, 1998; Dargent, 2010), or more specifically the role of religious issues amongst political attitudes, is still relatively rare. This paucity of research remains despite the fact, as Péro and Solomos (2010: 6) note:

(...) over the past decade more mobilizations around religion have also come to the fore in the context of minority mobilizations in a number of countries. Such mobilizations are complex in form and need to be located in local, national and transnational networks.

A notable exception to this, in the France of the 1980s, is the survey carried out by the CERI in 1985 on the relationship of the Muslim population in France to the political process. This study focussed less on the French of immigrant background than on the immigrants themselves (the so-called first generation of immigrants). The aim was to grasp ‘the ways of being Muslim in France and the political attitudes of populations of Islamic culture’ (Kepel, Leveau and Wihtol De Wenden, 1987: 771). Apart from this study, the analysis of religious mobilisations has long concentrated on the links which the associations maintain – almost exclusively Islamic – with the association network and the local social fabric (Ibid.) or again on the rise of forms of mobilisation linked with Islam after the failure of the civil rights movements in the 1980s. From this point on, religious practice was thought of as a ‘consequence of an impossible action and not as the basis of this action’ (Lapeyronnie, 1987: 311).

The question of the place of Islam and of religion in the collective mobilisation of migrants and minorities is very seldom considered in the literature on the formation of immigrant associations in France. Diop and Kastoryano (1991) remind us of this in an article on Islamic associations in which they observe the significant absence of the socio-religious dimension in research conducted for decades on non-European immigration. The two authors stress that the movement gained momentum and an upturn after 1981,
boosted on one hand by the law on foreigners’ right of association in 1981 and, on the other, by the emergence of a ‘demand for Islam’.

The approach which dominated in the context of this emerging academic interest in Islam, was the study of entrepreneurs identitaires, in other words, of the development of an organised Muslim presence in France. Some associations date from the beginning of the 20th century (Fraternité musulmane, created in 1907) but it was not until the 1960s that immigrant workers begin to turn towards associations of the religious type. These associations, studied by Diop and Kastoryano during the 1980s and 1990s, were essentially educational in intent (language classes, educational support and religious education). They studied four types of association: religious associations in the private sphere; associations with the aim of presenting a more positive image of Islam and concentrates on the propagation of universal values, associations which were based on Islamic identity and attempts to mediate between civil society and government bodies and associations which based teaching and practices on the model of the Prophet.

We have to recall here that the literature concerning ‘the associations and immigration movement’ is traversed by multiple rationales and heterogeneous dynamics (Poinsot, 2001: 64). If, the movement is difficult to identify, its analysis is reduced to the immigration issue, by ‘locating the different types of associations in the history of immigration in France and putting into perspective the different periods in which they appear’ (Hammouche, 2001: 41) or the dynamics and practices of associations over time (Wihtol de Wenden and Leveau, 2001).

The change in administration to a left-wing government led to a new approach to immigration which contributed to a reversal of the aims and objectives of immigrant associations. Thus, from the 1980s, we witness a second (or a third14) wave of new types of associations. These associations were to a large extent managed by the young descendants of immigrants, who were less concerned by the prospect of returning to their parents’ country of origin and more interested in social and economic participation in France. As the various authors who have worked on the mobilisation of the ‘beurs’ observe, integration became the main aim of this new generation of associations ‘while reference to the country of origin was much more low-key’ (Hammouche, 2001: 43).

A typology of associations on a generational basis relates transformations to changes in immigration over time; other authors, like Baillet (2001: 56) propose a periodisation based on the motivations and the projects elaborated, in other words in terms of the relationship of the militants to their militantism.

A binary interpretation emerged from this shift in associations ‘of immigrant origin’, based either on the country of origin of the members or on the normative framework in which their aims were set. The most frequent but ambiguous of these binary classifications posits the associations as being either universalist, or community-based (communitarian) (Baillet, 2001). These typologies understand the various mobilisations of the young descendants of immigrants according to their social function. Through the lens of these models ‘sociétaristes’, or society-based, associations were characterised as focused on citizenship activities that, in line with the republican approach, promoted the development of society-type relations while the others were seen as determined by cultural, ethnic and/or religious dimensions, thus

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14 For some authors, a third wave. Marie Poinsot (2001) for example identifies as a second wave the Consular type associations ‘official creations of the countries of emigration often inherited from independence movements’ which replaced the French associations of support.

15 https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/beur


Cf. Cockney rhyming slang: ‘verlan’ is the slang spoken in the ‘banlieues’ north of Paris – the syllables of French words are reversed; this language also contains many words from the African languages in these areas.
contributing to ‘strengthening community-based sociability’ (Baillet, 2001: 58). The ‘community-based’ associations were characterised by high densities of networks of solidarity and volunteering, bridging the gap between ‘modernity’ and ‘tradition’ and ensuring mediation between diverse populations. As Poinso (2001: 62) notes, the communitarian paradigm has usually directed research studies and, particularly when in relation to African associations both of men and of women, presented the association as a ‘conservatory of identity heritage’.

The relative fading out of rationales of action and mobilisation based, amongst others, on religion can also be related to the dependence of associations on public authorities. In their ‘local’ interpretation of associative commitment, Battegay and Boubeker (2001: 96) consider the recognition of associative action linked to immigration is its capacity to play the role of relay of public action:

(...) the emergence of associations for young immigrants appeared as not only instances for specific expression and collective action, but also as actors in the social life of these local areas, interlocutors for media narratives and potential relays of public action.

This also corroborates with the observation of Faure and Thin (2007) in their regional study of associations of immigrant-origin women living in working-class areas since the beginning of the 1980s. They observe the extent to which the women have been encouraged by the public authorities to direct their actions towards countering withdrawal into the community and defending secularism. In France, there is a long tradition of considering women to be the local initiators of various forms of mediation: these include the resolution of conflicts facilitating intercultural communication in local areas. This has led to a restricted view on the full panoply of rationales for the involvement of women in political life.

2.2.2 The disconnection between anti-racist struggles and the experience of young people of immigrant descent

The way in which anti-racist mobilisation has evolved in France is a good illustration of both the strength of the paradigm of integration and the evolution of the conceptions of ethnic differences.

Paradoxically, just at the point when young French people born to immigrant parents were beginning to assert their presence as an integral part of French society, public policy debate became focused on the need for integration. Thus, while young people born of immigrant parents were articulating claims and expectations in relation to shifting identities within French society, the debate on integration positioned these young people as external to that society. One consequence of this was a lack of attention to the actual experience of racism and the failure to recognise its various manifestations and social roots, reducing its discussion, rather, to the question of the political threat of the Front National.

In 1983, a movement led by the so-called ‘second-generation of immigrants’, tackled the confusion head-on by linking the denunciation of racism to the false promises of the integration model. The 1983 March for Equality and Against Racism (also known as the ‘Beurs March’) was seen as an opportunity to show the inconsistency of the French republican promises in terms of equality for the descendants of North African immigrants. This movement denounced the racism experienced by the first generation while asserting the right to be both equal and different within the French society.

Throughout the 1980s, racism became a major issue in society. In 1985, the creation of the association SOS-Racisme led to an increasing mediatisation of the issue. A specific and quite new feature of this anti-racist force, among others (Radio Beur, France Plus, etc.), was the involvement in it of an entire generation who were concerned, initially, with the claim of having the right to be different, i.e. to be recognised through a particular way of life, particular cultural productions and without having to constantly justify or prove assimilation into French society.
In a sense, this focus highlights a movement of ‘positive victimisation’ which makes racism a social issue while building a new image of second-generation youth determined to speak out, to give themselves visibility in the public sphere.

However, whilst these new demands reshaped the issue of racism for a period, the movement collapsed and the debate quickly refocused on the immigration issue. The fight against racism certainly continued at the association level, in particular through SOS racism, but its focus became detached from the question of identity and re-oriented to the question of integration. Moreover, if these new demands shifted the focus to identity for a while, the debate quickly went back to question of integration in line with traditional approaches to racism which had focused on tackling social exclusion. In other words, from a political and institutional point of view it was understood that tackling social exclusion would inevitably decrease racism. Firstly, because it was supposed that the social and economic integration of migrants and their children would protect them from racism and secondly because racism was considered to be a consequence of the social tensions in underprivileged suburbs and neighbourhoods. From the 1980s to the end of the 1990s racism was indeed mainly understood to be the result of poverty in deprived areas. The discourses of one of the most important anti-racist associations, SOS-Racisme, followed this idea. Concurrently, the growing success of the Front National (extreme-right party in France), encouraged a dominant political discourse which targeted the white voters of deprived suburbs – who were increasingly to be found among the underprivileged social groups. They presented what appeared to be a compassionate message empathising with the difficult living conditions and multicultural environment of the voters. In other words, racism was, in a way, socially rational - explainable.

The French concept of antiracism focused on the causes of racism rather than on the consequences for people experiencing it. Moreover, racism attracted less attention than the integration issue, which has been – from the mid-1980s – the paradigm of policies dedicated to immigration (Schnapper, 2007). The fight against racism has been relegated to the shadows.

Gradually, the theme of the experience of racism merged with that of delinquency in the discourse of the various political and voluntary community actors who seemed to agree with the racist perspective. The rationales of racism are indeed presented as an answer to those of the behaviour, attitudes and practices of which the immigrants and their descendants are accused. The text below, written by Harlem Désir in 1987, after his appearance in the media on the television programme L’Heure de Vérité, revealed an approach to racism which clearly empathised with those who favoured or were open to racism out of exasperation. The picture painted by Harlem Désir does make a few allusions to Islam particularly in reference to Ramadan:

(...) Everything concurs in transforming unemployment, the poor housing conditions into a crisis between communities. Young people hang around on the housing estates. They are often, very often, the children of immigrants. Normal: their parents live there, they have more children than other people – young people don’t find jobs. The difference in customs, life-styles all become a source of tension: every year, Ramadan provides us with a number of incidents, small dramas and sometimes major dramas. In this environment everything is a form of aggression: the slightest noise is unbearable, any silhouette at night is a suspected car radio thief on the prowl, the scene is set for self-defence tragedies. What is surprising is perhaps that there are not even more.

Racism is considered to be a sort of virus or symptom, caused by unemployment and the deterioration of social conditions, which tends on one hand to place the phenomenon outside society, in a way similar to the areas described, and on the other, to be considered as a sort of pathology which besets the ‘excluded’. Young people from the outlying suburbs are increasingly portrayed in a way that conflates immigration and delinquency (Peralva and Macé, 2002) and, in so doing, ignores the actual experience of racial
discrimination. It is against the background of this confusion that public policies have primarily challenged the integration of ‘immigrant populations’, a term in itself ambiguous as it refers both to foreigners and individuals born in France. It is in this context that from the mid-1980s, a ‘crisis in the model of integration’ is described in the media and political debate and also in academic literature, giving us to believe that this model previously functioned perfectly with Polish, Italian or Spanish immigrants who have ‘naturally’ become citizens totally assimilated in society.

A model of integration which, moreover, leaves community-based mobilisation no other choice than that of constituting itself by assuming uniquely negative representations of difference. This restricted appropriation of the campaign against racism puts the individuals directly concerned in an uncomfortable position by preventing them from expressing difference, while at the same time recognising and valorising that difference only as a factor of discrimination, rejection or exclusion. This is one of the specificities of the French experience, namely that the expression of cultural difference in the public sphere is viewed as more legitimate when it is conveyed from the position of a victim position – as a painful identity - than when it is consciously asserted with pride.

Some authors such as Lapeyronnie (1987) make the connection between collapse of the movement for equality and against racism and the rationales for withdrawal into the community amongst young people in the deprived suburbs to whom attention was gradually being turned. In his opinion, the importance assumed by practising Islam for some of the youth in these working class areas can be seen as part of local withdrawal strategies that emerged in the absence of any organised action; it signalled a symbolic search for identity or community roots as well as a sense of injustice.

But here, the search for a strong community identity through religion and a form of ascetism does not only have a community dimension. It also has an individual dimension. Since the egalitarian utopia cannot be achieved, the revolt or indignation cannot be expressed, as a result of the collapse of the movement, the demands are internalised and reversed (…) Thus, Toumi Djaidja, the leader of the March for Equality in 1983, received by the President of the Republic on this occasion, was elected Imam in his Cité des Minguettes. Withdrawal into the community, the search for identity and the practice of religion are the consequence of an impossible action and not the foundation for this action (Lapeyronnie, 1987: 311).

2.2.3 The Islamic ‘headscarf’ issue: a pivotal issue in the register of claims and assignations

The question of the Islamic veil has haunted France since its colonial period. It culminated dramatically in the middle of the Algerian War with the unveiling ceremony in Algiers on the 13th May 1958 when Muslim women were invited to come up onto the stage in Government Square, remove their veils and burn them as a sign of emancipation. There were numerous incidents around the Muslim veil in post-colonial France well before the first of these crises – which took place in Creil in 1989 – the veil had become an image of Islamic and Islamist danger. We only have to think of the extremely provocative image of the bust of Marianne – the symbol of Republican principles – wearing a tchador on the front page of Minute, an extreme right weekly, on 16th July 1983. The image was then re-published by the Figaro Magazine on 26th October 1985 and on 21st September 1991; and yet again by the Nouvel Observateur on 5th October 1989.

The ‘politico-media hysteria’ (Deltombe and Rigouste, 2005) over the headscarf affairs at the end of the 1980s put Islam once again in the media spotlight, while weighting this major issue with a gendered dimension hitherto hidden (Amiraux, 2003). We also note the widespread use of the term tchador to refer to the veil in this first phase of the headscarf affair, which marked the international dimension in which Islam is located in France. In the main, religion is reduced to a threat from outside. Some authors noted the contrast, or even the opposition between a traditional conception of the veil of the generation of immigrant women and its reduction to a cultural dimension and the conception (of the veil) of their female
descendants or again of converts, referring to a conviction, a choice and a right (Khosrokhavar and Gaspard, 1995; Arslan, 2010).

The questions of assimilability, of the integration of the second generations, and of national identity tend to be increasingly considered through the prism of ‘Islam’. The academic research in the 1990s in a way endorses this evolving and one-way approach to integration. Islam is implicitly dealt with in studies focusing on the Maghrebian population sometimes as an implicit cultural factor, and sometimes as a factor to be evaluated in measuring integration. Various approaches lead us to believe that integration would be more successful if people were to distant themselves from religion. When referring to the situation of the descendants of immigrants from Muslim countries, with the exception of Algeria, Tribalat observes ‘their greater religiosity leads us however to presume a less radical adaptation’ (which here should be understood as meaning ‘less fundamental’) (Tribalat, 1995: 262). For his part, Taieb stresses that the evolution of religious practices ‘may be seen in a certain way as a sign of assimilation. Indeed, we observe a sharp fall over the long term, and even greater amongst Kabyles’ (Taieb, 1998: 357). Other authors work exclusively on the ‘Islam phenomenon’ both as entry into the public sphere (via local politics) and as a phenomenon of subjectivation of the actors. But there is very frequently a confusion between the origin or ascendancy linked with a country in the Maghreb and the religion. In her book Être musulman en France, Cesari (1994) concentrates almost exclusively on the Maghrebian population. Other authors do not give us much explanation as to their sampling method.

Muslims appear as a population to be scrutinised, monitored, controlled and trained in the name of the values of modernity and human rights. The use of the term ‘Muslim’ enables parents and children to be considered in the same unit of meaning, thus erasing the sociological specificities of different generations, trajectories, and paths, not to mention beliefs and practices but above all, it differentiates these children from the national community.

The understanding that successful ‘integration’ of immigrants and their descendants is linked to their religious affiliation has triggered various responses, amongst which, Muslim fundamentalism (intégrisme) has been highlighted by politicians. In an interview with Nicolas Duvoux (2015), Jouanneau and Pingaud do indeed remind us on the basis of Bonelli’s research (2001, 2008), that:

(...) as from the second half of the 1980s, the reports were often excessively alarmist as they also aimed at increasing an audience and a legitimacy weakened by the end of the Cold War. The officers from the Intelligence Service (RG, Renseignements Généraux) and the DST (Directorate of Surveillance of the Territory) (and to a lesser extent some of the analysts at the Quai d’Orsay) endeavoured to heighten the awareness of the ministers who succeeded one another at the Place Beauvau16 to the risks associated with the spread, on French territory, of what was referred to as Muslim fundamentalism (intégrisme). Given their remit, these officers were not interested in Islam as a religion, but in Islam as vector of politisation and perhaps of radicalisation.

2.2.4 Conclusion

We note that the question of Islam appears in outbursts during the 1980s both as a synonym of immigration, which dominates the discussion and rebounds on the theme of integration, backed up by the idea of the cultural incompatibility inherent to this section of the population and as a political and social phenomenon to be monitored. In this attempt to present a picture of the representations of Islam in France in the 1980s, when radical Islam as such is only occasionally discussed, we find allusions to Islam or evocations of Islam, relating to a condition of extreme strangeness in opposition to integration and citizenship, much more commonplace. That’s why studying the French patterns of radical Islam leads to

16 Place of the Minister for the Interior in Paris.
exploring the nexus between immigration, origin and religion which tends to maintain a stigmatising societal imaginary about Islam.

One important point which emerges from this state of play in the 1980s concerns the marginal place of migrant women or female descendants of migrants, who are only occasionally the object of specific reflection, characterised by an intersectional approach which combines the dimension of gender/sex to analyses in terms of class or race. This serious lack of reflection is all the greater when we consider, as Rassiguier (2004: 3) points out, that ‘the imaginary construction of immigrants and immigrant communities in France is built on a corpus of gendered images, often contradictory, in which the women occupy a central position’, as we have just seen with the issue of the veil. Rassiguier stresses in this respect that the active participation of women in the undocumented workers movement and in the occupation of the St Bernard church in 1996 was not mentioned by the press and in the media.

Until the beginning of the 1990s, radical Islamism was considered to be the prerogative of religious activist groups in foreign countries. The first major model of radical Islam in the 1980s in France was developed in response to the perceived influence of foreign Islamist militants (in particular, Algerians and Iranians). Fundamentalism (intégrisme) was understood as emerging as a kind of mirror-effect to what was happening abroad. As public discussion of Islamic fundamentalism in France became more intense, therefore, these developments were perceived as resulting from the influence, or even interference, of foreign states. While radical Islamism in France was not really the object of models strictly speaking during the 1980s, during this first decade there is a regular association in which it is combined with major social issues (strikes of unskilled workers, places for prayer, and more generally, the presence of a Muslim population in France). This perspective enabled a model of radicalisation to emerge on the basis of the way in which it was portrayed in political discourse and the media.

In the academic sphere ‘radical Islam’ is an expression established by Bruno Etienne’s book (entitled L’islamisme radical) published in 1987. At the end of the 1980s the researcher showed the two facets of the phenomenon which is usually referred to by the term ‘fundamentalism’ from which he distanced himself, concentrating on radical fundamentalism as an ideological current. According to him, this approach to Islam proposes an alternative to Western hegemony which is messianic, revolutionary and universal. Its negative aspect is characterised by a rejection of the materialism, the secularity and the immortality induced by Western domination while at the same time presenting a positive meaning as the affirmation of the need of a return to the Islamic precepts of behaviour and organisation which would contain in themselves the solution to all the present-day problems (Etienne, 1987). The French context was the object of a final chapter in which Etienne reminded us that the Islamist networks concerned less than 1% of the Muslim population.

2.3 The 1990s and the gradual incorporation of radical islam

2.3.1 The ‘re-islamisation’ of the young people from immigrant background: virtues or threats?

As from the beginning of the 1990s, we witness a rise in the theme of Islam in the poorer suburbs, in particular in the theme of the ‘re-islamisation’ of these areas. Numerous authors became interested in this ‘return to the religious’ (Hervieu-Léger and Champion, 1990; Kepel, 1991; Berger, 2001; Lenoir, 2003). This fact could be explained in particular by a lack of tangible bench marks caused by liberal Western...
society and by the experience of immigration. This may indeed explain the conversion of some individuals and convey their desire to introduce

(...) a sacred dimension into their existence to counter the deficiencies of a modernity which leaves them alone to confront the psychic and affective problems which they encounter in their lives (Khosrokhavar, 1997: 14).

The idea of re-Islamisation refers also to the importance acquired by Islamic associations in some deprived suburbs. As Claire de Galembert (1995: 178) stresses:

(...) the town is an ideal area for the negotiations between Muslims and public institutions which mark a new stage in the entry of Islam into urban space by means of a move from Islam as a ‘substitution value’ (Islam as a refuge in adversity) to Islam as a ‘means of protest’\(^{18}\) mobilised in particular by the young people of the second generation.

Periodically, the 1990s were also the scene of important discussions around the construction of places for Muslim worship, which placed the municipalities at the forefront of the issue. Opposition between the local and national level could be observed, with very real tensions between these two levels highlighting different major argument such as, the argument of control (of the Muslim community), the argument of social peace and the electoralist argument (Galembert, 1995).

The increase in the number of Islamic associations in the suburbs went hand in hand with a wider movement of remedy for disaffiliation, or what was known as ‘la galère’ (no job, no qualifications) (Dubet, 1987). These associations organised a whole series of activities which extended from support for schoolwork, to leisure activities as well as campaigning against delinquency and drugs. Islam had become a ‘hub for structuration’ of the new generations (Galembert, 1995: 182) challenging what had been considered as a form of communitarian withdrawal. The failure of the model for integration became the explanatory framework for a movement known as ‘Islamisation’ or ‘re-Islamisation’ of areas with a large immigrant (and their descendants) population.

The issue then became one of the new Islamic religiosity, which appears to be envisaged more as a response to exclusion and the bitterness of the actual experience of racism than as an aspiration towards spirituality. The religious fervour for Islam seems to have been constructed against a background of social and cultural problems and economic inequalities and, as such, was a cause for concern for numerous institutional and political actors. For instance, De Galembert takes the case of Jean-Pierre Duport, the Prefect of Seine-Saint-Denis, who expressed his fears to the Minister for Home Affairs, reporting ‘a patient and methodological form of indoctrination’ targeting in particular young people in working class areas. His words, reported in an article in La Croix, 21 October 1994, expressed concern about the links concerning the goals of these forms of solidarity and support by pleading for the reinforcement of local social action capable of countering ‘forms of neighbourhood help which is the Trojan horse of fundamentalism’ (Ibid.: 183).

This degree of attention focussing on Islam was also based on the succession of events and major social issues which converged directly or indirectly on the problem of identification with this religion: the assassination of five French citizens in Algiers in August 1994, the capture of hostages in December 1994, eight bomb attacks between July and October 1995 attributed to GIA Jihadists causing eight deaths and almost 200 wounded, the assassination of the monks in Tibhirine (Algeria) and, internationally, the Rushdie Affair. In addition to these events, we have the campaign against delinquency and anti-Semitism in Muslim majority (or identified as such) areas (Del Grosso, 2015: 64). The theme of urban violence, to a large extent associated with juvenile delinquency, occupied such a considerable space in the discussions that the focus was constantly on the question of ‘social bonding’ in the deprived areas and how to

\(^{18}\) The author borrows this dichotomy from Mustapha Belbah. Cf. Mustapha Belbah (1994).

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promote it (Genestier, 1999). Throughout the 1990s, political discussion centred on this phenomenon and in particular the fear that it aroused amongst the inhabitants of numerous areas, which was presented as one of the main preoccupations of their elected representatives. In the content of numerous articles in the press discussing this problem, references are made to ‘young people’, ‘juveniles’ ‘delinquents’ or even ‘savages’. But through the stories told, though the details related concerning the profile of the protagonists frequently referred to as ‘Arabs’ or as ‘Maghrébins’ (North Africans) which led some to emphasise the link between the feeling of insecurity and the rise of the FN. In 1991 Gilles Kepel (1991: 371) offered an ethnographic description of the ‘new Muslims’ who combine these various dimensions:

Till now we had never seen ‘loubards beurs’ (Arab-origin hooligans) re-Islamised and wearing different clothes: Adidas shoes, bleached blue jeans with flares in the fashion that year, a tee-shirt and a jacket, gel in their hair – but led by a young Imam dressed correctly and wearing a turban. They spoke with a strong local Lyons accent and were shouting ritual formulae in a newly-acquired Arabic.

2.3.2 The increasing interest for the extremism associated to Islam

Attention for social actors who were now increasingly visible in the suburban areas was tinged with anxiety as to the consequences of this enthusiasm. In this respect, fundamentalism (intégrisme) as radical Islam was termed in these years, and which refers to both the fear of a withdrawal into the community and to a political-religious form, violent in nature, which constitutes an impasse in the consideration of the deprived suburbs and Islam. We witnessed the deployment of a relatively extensive terminology to describe forms of extremism associated with Islam: Islamism, fundamentalism, ‘intégrism’ which all resonate with Islamic and more generally, Muslim, giving rise to all sorts of confusion. Discussions became tense and engendered a very broad conception of radical Islam which was to extend into the stigmatisation of all forms of self-expression deviating from the republican norm (Khosrokhavar, 1997: 10). The idea was not so much to take religion as a point of departure in the reflection, than of arming oneself with a dose of tolerance to be assumed with respect to Islam at the outset.

In Pujadas and Salam’s book (1995) for the general public, the two authors endeavour from the outset to rank these questions of terminology in a pedagogical manner. The term ‘Islamic’ is to be understood as the adjectival form of Islam and refers to matters concerning Islam. Islamism corresponds to a body of doctrine, that of the politico-religious movements which advocate complete radical Islamisation of law and government institutions of Muslim countries. Fundamentalism (‘intégrisme’ in French) is defined as an attitude or a frame of mind of some believers who, in the name of an intransigent respect for tradition refuse any evolution. Fundamentalism (‘fondamentalisme’ in French) according to the authors, means that religious discipline must be fully respected but it is primarily a rigourism with no intention of hegemony over the world of the profane (Pujadas and Salam, 1995: 10). In spite of some precautions of understanding concerning the recognition of various realities, a degree of confusion reigns and nevertheless persists in the use of these numerous terms.

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19 In its report in several instalments on the issue of violence the article in the Monde, of the 29 January 1999, titled: ‘La peur qui inquiète les élus’ (The fear which worries MP’s).  
20 Cf. the remarks of Jean-Pierre Chevènement in particular end of 1998-beginning 1999 concerning the figures for delinquency and referring to ‘sauvageons’.  
21 In the same article as the one quoted above, the mayor of Valréas (Vaucluse) Thierry Mariani, states: ‘In their speech the path is clear. People being to speak of the car-radio they had stolen, then of the Arabs who are too numerous and it finishes by 30% voting for the Front National’. He went on: ‘In the evening of Christmas Day, five young Maghrébins had fun blocking the path which leads to the church, troubling the people who were going to midnight mass. For the whole of the following week, in the town centre they talked of nothing else, complaining: the Arabs are preventing us from going to church’.
How are the ‘new adepts of the Jihad’ (ibid.: 10) presented? Radical Islam is presented as a ‘misguided reaction’ to an unpopular religion, which is poorly represented and often abandoned to foreign interests. The poor knowledge of the Koran, coupled with the resentment or bitterness based on the opportunities which are refused to them everywhere else, characterise the representations of these young people. The authors differentiate this phenomenon from communitarian demands and politicisation by insisting on its minority dimension (‘minority in the minority’, ibid.: 11). The discussions concerning the manifestations of radical Islam bear mainly on the extent of the movement, the vision of Islam and the nature of the demands which are structured by all sorts of factors such as the political situation in Algeria, the social-economic situation in France, actual experience in the suburbs, a past of delinquency and individual failures.

Membership of, or sympathy for, the Algerian FIS (Islamic Salvation Front) which structures a number of the associations in deprived areas (‘les quartiers’), posed questions concerning the nature of the associative activities and the support for, as also their openness to, the extreme forms of violence which struck Algeria at the time and, to which, several French citizens fell victim, as we recalled above.

The police and the Intelligence Services heightened their attention to two Islamist minorities: the extension in France of the networks of the Turkish Islamic Centre in Cologne and the growing activism associated with the Algerian FIS. The authorities were more concerned by the latter. The media reported an increase in the number of meetings of sympathisers and specialised structures gathering different kind of profiles: Tunisian and Moroccan sympathisers as well as young ‘beurs’. Amongst these structures the association Fraternité Algérienne en France, of which Djaffar al-Houari and Moussa Kraouche were two militant public figures, was presented as particularly active.

Amongst the different strands of Algerian Islamism, the French counter-Intelligence services mentioned the Djiaz’aristes like Djaâffar El-Houari who, in December 1990 created the FAF (Fraternité algérienne en France) an organisation linked with moderates in the FIS like Rabah Kébir and the Salafists, more international in tendency, such as Kameredine Kherbane, a former MIG pilot, whose movements in the Near East the French Intelligence services followed closely (Aggoun and Rivoire, 2005: 333). In the first instance, the FAF’s mission was one of political communication, recruitment and fundraising. The action carried out by the FAF was a relatively hybrid mix, somewhere between an action of support to the Algerian FIS, the campaign against delinquency and substance abuse at local level and the organisation of leisure activities, and educational support.

These intertwined types of action ensured the success of associations, headed by local personalities, whose discourse was based to a large extent on the feeling of ethnic and social exclusion of the second generation, and tended to produce a potential large spectrum of radical Islam. The range of the phenomenon is extremely broad. Pujadas and Salam (1995: 73) emphasise the difference between the profiles of these actors and radical Islam but do indicate that ‘the frontiers are distinct’.

In July 2000, the resolution of the Kraouche affair, which was something of a scandal, pointed to the tensions around the issues of identification or detection of radical Islam. The ruling to dismiss proceedings delivered by the judge Roger Le Loire in Paris, in favour of Moussa Kraouche confirms that the Islamist militant arrested on 9 November 1993, and imprisoned for one month, was apparently arrested on the basis of an error by the services of the police. The Kraouche case dates back to the beginnings of the campaign against radical Islam in France. At the end of 1993, while the GIA (Groupe islamique Armé) were stepping up the exactions against French citizens, Charles Pasqua, the Minister of the Interior at the time,

22 The term ‘Djihad’, also present in the title of the book La tentation du Djihad. L’islam radical en France (The temptation of jihad. Radical Islam in France) is rarely used during the 1990s.
launched the operation, *Chrysanthème*24. The intention was to break up the networks of support in France for the rebels in Algeria. Almost one hundred targets were defined, including Moussa Kraouche who was subjected to custody following a search which found photocopied documents placed in sealed bag n°40: the list included – a claim by the GIA of responsibility for the assassination of two French geometers, the letter from an Islamist leader to a French woman whose husband had been kidnapped, and a communiqué from the Supreme Council of the Islamic Armed forces. When he was questioned, Kraouche apparently explained in his panic that he had received these documents by fax. The police officer in charge of questioning him then realised that these documents were identical with those in the file sent to the police officers mobilised for the operation. One of them was later to have reported that he had lost this file. Despite these disturbing elements, Kraouche was examined and imprisoned by the judge. In January 1994, the Minister for the Interior, Charles Pasqua made public a report from the National Police General Inspectorate which recognised that the documents seized in Kraouche’s home did not belong to him and that there had been some ‘confusion during the sealing of the records’. A version which was then confirmed by the admission that the police documents were confused with those found in Kraouche’s home. There was an error and there was no stitch-up (ibid.).

The ideological question within the meaning of Jihadism seems to remain marginal. According to Caillet and Puchot (2017), the Jihadi ideology is not the matrix of the radicalisation of young people in France at this point in time, even if these two authors clearly defend the imperative of starting with an ideology-based approach of radical Islam. In turn, Khosrokhavar (1997: 245) specifies that there is no clear ideological corpus with which it is possible to link radical Islam:

> In France, theologically speaking, the intellectual field of radical Islamism is extremely unsophisticated because the religiosity of the radicalised youth is primarily associated with a profound social and mental malaise. (They would not understand) any legitimation of a religious nature involving scholarly demonstrations of the *fiqh* (Muslim canonical law) or of the *kalam* (Muslim theology) with which traditional Islam is amply provided.

In pioneering manner, he sets out a model of the rationales which accompany adhesion to radical Islamism of which the matrix resides in the transnational organisation, the accumulation of the frustrations caused by racial discrimination and a revolt related to the position on the international political scene.

We can see that sensitivity to radical Islam is based on multiple factors with however a special interest in the international dimension which, from the outset, poses the question of the differences in scale of meanings within which the notion of radical Islam circulates and on the importance of the feelings of injustice. This model opens a space for reflection which includes spatial questions of territory and mobility, forms of belongings and imaginary which are all dimensions long neglected given the centrality of the theme of integration and the absence of interest for the North South flows of migration (Fabbiano, Peraldi, Poli and Terrazzoni, 2018).

### 2.3.3 The first major trials

The 1990s were the scene of several trials which were to give a new visibility to radical Islam. After the series of attacks in 1993 (in Morocco) and in 1995 (in France), the courts were to provide material for the media coverage of various affairs. The common ground was that all the incidents took place in countries in the Maghreb (Algeria and Morocco in particular); these countries were the main scenes of the action of the French version of radical Islam. France effectively appeared to be a rear-operating base for the relay or coordination of struggles or demands which took place mainly in Algeria, Morocco and to a lesser extent

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in Bosnia. This bilateral dimension – which is nevertheless articulated around a transnational dimension – sometimes creates knots of understanding around diverging interpretations depending on the national location with the possibility of a difference in the judgements (depending on the country). Another common ground of these trials is the ‘new’ visibility of networks mediating individuals of different nationalities and social background. This first series of trials took place before that of the Koussa-Kelkal group, for the attacks which took place in France in 1995.

These terrorism cases also revealed networks and rationales which brought together people from different walks of life; those involved in the fight against delinquency and drugs, prison visitors, organisations for leisure activities, educational support and sometimes teachers of Arabic. They all accused the associations linked to Islam but also the Imams. ‘Preaching in Prisons’ (Pujadas and Aslam, 1995: 73) thus refers to the rationale of recruiting youths with a past of delinquency, from the deprived suburbs, who are presented as easy prey. The viewpoint adopted by the two authors on the basis of an account by a youth from the deprived suburbs whom they interviewed, nevertheless reveals the absence of nuance which predominates on the issue.

In the prison yard there were several Muslims including some (white) French people and some Blacks, he said. So he also asked to see the Imam. But he could only meet him in the visiting room. However, Bois d’Arcy did have a room reserved for prayers, as all prisons do. ‘We saw the Rabbi and the priest coming in, that’s all. The Imam... it was as if he was on the banned list’ he complained. Hacène is not an isolated case (…) ‘They (the Imams) don’t judge you’, explained Hacène. ‘On the contrary, they tend to explain to you why you are there, that Western society turns you away from Islam, that it cheats you, despises you and perverts your natural vocation to be a good Muslim’ (Pujadas and Aslam, 1995: 74).

They conclude with a footnote ‘Report remitted to the Elysée25. They draw attention to the success of the Islamist militants in prisons, to the interest of the youth interviewed in Islam and his request to meet an Imam. This perspective illustrates, in particular, the lack of knowledge, which was very considerable at the time, about Islam in France, about the range of association involvement and the variety of relationships to Islam in prison over and above problematic cases or polemical subjects. The starting point is radicalisation to think about other aspects and not the reverse.

In all cases, the book insists on the role of the prisons in adherence to radical Islam, referring in turn to the visits of the Tablighs and the people from the association sector involved in affairs of justice, ‘Similarly in the Parisian region it is in the prisons of Fleury Merogis, Bois d’Arcy or Fresnes that in the years 1989-1990 the radical movements in Nanterre went to recruit (Ibid.: 75).

‘A network of Islamists’

The first trial took place from 9 - 13 December, 1996; it assembled a network of 35 Islamists’ around the charismatic figure of a Moroccan Abdelilah Ziyad, the presumed leader of this network. During the trial, the latter admitted having ordered youths from Paris, La Courneuve and Orléans to convey arms to Morocco on six occasions between 1992 and 1993. He, along with his ‘brother’ ‘Said’, was also the head of networks set up in France ‘to destabilise Morocco’ with the aim of making it into ‘an Islamist republic and of ending the injustice of the regime of Hassan II’ (Simonnot, 1996).

This affair revealed a situation which, to say the least, was complex and which refers on one hand to the disjunction between the nationality of the defendants and the national space of the law courts in which they were being judged, and on the other, to the one-sided nature of the judgement in Paris denounced from the beginning of the trial by the lawyers. Since January 1995 three young men, two of whom were

25 French Presidency.
French, imprisoned in the prison of Rabat, had been condemned to death and three others to life imprisonment for attacks in Morocco, one of which had caused the death of two Spanish tourists in Marrakech. However, it is in this same affair that the person alleged to have ordered these crimes, Ziyad, and one of the youths who had participated in the attack, Tarek Fallah, both of whom had been extradited from Germany, were being judged in Paris.

These trials were to reveal to the general public for the first time the phenomenon of the recruiting of young descendants of North African immigrant parents in the deprived French suburbs. The attack in Marrakech (the only one to be carried out among other intended terrorist acts in several towns in Morocco) put two young men from the Courneuve, with so-called ‘ordinary’ trajectories front stage. The protagonists of the attack on 24 August 1994 in Marrakech were three young French citizens of Algerian and Moroccan origin who had grown up on the housing estate the ‘Cité des 4000’ in La Courneuve (Seine-Saint-Denis). The inquiry carried out by the Moroccan authorities revealed the existence of four groups of seven people who were to commit attacks on the same day in Tangier, Fez and Casablanca.

Almost two years earlier on 10 January 1995, six accused youths from France and eleven of their local accomplices appeared before the Criminal Court in Fez (Morocco). These seven youths were accused of having formed a criminal association with the intention of committing several attacks aimed at destabilising the Moroccan government. These were Stéphane Aït Idir, 22 years, Rédouane Hamadi, 23 years, Kamel Benachka, 26 years, Abdesslam Guerrouaz, 25 years, Moustafa Meziane, 36 years, Abderrahmane Boujedli, 24 years, and Hamel Merzoug, 28 years. We note that these youths came from several cités (housing estates), la Goutte d’or in Paris, the Argonne in Orléans, the 4000 in La Courneuve, and from other towns including Besançon, Carpentras and Avignon.

From Morocco to France, the variety of profiles of the accused brought to mind the nebulous nature of radical Islam and in all cases attracted attention to its transnational dimension: the trajectories of the French youth from the deprived suburbs, Moroccan or Algerian in origin, their assumed recent involvement in extreme religious violence; the birth of a Franco-Maghrebin Islamist network which launched its militants, who were trained in Pakistan, in the attack on Morocco, and entrusted others with missions in Bosnia and Algeria. The hypothesis of potential links between this network and the Algerian military security forces was implicit in the judicial relations between France and Morocco, even if this version of the affair was not, in the end, included in the indictment in Morocco which simply referred to ‘an Islamist network sponsored from abroad’ (Millet, 1995). As one of the lawyers of the defendants imprisoned in Morocco (Merzoug Hamel) reminds us:

In this matter there is an agreement between Morocco and France for the management of the Islamist question. The two countries have agreed that they would each judge their own suspects and those found guilty. Those who were arrested in Morocco would be judged in Morocco and France would not interfere. Those who were arrested in France would be judged in France and ‘Morocco would not interfere’ (de La Baume and Erhel, 1997: 27).

The trial which opened on 10 January 1995 in Fès was soon suspended, in order to leave Judge Bruguière, in charge of the appraisal of the file for the French side, the possibility of implementing his rogatory commission and meeting the accused. For their part, the lawyers of the accused in France denounced the conditions of the investigation (no access to the files, no knowledge of the appraisals of the evidence and the charges made by the Moroccan police and the court) and demand the hearing of Ziyad and Falah, held at the time in Germany where they had been arrested a little earlier.

At the same time, in France arrests for ‘criminal conspiracy in connection with a terrorist enterprise’ continued. This very wide-ranging charge aimed to break up the networks – proceedings were finally brought against thirty-seven people in France – of support to terrorists. Logistical support (having false papers or material to make them, the possession of cars which had been used to transport weapons, the
'loan' of a passport to cover the flight of the leaders) was added to the active participation charge (armed robbery, the possession of arms, the transport of arms). The trial also showed that the majority had gone to Pakistan and Afghanistan to be trained in armed combat. Some had fought in Bosnia. Others had made do with courses in the south of France or in the forest in Orléans: endurance, training in clandestinity, sometimes in shooting (Ibid.: 10-1).

The hearing of Ziyad was an opportunity to review his involvement and his central role in the recruiting of French youths. It revealed that he began to frequent the MJIM (Movement of young Moroccan Islamists) which was in opposition to the regime from the age of eighteen (Millet, 1995).

In 1985, Ziyad and Said were sentenced in Morocco to life imprisonment for having imported arms from Algeria into Morocco. But they had fled to France several years ago (in 1982) where Ziyad began to construct several networks in the name of the MJIM. Expelled from France in 1984, he left for Libya, then to Algeria in 1985. He received an Algerian passport and returned to France in 1987 where he obtained a residence permit as a student in IT (information technology) on the basis of his Algerian papers. He ran a bookshop at Porte de Clignancourt in Paris, then gradually established his networks: in the Goutte d’Or in Paris and in La Courneuve (Seine-Saint-Denis) and also in Orléans (Loiret) with his ‘brother in Islam’, Mohamed Zinedine, known as Said, the other ‘Emir’, was still on the run at the time of the trial. Ziyad’s stay in Algeria was to back up the hypothesis of his manipulation by the Algerian services, defended in particular by the Moroccan government after the attacks in Marrakech (1994) (Millet, 1995). This was not taken up in Ziyad’s investigation file in France, however this hypothesis was mentioned by one of the witnesses for the defence.

This is not the place to provide a fresh analysis of the veracity of these facts (Rivoire, 2008) but to resituate the context in which the trial occurred. During the summer of 1995, a series of bomb attacks took place in Paris with ten dead and almost two hundred wounded. In addition to the youths who perpetrated the attacks, who grew up in the deprived French suburbs (the best known being Khaled Kelkal), there were other Islamists, often older, who came from Algeria. They both claimed to belong to the GIA (Groupe Islamique Armé), led at the time by Djamel Zitouni, and to have contributed to the organisation of these attacks, along with potential secret service agents from the Algerian army (the DRS, Department of Intelligence and security, ex-army security).

Someone named Ali Touchent was identified by the French secret services as being the main instigator of the attacks in Paris in 1995. The fact that he was then the only Islamist militant to have escaped the raid by the French (in 1995 in L’Hay-les-Roses) and Belgian police was to reinforce the suspicion concerning the nature of Touchent’s belonging to the GIA. In fact, several French sources suspected the Algerian services, the Département Renseignement Sécurité) to have organised the secret escape of Ali Touchent from the UK at the beginning of 1996. Despite the fact that his photo had been widely circulated he was living and moving around peacefully in Algiers in the building of the CHN (ex-Compagnies nationales de sécurité, which corresponds to the CRS in France), near the Châteauneuf barracks, which is a high security area. Given the impossibility of clarifying the situation and of identifying those who ordered the attacks, these were officially attributed to Djamel Zitouni (the leader of the GIA). For its part, after this dramatic campaign of attacks, the French government distanced itself from the Algerian regime:

For the regime in Algiers, having decided to remain in power, the 1995 attacks were therefore a highly beneficial operation, since they contributed to permanently discrediting the Algerian Islamists. Hence the question: Was Zitouni, who was reputed to direct the GIA in 1995, the real person responsible for the attacks, or was he manipulated by the DRS, as several former officers from this service assert? According to their evidence, the GIA was infiltrated by the DRS as from 1993, then encouraged to become radicalised to the point of becoming, under the command of Djamel Zitouni, a counter-revolutionary movement indirectly serving the interests of the army (Rivoire, 2008: 364).
The portrait which the trial reveals of the accused, highlights the encounter between the feeling of humiliation and injustice of the young descendants of North-African immigrants and the politico-religious perspective of the new arrivals from Morocco and Algeria, who mostly had educational qualifications, against a background of a network of shared knowledge mainly shaped by the mosques (and in certain cases by friendships or family relations). The evidence from the suspects at the trial in Paris sheds light on numerous forms of mobility – in particular in the direction of the Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria, Libya), Afghanistan and Pakistan. This undoubtedly constitutes the dimension usually shared by most of the members of the group. In the course of the explanations given in court, the political and religious convictions are extremely variable. We note the gap between Mohammed El Kantache (Orléans), who speaks of the Jihad as a physical and pecuniary effort and justifies his participation in the transport of weapons as being ‘to change things in Morocco’ (de La Baume and Erhel, 1997:44). Rachid Falah (also from Orléans), who presented the Jihad as ‘armed humanitarianism’ (ibid.: 52), Salah Kabene (from La Courneuve), who associated his trip to Pakistan to the need ‘to take a holiday’ and the promise of ‘finding a house there [in Pakistan]’, or ‘to go somewhere on holiday (Ibid.: p.70), and Ben Haddou, who admitted his fascination for the personality of Ziyad.

The trial showed that radical Islam in France appeared to be established around a pact of actions based on feelings of injustice, synchronous but varied, with priority to building on sometimes a political dimension (with a programme of overthrow of the regime, similar to the FIS and the GIA in Algeria), sometimes social when confronted with the socio-economic conditions in the areas of exclusion in the deprived suburbs, or again religious. In all cases, the representation of a homogeneous social environment rapidly disappeared. Radical Islam is composed of an inextricable tangle of registers of justification and action.

In this legal case, the political cause (with respect to the situations in Morocco and Algeria or in Bosnia) was mixed with questions of racism and injustice experienced in France and was to predominate in the arguments presented by the defence. In all cases the state appeared in the forefront. The lawyers for the defence referred to the difficult relations between France and the Algerian government, the unconditional support of France for the king in Morocco, or again the involvement of the Algerian government in certain terrorist networks. During these years, similar discussions were going on in Algeria. Religion seemed to be fairly subaltern to the issue.

Maître Pascal Lavisse, a member of the bar in Orléans, the lawyer for the brothers El Khantache and El Mostapha Ben Haddou, criticised the policy in France regarding the development of a religious presence in working class areas:

I would now like to explain to you why they are here, how they came to be here, and what their future will be. At the outset, none of them was particularly religious. Nobody was particularly hostile to Morocco. They went to Morocco on holiday – they went there to see their families (...). How did these individuals end up where they are? At the time, we were happy that mosques were opening in France, with Imams officiating. Because it was a way of ending violence and drugs in the suburbs. Now we are reaping what we sowed. It seems that they are terrorists.26

Drawing on a model of radical Islam from the 1980s, this legal case stressed the idea that violence was exhorted by a foreign country (mainly Algeria) which had transited through radical Islam. However, some of the lawyers and witnesses for the defence, seemed to challenge the role of the French state in this.

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26 Ibid.: 131.
Lucile Provost-Schmid, a writer and former diplomat at the French Embassy in Algiers from 1992 to 1994, stood as a witness in this trial for the defence of Tarak Falah. She was in post at the French Embassy in Algiers and had just published a book (Schmid, 1996) on the situation in Algeria in the 1990s:

I observe that the export of violence objectively suits the Algerian government, because it makes the conflict in Algeria appear to be a conflict between barbarians and a stable government which is a pole for structuration and stability of the situation in Algeria.\(^{27}\)

The symmetry between the French and Algerian situations is striking from the idea of a dynamic of Islamisation or re-Islamisation (which we highlighted in part 2.3.1) from the conflicts between dealers, rackets of local halal merchants, purchases of arms, or again the system of points (compensation for forbidden acts such as drinking alcohol – by the payment of large sums of money) and the constitution of networks. In any case, it can be assumed that the representations of radical Islam in the 1990s added a new layer of complexity and taboo (after colonisation and immigration) within the relationships between both countries.

*The Chalabi affair: a concentric perspective of Islam radical*

For two months from 1st September 1998, one hundred and thirty-eight presumed Islamists, arrested in 1994 and 1995, appeared in court charged with ‘criminal association in relation to a terrorist undertaking’. It was considered to be a ‘marathon trial’ (with no less than 100 volumes and thousands of call marks), ‘an extraordinary trial’ and one which was also criticised for the grouping together of very different defendants whose varying degrees of involvement gave rise to numerous discussions. Its exceptional nature, over and above the impressive number of accused (of whom twenty-seven appeared as prisoners) was also due to the venue where it took place. The judicial authorities had requisitioned a gymnasium (from the École nationale de l’administration pénitentiaire) as a courtroom. These 138 detainees were suspected, to varying degrees, of having provided logistical support to the Algerian maquis of the GIA (Groupe Islamique Armé). The dismantling of the Chalabi network dates from the beginning of 1994. In the context of an investigation into drug trafficking, the investigators were interested in an association; the Association for the Education of Muslims in France (AEMF) established in Orly and directed by Mohamed and Brahim Chalabi, two brothers, well known in the world of organised crime. The AEMF was provided a lead for the investigators who gradually discovered the existence of a genuine structured network with several cells. The first, centred around the Chalabi brothers, was responsible for the recruitment of young people who were encouraged to join the ranks of the Algerian maquis and were trained in armed combat. Another leading activity of this cell was the supplying of arms. On 17 October 1994, a legal investigation was opened for ‘criminal association in relation to a terrorist undertaking’. A few weeks later, a wide-ranging operation enabled the capture of an impressive arsenal.

The second structure, directed by Mourad Tacine, a thirty-eight years old Algerian, specialised in the production and provision of false administrative documents. On 8 November 1994, in the context of a rogatory commission, eighty-five people were arrested during a large-scale raid in Paris and in the suburbs and in several provincial towns. During a search in a building in Paris in the 10th arrondissement, the investigators discovered a clandestine workshop specialised in the production of false identity papers.

It was not until the month of June 1995 that the investigators identified the third branch of the network, which specialised in purchasing and in seeking sources of financing to send the material to Algeria. Some months later, the investigators discovered the person in charge: Mohammed Kerrouche. A member of the GIA, the latter appeared to be the ‘brain’ behind the operations and, consequently, the central figure in this trial, without however being present.

\(^{27}\) La Baume and Erhel, op.cit.: 1 02-3.
Of the 138 arrests linked to this affair, the judgement handed down gave rise to 51 acquittals, to which a further 4 were added after the appeal, with over 2 million francs awarded in reparations on 29 March 2000.

The Kelkal affair / The group of Chasse-sur-Rhône

Khaled Kelkal was the first radical Islamist to gain media attention, as a result of his identification by the police in the context of the search for suspects after the attacks in the summer of 1995. His fingerprints were found on 26 August 1995 on a gas bottle placed on the high-speed TGV Lyon-Paris train. By chance, a German sociologist, Dietmach Loch had interviewed him at length in 1992, a few years previous to his decision to act. This interview, which is extremely informative, was to have particular importance, as Kelkal was killed by the police during his arrest. He has become a symbolic figure; one might describe him as a pioneer in the imaginary world of French radical Islam. The trajectory of Kelkal brings us up against a set of factors which nevertheless demonstrate the strength of a feeling of humiliation, injustice and, in a way, despair. Moreover, it was this dimension which was the most prominent in the analysis of radical Islam in this second half of the 1990s. But the more sensitive mechanism which operated between this dimension of humiliation and injustice, and the move to violence has not as yet been elucidated; this perhaps can only be done by examining in depth the trajectories, obviously complex, of each actor. Some analysts consider that religion plays the role of an operating agent of sorts, which aggregated the other factors.

At the time of Kelkal’s interview with Dietmach Loch, it was predominantly the interruption to his schooling, his entry into the world of delinquency and the resultant experience of prison which characterised the profile of this young man. On 5 July 1991, having finally stopped his schooling just before the ‘bac’ (school leaving examination), he was sentenced to three years in prison, a sentence which was extended to four years after the appeal. Khaled Kelkal explained to Dietmar Loch that this loss of liberty was to be of a rather specific nature as a result of the relationship which he formed with his co-detainee, with whom he declared having learnt Arabic, his religion, Islam etc.

Other extracts from the interview shed light on the growing importance of religion for Kelkal but do not reveal any Jihadi intention:

Frankly? It’s very important in life. Even now, I’m thinking hard. I’m saying to myself, ‘I must do my religion. I must pray’. Every three or four days, we rent a cassette with the famous scholars of Islam, with those from the West, where they show the words of the Koran. One of the biggest professors of astronomy in Japan has certified that the Koran is the voice of God. The foremost scholar in the Nasa has also certified this. What is said there cannot be human, it can only be divine. After that it cannot be denied. When the most important scholars say something it can no longer be denied. This is very important for me. When I was in secondary school, I was already saying my prayers. I felt really happy. I had no vices. (I was) Well. At the level of God, at the level of people. (I was) Well. We were even first in the class, saying our prayers and so on. The day I stopped saying my prayers was the day when all this confusion started. I stopped observing Ramadan, saying the prayers and where did I find myself? In a hole – in prison. But even in prison I didn’t give up. Before, I didn’t know how to read and write Arabic. When I entered prison, I said to myself: ‘I mustn’t waste my time’. There was a Muslim brother with us. I said, ‘I’ve got to learn Arabic’ I learnt Arabic. In one week I knew how to read. Yes, it was fast. It’s because I like it. I learn super-fast. From that

28 On 25 July a gas bottle filled with screws exploded at the RER underground station, St Michel, in Paris, killing 8 people and wounding 119. On 17 August a similar type of device was hidden in a garbage bag near the Arc de Triomphe, wounding 17 people, of whom 3 seriously.

29 Interview conducted on 3 October 1992 and published as transcribed by the researcher on 7 October 1995.
point on, I went back to religion. I’m going to go to the mosque every Friday. When I look at the cassettes, when the scholars speak, you can’t deny it. There is a Creator. It’s not a question of chance. Everything is in its right place. Everything has a meaning. I can’t deny it.

Retrospectively, religion seems to have found a relatively unstable place in Kelkal’s trajectory. One of his uncles, Ahmed Nefoussi, who long suffered from having been accused of radicalising him, when interviewed by two journalists from *Le Monde* (Leclaire and Mouats, 2015) said:

In Mostganem I never saw Khaled praying and he did not attend the Mosque. When he was not at the beach with his cousins, he used to sit on the pavement opposite his grandparents’ house for hours. He was a nice boy but he didn’t speak much.

He draws a more complex portrait of Khaled serious, rather withdrawn and taciturn. We also learn in this article that Khaled Kelkal’s grandfather had been shot on 6 February 1962 by a French soldier in front of a café in Tigditt (the main working-class area in Mostaganem, Algeria). Kelkal’s uncle stressed:

He was shot in the heart. For no reason at all. Thirty years later it’s his grand-son, Khaled, who is killed by a gendarme. His death proves that the French still hate Algerians.

What is striking in the different perspectives or analyses of Kelkal’s trajectory, is the permanence of a feeling of injustice which designates, in particular, the institutions – schools, police, justice – in their manner of ‘dealing with the Arabs’, an expression a less popular today than in the 1990s.

### 2.3.4 Conclusion

At the end of the 1990s, Khosrokhavar (1997) painted a very clear picture of the forms of religiousness amongst young French Muslims. While recalling the minority nature from a statistical point of view of the progression of Islam in the deprived suburbs, he categorises the various rationales of appropriation of Islam of which the majority refer to the individual assumption of the self or withdrawal into a closed group. According to him, this Islam is a prevention against violence and enables the avoidance of a confrontation with society which contrasts with a ‘very marginal form which is the exacerbation of violence and its legitimisation by the sacred, which is radical Islamism’ (Khosrokhavar, 1997: 220).

The model of radical Islam which he defines in pioneering manner, focuses on the conjunction of factors – social exclusion, unstable family, the presence of Islamist preachers, racist humiliation – which gives a large share to rancour, and feelings of injustice and humiliation. Khosrokhavar stresses here the distinction which has to be made between the rational of Islamist terrorist action and the Islamist radical sensitivity, the meeting of which remains exceptional. We will return in Section 4.1 to the intertwining of factors which give major importance to the feelings of humiliation and injustice.

We also observe, through the profiles of the 1990s, to what extent mobility towards situations of conflict, and more particularly how contact with violence gives a competence, a know-how which seems to take the dimension of a rite of passage or of initiation, even if the violent action does not appear to be totally controlled.

The different cases that we mentioned above mark a turning point concerning the role of France in radical Islam and reveal a kaleidoscopic vision of the phenomenon through the emergence of the subjectivity of the individuals involved in terrorism, either directly or indirectly. This model of radical Islam is exclusively masculine, with an extensive presence in working class areas of the towns in the Parisian region, but also in smaller towns in France in both urban and rural settings. In the main, it extends over a geographic and ideologico-political arena encompassing France and Algeria. The phenomenon transits through various configurations with a mix of religion, politics, violence and a feeling of injustice.

The models of radical Islam which took shape in France in the 1990s resonate with current events in Algeria. The image transferred seems all the more exact as the violence associated with Islam in France is
conceived of as a product for export. The discourse of the actors, or at least what one wishes to hear of it during this period, was tinged with a political dimension, associated with strong resentment usually accompanied by failure at school, social drop-out, petty delinquency or organised crime, but not only this. Prison began to appear as a central space, a *milieu*, for the diffusion and production of radical Islam. The interest in religion was secondary and was conceived in quite varied ways within the groups or networks exposed by the media, in the course of the terrorist events that have affected France.

The 1990s witnessed the emergence and gradual incarnation of the radical actor through a complex interplay of scales. Radical Islam was not only considered from the angle of an external threat from a foreign country but also as an internal threat from the actors. Although they were perceived as being influenced by the international political scene and involved in transnational networks, these individuals were French and involved in terrorist actions organised from France and on French soil. The media coverage of the trajectories of these individuals suggested a number of factors intersected in their radicalisation process – these included social inequality and racism but the adherence to a radical ideology, in particular that promoted by the Algerian Groupe Islamique Arme (GIA) remained viewed as the key factor. Alongside of these cases associated to the issue of terrorism, we also witnessed a growing tension around the debate on integration in the light of an overall suspicion of Islam.

2.4 After 09-11

After 11 September 2001, public discussion focused on the challenge of international terrorism. One of the main issues was to define the nature and the extent of the threat it represented to Western society, to specify the values which it endangered and to justify the policies to be implemented to defend them. In other terms, in the disorder created by the attacks, the issue was one of recalling the foundations, real or imaginary, of the former order, and of redefining the contours of a new political order. The declarations of numerous politicians, security professionals and intellectuals created a platform for public communication which, in its desire to interpret past events and future decisions in a meaningful way, proposed schemas for the understanding of the new social reality.

The Muslim issue, which had to some extent calmed down after the Kelkal affair and the end of the so-called ‘Islamist’ attacks, once again became front-page news in the public sphere; this was based on one hand, around a dynamics of wholesale suspicion which went from communitarianism to terrorism and, on the other, around Islamophobia and practices of discrimination on the basis of religious affiliation. At the same time, the estimates of the size of the Muslim population in France and the fluctuations in the very different estimates (which ranged from 2 million to 6 million people) attracted increasing attention. The first opinion polls (including those of the CNCDH) on ‘being Muslim’, on the portrayal of Muslims, on

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30 In 2000, the Haut Conseil à l’Intégration’s report was devoted to the theme of ‘L’Islam dans la République’ (‘Islam in the Republic’). In the wake of its line of argument which accompanied the institutionalisation of the campaign against ethno-racial discrimination in this afore-mentioned period, we witness a relative criticism of the approach by integration: ‘Our sole desire is that our National Education system, at all levels, endeavour to familiarise, in the true meaning of the word, our compatriots with Islam to ensure that it appears as an asset rather than a threat. Finally, we may perhaps also have to revise our conception of equality to ensure that it is capable of responding to the requirements of a population which is less homogenous than formerly. Integrating Islam in the Republic would materially give Muslims every opportunity of promotion within French society. Accession to citizenship would be merely an illusion if it did not afford access to the full enjoyment of cultural, social and economic integration: this is a question of equity and dignity’ (HCI, 2000: 8). The report concludes: ‘We have a situation hitherto unknown in which it is no longer a question of integrating minorities of foreign origin but individuals whose religion is frequently the most important indication of their community affiliation, it is the duty of the Republican school to ensure that Islam is not a obstacle but an opportunity for the integration of young Muslims’ (HCI, 2000: 80).
Muslims and citizenship, as well as the emergence of issues associated with religious discrimination, all date from the early 2000s.

‘Communautarisme’ is a neologism which appeared in the French language about 30 years ago. It is part of the language of political discourse and catalyses a whole variety of more or less implicit characteristics which are rarely related to actual facts (Dhume, 2007). The French term thus has nothing to do with ‘communitarianism’ which, in the United States, designates a movement of thought opposing the individualism of society and advocating the reconstitution of communities, the assertion of collective identities, along with the re-creation of social bonds within these communities of affinities. In France, the word ‘communautarisme’ refers to a rationale of difference which excludes and the primacy granted to community rules as opposed to the laws of the Republic thus threatening national cohesion and public security. It means that there is a desire to claim privileges, or special rights in public space simply on the basis of belonging to a specific community.

The main events, which punctuated the public sphere and discussion from the early 2000s, reveal at least two phenomena: on one hand, the feminisation of the Muslim question along with the emergence of the Muslim woman as a central theme, both for the majority society and for the Muslim minority; on the other hand, the engagement of Islam in the public sphere and tensions with national identity.

Henceforth, Islam is presented as one of, if not the most important examples of ‘communitarianism’ to traverse and threaten national cohesion and public order in French society.

It is against this background that the analyses of Islam in France developed, focusing on the increasing appeal of Islam for a section of French youth, the need for better information about the different variants of Islam in France (Hajji and Marteau, 2005), and communitarianism. These are the questions which were to contribute to the image constructed of radical Islam in France.

Moreover, the extent of the theme of communitarianism in the discourse during the beginning of 2000s, considerably reduced the reality of Islam in France. This deviation is particularly problematic as it is precisely on the grounds of racism that communitarianism thrives. Muslim communities tend indeed to be offensive and focus in on themselves in the context of experience of racism.

In the wake of the reinforcement of the legislative corpus of the anti-discrimination law in France, the beginning of the 2000s marked a new interest in discrimination targeting Muslims on religious grounds (Open Society Institute, 2002).

In 2003, the Commission for consideration of the principle of secularism in the Republic had already insisted on the need to avoid any confusion between the existence of a community and communitarianism, equally culture should not be confused with cult (worship). The Commission reminded those concerned that the Republic does not legitimate the existence of communities but that it can take into consideration cultural associations which play a decisive role in encouraging secularism.

In France, there is little space to consider these differences between communities and communitarianism. French society fears the existence of communities in which there is a systematic tendency to see ‘communautarisme’, to the extent that the concepts are regularly confused in political discussion, whether this amalgam be voluntary or not. The ambivalences and dilemmas specific to belonging to an identity are simply dismissed.

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31 The two authors list the Atheists, the Malikis, the Tablighis (distinguished from the ‘Islamists’. They are described as neo-communitarians whose ideological foundation is a ‘non-fundamentalist’ form of fundamentalism which does not emphasise the break with society), and the Salafists who are associated with radical and sectarian practices. Amongst these it is important to distinguish the Cheikhists and the Jihadis (who belong to a warrior-type of Salafism), the Integrationists, and finally the Converts and the Sufis.
Several discussions centred on Islam punctuate the first decade of the years 2000 and bring in their wake the elements of controversy specific to the representations of this religion in France. While we do not wish to resort to an analysis mobilising ‘science studies’ to envisage these different instances of disagreement from the viewpoint of controversy (Lemieux, 2007), we do propose to detail the main principles in order to underline the permanence of a vision of Islam as a problem in France.

2.4.1 Radical Islam through the Anti-Semitic violence in France

From the end of the year 2000, France was the scene of a rise in anti-Semitic violence, threats and insults, quite unprecedented since the end of World War Two.

These renewed tensions were in part due to the general climate, to the increase in the number of places whence various expressions of contemporary anti-Semitism seem to appear. These included in particular working-class suburbs and schools and, in all instances, social environments which do not correspond to the traditional image of anti-Semitism associated with the nationalist extreme right or fundamentalist Catholics. There was also a rise in specific actions which were much more serious, such as attacks, which were usually against individuals, goods belonging to them or Jewish institutions (Wieviorka et al., 2005).

In the re-appearance of the phenomenon many interpretations emerge, as yet not perfectly defined, but which convey the existence of a social danger. The defining features are young males, exclusion and its culturalisation or even ethnicisation. The ‘youths from the suburbs’ are indeed designated as being in the forefront of the phenomenon and, as often in the French context, the discourse deviates from one category to another: ‘youths of immigrant origin’, ‘Arab-Muslim environment’ or again ‘the Muslims’ are thus singled out as the new figures active in anti-Semitic hatred. Numerous observers make a direct link between, the resurgence of the phenomenon on one hand and the population of Maghrebian immigrant origin (and, by elision, Islam) on the other, with a renewed sensitivity for the Palestinian cause.

In academic circles concerned by the possible return of anti-Semitism, one question gradually rose to the fore, that of whether or not the issue was one of a rise in classical anti-Semitism or the emergence of a new form of anti-Jewish hatred. The opposition between Jews and Muslims, between Jews and Arabs or again, between Jews and Black people became the focus of what Taguieff defined as the ‘new Judeophobia’ (Taguieff, 2002). What alarmed many people in civil society and, in the first instance, the Commission Nationale Consultative des Droits de l’Homme (CNCDH), was the correlation between this phenomenon in France and current events at international level. The reports of the CNCDH record, during the first four years of this rise in anti-Semitism, the existence of a close link between the international context, in particular the conflict in the Near East, the return of the Second Intifada, the attack on 11 September and the outbreak of actions and threats targeting Jewish people or properties. The example below shows this correlation was stated as obvious in the foreword to the statistics of the Ministry of the Interior, and quoted in the CNCDH report in 2000:

Furthermore, the outbreak of violent reactions observed in the autumn of 2000 in reaction to the resumption of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict result from an amalgam of motivations in which anti-Semitism is mixed with anti-Zionism, delinquency, even racism and xenophobia for operations brought against members or representations of the Maghrebi community (CNCDH, 2000).

The coincidence between important events in the near-East, which were headline news in the media, and the upsurge in anti-Semitic actions in the 2000-2002 period effectively led to a presumed link between the international context and what was happening in France (Taguieff, 2002; Winock, 2004; Obajtek-Kirkwood, 2004). However, the CNCDH warned against hasty explanations; already in the Report in 2000 we could read:
It seems that an appreciable number of these actions, the majority of which are committed by young delinquents are the work of individuals mainly interested in satisfying their taste for violence (CNCDH, 2000: 25-6).

While some, like Taguieff (2002, 2004) and Trigano (2003) base their remarks on the political and media instrumentalisation of the Israeli-Palestine conflict being at the origin of the demonised figure of ‘Jews-Israelis-Zionists’, the international context cannot suffice to explain the French reality in terms of the rise in violence and anti-Semitic actions. The 2003 report of the CNCDH suggests instead that:

(...) the international context seems also to be often exploited by the perpetrators of actions who are anxious to find political ‘justifications’ for expressions of a violence prompt to seize any ‘opportunity’ for expression (CNCDH, 2003: 51).

Participation in a wide-ranging programme for research on anti-Semitism during these years (Wieviorka et al., 2005), enable us to substantiate here the links between the idea of radical Islam and the ongoing anti-Semitism of the immigrant-origin youths in deprived working-class areas. One of the facets of this research invited us to envisage the phenomenon of anti-Semitism from the educational angle. According to the media in this period, schools constituted a prime area for the observation of the rise of anti-Semitism in French society. The ‘new’ anti-Semitism which was mainly attributed to young people of immigrant origin, put educational institutions in the forefront on one hand, as a space open to these youths who were likely to exhibit their prejudices or their violence and, on the other, as an institution whose vocation it is to combat this type of phenomenon.

The concerns, such as those expressed in several publications\(^\text{32}\), combined two aspects which drew an alarming picture of the situation in state schools. The first focused on the issue of anti-Semitism and stressed the schools’ inability to protect Jewish children from the threat of attack and the difficulties in teaching about the Shoah. The second was part of a more general tendency to denounce the crisis in the Republican institutions, including schools. Over and above the question of international dimensions specifically associated with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or the warlike Islamism of Bin Laden, research carried out at the beginning of the 2000s revealed the difficulties of schools in dealing with current events, even though these, through the media, occupied a central place in the life of the pupils who refer to them constantly.

This research also showed that it was difficult to distinguish the issues, which in the pupils’ imagination, referred exclusively to the Israeli-Palestinian question, from those associated with radical Islam at a global level. Identification with the Palestinian cause is constantly mingled with the understanding and even sympathy for Bin Laden. Symmetrically, particularly on the Jewish side, a similar criticism associates the concerns relative to the action of the Palestinians, and others, which refer to Islamist terrorism. The attacks on 11th September 2001 accentuated this phenomenon, revealing and emphasising considerable changes in state schools in differing social contexts.

The empirical data collected in different schools in the frame of Wieviorka’s research on Anti-Semitism highlight a dynamics of cumulative, or correlative forms of extremism among the youth after the 09/11 attacks:

A teacher of history and geography in a Parisian lycée noted a difference: ‘That year I had been given the senior elite class in the literary stream in the Lycée. Many of the pupils were left-wing who thought they were being very clever and on the following day we discussed it and there, some of them said to me: ‘Yes, we are talking about the Americans because they had thousands of victims, but they have killed hundreds of thousands of victims at global

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\(^{32}\) Brenner (ed.) (2002); Sebban (2004); Goyet (2003).
level’. A somewhat primary anti-Americanism was expressed and I intervened fairly severely (...). There was really an 11 September effect, it’s true. At the beginning of the next school year, I really felt there was something brewing (...) Israeli flags were drawn on a desk with the slogan ‘Long live Israel’; I had never seen that before (...) And I began to hear that there were sometimes fairly violent arguments. In a fourth year class (...) a pupil, whom I had not identified as Jewish since the beginning of the year, but who had made no secret of his Jewish origins so that I understood that he was Jewish. He suddenly said something under his breath which shocked the others and then and there, a very violent argument broke out amongst the Jewish pupils in the class. I understood that, when he was in class, he defended positions like: ‘The day when all the Arabs are in prison or the sea, we’ll have peace and quiet at long last’ and the others were shocked.

What this teacher observed in a ‘good’ Parisian secondary school refers, on one hand to the radicalisation of some Jewish pupils, particularly favourable to the State of Israel (cf. the flags) and on the other, to an extreme left political statement of rather ‘primary’ anti-Americanism. He insisted on the image of a corresponding rise in anti-Semitism: ‘You feel there is a move, from the 11th September to the war in Iraq and the amalgam was made, anti-Americanism, anti-Israelism and an anti-Israelism which was so virulent that it was positively anti-Semitism’. A secondary school pupil from a school in the 18th district in Paris also observed that, after the attacks, some pupils did not observe the minutes of silence requested by the teachers. They said ‘No we won’t observe the homage because it’s their own fault, the Americans deserved it. But all the same, a few people did observe the silence’.

In a very different situation, that of a ‘highly reactive’ deprived suburb, a teacher of history observed a ‘radicalisation of the identity’ of his immigrant-origin pupils: ‘During the first Gulf war I was faced with students who were anxious, frightened that war would break out in France, fearing they would be deported and whose families were stocking up on provisions and had almost emptied the little local supermarket next door. And then the second Gulf war, and even before, the attack on 11 September, brought about an entirely different attitude, different in so far as it was not fear which was manifested but a radicalisation of identity. Obviously that completely changes the situation’. This observation was widely shared; the September 11th attacks have given rise to a strong identification with Bin Laden and the perpetrators of the attacks. A physical education instructor in Sarcelles said: ‘Bin Laden was put on a pedestal. For example, in the notebook for parent/teacher correspondence they decorated photos, put a beard on a pupil’s photo, they spoke about Bin Laden all the time. They insulted the others, they called them Bin Laden but this was really an expression of admiration. It looked a bit like all or nothing’. He insisted on the entertainment aspect of these remarks, which Canal+ (French TV channel) definitely contributed to encouraging: ‘the guignols’ (puppet images of politicians on television) were the source of a certain number of expressions which were heard used indiscriminately for weeks on end but it never went very far. It wasn’t ideological. A supervisor in the same school confirmed: ‘What most of the kids that I heard said, was not their idea. There was the whole lingo of the Guignols (on Canal+) and all that, so for them it was a joke, they were imitating Bin Laden’. But in this context she also observed ‘really an increase in anti-Jewish remarks, even from those who were Caribbean or African or even Catholics. It was like a trend and one had the impression that it was very much in vogue’. In other contexts, the playful or ‘fashionable’ nature was not on the agenda and it was more like a frenzied form of excitement which was rather alarming. The female head of a secondary school (college) said: ‘I was at Bezons in a secondary school and I must say the kids, the population, the Muslim children ran riot at the time. From one day to the next. It took at least 3 months to calm them
These quotations taken from the research on Anti-Semitism at the beginning of the 2000s reveals a range of extremisms amongst some of these young people, from very varied backgrounds, in the form of anti-Semitism in schools which is sustained both by ill-informed identification with the Palestinian cause and a degree of sympathy for anti-American or anti-Western attacks. These expressions related to several forms of radicality are all nurtured by the ethnicisation of French society, with rationales being conveyed by forms of visibility and scandals.

In the first half of the noughties, this research around the resurgence of antisemitism in France highlighted the expression of several forms of extremisms among the French youth. Their common point resides in the meeting of global issues and local problems, specific to French society as a whole, but also internal to the institution of the school. Nevertheless the debate mainly focused on the extremism associated with Islam referring to a whole sector of young people adhering to a form of radical Islam via an identification – both provocative and risky – with terrorism, and in its wake, with the appropriation of political perspectives, associated with current events.

2.4.2 The affair of the ‘veil’ (or ‘headscarf’): the Stasi commission and the 2004 law

From 2003, the ‘debate on Islam’ focused on the Islamic veil, which became a somewhat polemical topic giving rise to heated discussion in the public and academic sphere. In the public sphere, opinion was divided; there were those who defended the law and the campaign against the submission of women, those who preferred to adopt the subjectivation approach and to leave women free to choose whether or not to wear Muslim veils and voices which revealed a renewed understanding of wearing the veil on the basis of a feminist approach. A considerable proportion of the academic literature analysed the conditions of emergence of the discussion and its social significance. At the same time, the subjective trajectories of young Muslim women, who to date had attracted little attention, were considered. In a relatively brief space of time, a law was passed forbidding the wearing of visible symbols of religious affiliation in schools.

The image evoked by the veil – and its various denominations: Islamic headscarf, veil, hijab, chador – gained momentum and became symbolic of Islam, much more significant than the male ‘beard’. It was...

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33 Translator’ note: The Collins English dictionary definition of ‘veil’ is ‘something which covers, conceals or separates’. The term ‘voile’ in French is normally translated as ‘veil’ in English. The ‘veil’ in question was usually a headscarf, which did not cover the face. It is occasionally referred to as ‘the French headscarf ban’ in the foreign press (Source: Wikipedia).

34 On 3rd July 2003: A commission, known as the Stasi Commission from the name of its president, Bernard Stasi (the Ombudsman) was commissioned by the President of the Republic J. Chirac to study the application of the principle of secularity (laïcité), following the very few cases involving young Muslim girls wearing veils/headscarves at school. The work of the Stasi Commission led to numerous discussions. On 11th December 2003, the Stasi Commission submitted its report, confirming the need to stress the importance of secularism in the construction of the nation and suggesting a law against visible religious symbols. On 15th March 2004: A law on the application of the principle of secularity, forbade the wearing of signs or clothing demonstrating a religious affiliation in state schools, colleges, and secondary schools. These situations were previously managed case by case by the educational establishments following a decision by the Conseil d’État.
also symbolic of the political and media coverage under cover of an increasingly intense opposition to a particular interpretation of French secularism. The tense discussions about the principle of secularism led to the 2004 law, banning the wearing of conspicuous religious symbols in state schools, often referred to as the ‘law against the veil’.

Presented as a new social issue, the wearing of the veil had not been an issue until it was worn by the second generation in France. As Gaspard observed, it was not by chance that it catalysed attention with the transfer of the symbol from mothers to daughters, in other words at the point when it began to appear in urban areas as a local phenomenon.

The headscarves of their mothers and grandmothers, very present in these suburban areas, were not a problem. They belonged to immigrants; it signified that these women were continuing to live in keeping with their customs, their countries and that they would definitely return there. On the other hand, the headscarf of the daughters, often born in France, and whose destiny was, as we know, to remain in France posed a question, which was one of ‘integration’, the question of the presence in the public sphere of a difference in religion and culture, and that of integration in the nation without cultural assimilation (Gaspard, 1996: 22).

The headscarf became symbolic of the masculine control to which these women were said to be subjected, however above this, the headscarf was becoming symbolic of the management of minority populations in society and the loss of control of their future. In other words, if it is a question of any form of control, it is less an issue of community control, whether patriarchal or traditional than of control by the majority and by society to ensure their inclusion in the national narrative.

Not only did the hysteria around the question of the veil (Terray, 2004) dominate political debate and make for tensions in the public sphere; it also affected the academic world and scientific production. The academic literature bears witness to the unprecedented interest which extended far beyond the simple question of the Islamic headscarf/veil to concentrate on the analysis of the ‘political undertaking’ (Lorcerie, 2008) of categorising as ‘other’, part of the population, while the trajectories of subjectivation of women of immigrant ascendancy were also examined. Through the headscarf, the academic world discovered, so to speak, social actors who, until then, had been marginal both in society and in public discussion. This was followed by a multitude of French and foreign studies giving the floor to French women who wore the head covering/veil. Several monographs offer portraits of dozens of women who explain the reasons for their choice. These studies have given rise to multiple typologies of the Islamic veil.

As de Galembert (2009) emphasises, the headscarf affair meant the presence of Muslims in France could no longer be ignored and has made the Muslim community a subject of discussion. However, the author insists on the fact that ‘the transformation of the Muslim community into an actor bearing collective demands remains precarious’ (Ibid.: 20). She also refers to discontinuities and hesitations in collective action when one thinks in terms of ‘Muslim community’. In her opinion, the issue of the headscarf had become a battleground for those who claimed to be voicing the legitimate Muslim cause or for various people in the business of representation. A good illustration of the media coverage of the mobilisation associated with the banning of the headscarf was the legitimation of the discourse on women by the varied actors who were potentially concerned by the issue. The angle of approach adopted by de Galembert when considering the mobilisation of Muslims in France tended to highlight the organisational weaknesses of Muslims in France even if she pointed out the transformation of militant initiatives through,
for instance, the movement Une école pour tous·tes (a school for all, whether Muslim or not) which reflected a kind of ‘de-communitarianism’ of the headscarf issue from 2004\(^35\) (Ibid.: 43).

For the past few years, the reconfiguration of the actors of the mobilisation has tended more towards the argumentative register of the campaign against discrimination and Islamophobia; this however seems limited as the institutions which might accompany the recognition of these campaigns remained quite hesitant.

2.4.3. The riots in 2005

Riots in France, as elsewhere, are often triggered by an event perceived as profoundly unjust, a police ‘blunder’ (or the rumour of one), or an unfair decision in court. In the case of the riots in 2005, the issue was the death of two adolescents in Clichy-sous-Bois. On 27th October 2005, Zayed Benna (17 years old) and Bouna Traoré (15 years) were electrocuted in the electric transformer in which they had taken refuge to escape the police who were pursuing them. The violence which followed lasted almost three weeks, gradually extending to the whole country and mobilising young people, sometimes as young as ten years old. No organisation, or leader claimed responsibility for this violence, which to a large extent consisted in setting fire to cars and buildings, institutions such as schools and day-care nurseries, and also shops. Another characteristic of these events was the numerous confrontations with the police and the fire brigades as institutional personifications of order and security.

The vocabulary of the Minister of the Interior (Nicolas Sarkozy), who referred to ‘scum’ (racaille) saying that he would ‘clean the scum off the streets with a high-pressure hose’, was understood as targeting, not only the delinquents, but all the young people in these areas and therefore stigmatising them – a further form of injustice.

In any event, there was no form of invocation of Islam in the revolts in the outlying suburbs and it should be noted that the Muslim representatives were amongst the local actors who called loudly for calm.

These events, were rapidly described as riots, started in Clichy-sous-Bois in response to the death of the two young boys and rapidly spread to the most sensitive areas in Ile de France before extending to the whole country. Between 27th October and 17th November 2005, numerous peripheral areas in towns in France – and particularly in the Parisian region – were the scene of violent clashes between young people and the police; considerable damage was done in these peri-urban areas. The violence was front page news and a challenge to those in power.

In this context, some representatives of the governing class (including the president of the working group of the UMP\(^36\) in the Assemblée Nationale, the Minister for Labour and the Minister of the Interior, N. Sarkozy) suggested there were explanatory links between the rioters, their origins and the kinship system of polygamy. Others, including the former Minister of the Interior, referred to ‘extremist’ danger, while the extreme right used the rhetoric of radical Islamism as instigator of the violence. A new set of arguments thus developed around radical Islamism which ignored the problems of social distress in the outlying deprived suburbs; the riots were considered to be an example of the Islamist threat and, in any event, a consequence of the lack of integration of the immigrants, along with polygamy and their

\(^{35}\) By ‘de-communitarianism’ de Galembert emphasises an opening up of support positions for veiled women beyond Muslim communities. One of the most prominent examples is the major role played by the academic Christine Delphy in the movement Une école pour tous·tes when she stated that the two systems of oppression (gender and race) coexist and combine, and that there is therefore no need to choose to fight against one or the other while highlighting the link between feminists and veiled young women. http://cfpe2004.fr/intervention-contre-une-loi-dexclusion-c-delphy/

\(^{36}\) L’Union pour un Mouvement Populaire is a French political party classified as centre-right to right on the political chessboard.
incapacity to bring up their children. It was not until December 2005 that the Report of the Renseignements Généraux\textsuperscript{37} invalidated the suspicion of a revolt fomented by Islamist movements\textsuperscript{38} and focused on the involvement of young people resulting from their ‘condition of social exclusion from French society’.

2.4.4. Islamophobia and religious discrimination: the difficulties in recognising radicality outside radical Islam?

Hajjat and Mohammed (2013: 20) define Islamophobia as the ‘complex social process of racialisation/otherness based on the sign of belonging (real or supposed) to the Muslim religion’. People are stigmatised and possibly discriminated on this basis.

From the year 2000, the term Islamophobia became current in the public and academic sphere in France to describe anti-Muslim practices and actions. This term focuses less on the ethnic origin of people but instead on their real or presumed religious affiliation. The use of the term was considered controversial and it was rejected by the CNCDH who, in their report in 2003, stated that this concept does not correspond to any precise and agreed definition and, as is described in this report, often tends to be confused with anti-Maghrebian racism. Another main argument is based on the instrumentalisation of the term by the fundamentalists. The commission considered that:

\begin{quote}
certain fundamentalist (\textit{intégristes} in French) movements are trying to reclassify anti-Maghrebian racism as Islamophobia in order to take better advantage of frustrations, by playing the card of the religious identity of the population of North African origin and make religion the absolute criterion for differentiation and sharing. The term must therefore be used with the utmost care (CNCDH, 2004: 183)
\end{quote}

On the other hand, the term was widely used in the media when Vincent Geisser, a CNRS researcher, published a book entitled ‘La nouvelle islamophobie’ in 2003, in response to Taguieff’s book, ‘La nouvelle judéophobie’ (2002). Since this date, the term has been used in militant Muslim networks to refer to any act of discrimination with respect to Muslims on the basis of their religious practices and convictions.

The ‘Collectif contre l’islamophobie en France’ (Collective against Islamophobia in France) assumed the task of denouncing all anti-Muslim racism and of publicising all instances of Islamophobia. Similarly, the HALDE (Haute Autorité de Lutte contre les Discriminations et pour l’Égalité) regularly received complaints of religious discrimination. In 2009, the percentage of complaints concerning religious discrimination received by the HALDE amounted to 3\% of the total complaints (10,545) (HALDE, 2010: 15). The majority of complaints received by the High Authority came from women (58\%) while 42\% came from men (Ibid.: 17). Almost all the cases dealt with by the college referred to the question of the veil, revealing an increasing number of attempts by firms to extend the application of the 2004 law either tacitly or explicitly in their internal regulations. For example, amongst the cases reported, a hotel explicitly stated in its house rules that it was forbidden to wear a veil on the premises. It was this slippage in legal interpretation of the prohibition of the veil (via the interpretation of the principle of secularism) which is the most striking.

We are now far from the 1980s, or even from the beginning of the 1990s, when the preference was to combat racism, head-on in a global fashion, primarily by opposing its political emanation which was the Front National. While the Front National continued to exist, the focus on the ideological-political struggle had moved. The focus now was on discrimination. This was a struggle which was both wide-ranging, covering extremely varied situations, but which gave rise to a space of transversal criteria set out in law:
origin, race, religion either real or presumed. The moralising and globalising perspective, with little effect, had now been replaced by a pragmatic and targeted conception. The expectations addressed to the business world were also now more demanding. In contrast with what had been an anti-racism struggle, the fight against discriminations poses the challenge of finding a shared interpretation, especially in France, where the grounds of discrimination such as race, origin, ethnicity, religion or skin colour are subject of long-lasting taboos.

The criteria of religion, while being an integral part of the legislative corpus of the campaign against discrimination, long remained in the background or implicit in so-called racial discrimination, which was to occupy all the available space in the first movement of institutionalisation of the campaign against discrimination, at the beginning of the years 2000. During this phase the institutional arrangements intended for the victims of discrimination were, in effect, based on a campaign against any distinction, exclusion or restriction based on presumed belonging to a race, on descent or presumed belong to a race, descent, or national or ethnic origin. Discrimination linked to other criteria were not taken into consideration: for example, neither sex, religion or age figure in the perimeter of discrimination considered. The criteria of religion was only addressed later, in the context of the process of creation of the Haute Autorité de lutte contre les discriminations (HALDE), in 2004, which was to replace the first scheme (114/CODAC) (Poli, 2004).

The promotion of the theme of diversity mid-way through the first decade of 2000, in particular in the workplace, did not really clarify matters, perhaps even the contrary. There were all sorts of surveys, of evaluation of diversity in companies which dealt to some extent with considerations of conceptions and practices associated with non-discrimination. These data always oscillated between two perspectives: one was universalist and the other differentialist – the issue of religion was rarely mentioned. The main criteria was origin. The nuances were organised around a universalist conception of diversity, as synonymous with the gateway to all differences, and a specific definition referring to one, or several, categories from which religion was absent.

In all cases we can observe a circulation between the implicit and an explicit which gained momentum with the multiple communication campaigns around the promotion of diversity. The website constitutes an illustration which is both interesting and amusing in the promotion of diversity: on one side we have a list of the various categories covered by the concept of diversity: ‘all publics’, ‘visible minorities’, ‘women’, ‘disabled people’, ‘seniors’, ‘sexual orientation’, ZUS39, which is an indication of the hesitations between general categories and categories of difference. On the other side, the photo on the banner chosen for the former web site symbolises a mixed population in the middle of which there is a woman wearing a Muslim headscarf.

From 2013, there was a significant change in the use of the term ‘Islamophobia’ in France. In his annual report on Racism, Xenophobia and Anti-Semitism, the CNCDH states that:

(...) it is appropriate to name what one denounces and wishes to fight. This is why, without ignoring the semantic impurities and the risks of instrumentalisation, (the commission) has chosen to use the term ‘Islamophobia’ to designate this dangerous, phenomenon, which threatens ‘living together’ and calls for all vigilance (CNCDH, 2014: 20).

Nevertheless, research on Islamophobia, as a concept but also as a phenomenon, was more developed in the English academic literature than in French and Francophone research (Asal, 2014: 16) and the term itself remains the subject of much polemic debates and semantic problems (Meer, 2019: 11).

39 Zone Urbaine Sensible (Sensitive Urban Zone).
2.4.5. Burqa and national identity

As illustrated in Section 2.4.2, the question of the Islamic veil and its uses is a long-standing political preoccupation in France and the 2004 – which, under the guise of defending the principle of secularity conveys instead a ‘culturalisation of republican values’ (Laborde, 2009: 26) and, as a result, lends itself to an ethnicised reading of the discussion of immigration versus national identity. This discussion not only reasserts the frontiers between the national ‘us’ and the others, but also contributes to creating new ones through the interplay of categories. The synchrony of the political processing of the wearing of the burqa and the niqab (through the parliamentary mission of information on the wearing of the burqa and the niqab directed by M. Gerin40) and the major discussion on national identity launched by M. Besson41 was yet another illustration of the way in which the State braces itself to manage a minority phenomenon associated with Islam in France – by presenting it as a more general threat. Furthermore, the opposition between full veil and national identity was already noted during a refusal of naturalisation in June 2008 which concerned a Moroccan woman wearing the niqab or face veil due to her ‘radical practice of her religion and was deemed incompatible with the essential values of the French community and in particular with the principle of equality between sexes’ (Conseil d’État, arrêt du 27 juin 2008, n°286798).

The government attack carried out against the face veil – a phenomenon which at the time applied to a very small minority of women, estimated at less than 400, according to the report submitted by the Security Branch of the police force in August 2009 – led to a stigmatising reification of Republican values upgraded to universal values against the presumed Islamist and fundamentalist threat. It is interesting to note in this connection that no woman wearing a full-face veil was interviewed by the Gerin Commission, as was the case for the Stasi Commission in 2003, and that the climate in which the interviews took place was extremely hostile, during the presentation of critical opinions, far from the homogenous positions of members of the Commission (cf. the hearings of Jean Beaubérot and Farhad Khosrokhavar42).

The positions adopted in public were frequently dramatic43 and confirmed the emotional tensions which accompanied the debate, which was denounced as politically instrumentalised by several commentators, but also by associations, the CNCDH and the LDH44.

We observe that while the right-wing parties were united in their position on the issue, the left did not succeed in creating a shared consensus. The reactions of the representatives of the PS (Parti Socialiste) were actually extremely varied, ranging from firm opposition to the possibility of a law (B. Hamont) to the agreement there was a need for a complete ban (M. Valls). Another important aspect to highlight concerns the language used during this discussion. The most frequently used terms – burqa, niqab – emphasised the phenomenon of the full veil as being a threat from a foreign country – Afghanistan, Pakistan – which came to a head in the amalgam between Islam and the oppression of women by comparing the women concerned in France with the situation of women in countries adopting the principle of the Islamic sharia.

The image of the veiled woman as a symbol of Islam as other (‘alterisation’), comparable to a national enemy, was prominent in the political and media discourse on this issue and, as it turned into a controversy to a large extent about the values of the Republic, it formed the basis for a dynamic of cumulative radicalisation to play out. The case of a (traffic) fine imposed in April 2010 (when the law on the banning of the full veil had not yet come into force - October 2010) was a major illustration. In April...
2010, a Muslim woman protested in Nantes, after having been reported by the police because she was driving while wearing a niqab. This occurred at the height of the debate on a bill from the President of the Republic to ban this type of veil throughout the country. The case was to resonate even further when Brice Hortefeux (the Minister of the Interior) revealed that the husband of this woman, Lies Hebbadj, a French tradesman of Algerian origin, belonged not only to a radical movement (the Tabligh, in a note from the Security Branch of the police) but was also suspected of polygamy and fraudulent social welfare (family allowance) claims. This caused a media storm. The Minister of the Interior, Brice Hortefeux, went as far as invoking the possibility of withdrawing the French nationality of Lies Hebbadj, who was naturalised as French in 1999. The polemic thus gradually changed; the path from full veil to national identity was not long. The focus of the discussion then extended from the full veil to polygamy – an issue already highlighted by the President of the Republic as an explanatory cause of the riots in 2005 – and all the conditions were met for a discussion on threats to national identity by Islamic practices of which the minority nature was concealed by the high-profile media dimension of this affair.

2.4.6 Wide media coverage of Islam

The 2000s also witnessed the spread of new models of radical Islam, which became an almost unavoidable theme in research on Islam, whether it was a question of endeavouring to grasp the contours, or defining the nuances in relation to other forms of Islam or again to criticise directly or indirectly the excesses of interpretation, as a result of the forms of stigmatisation and potentially of discrimination which they produced in society.

From the beginning of 2006, the debate around the scenario of a possible rise in fundamentalism (intégrisme in French) reappeared in the media and brought in its wake the same more general questions involving the issue of the compatibility of Islam with secularism, posing the Republic principles as a systematic preamble to all reflection. In any event, the radical threat was considered to be a very real, although a small one, and was associated with religious fundamentalism (intégrisme), more than with terrorism. The example quoted was that of the Salafists, described as a rite derived from the Saudi Wahabis based on a literal reading of the Koran, placing the values revealed by God above all others. In any event, we are ever more frequently reminded that the question of Islam in France is not only religious but also social and political. The theme of radical Islam is not only increasingly a part of the discussion of Islam in France but is also the subject of several books, particularly from 2005 onwards (Kepel, 2000, 2004; Burgat, 2005; Marret, 2005; Amghar, 2006; Bouzar, 2006; Filiu, 2006; Khosrokhavar, 2006).

The strict observation of practices and attitudes of some young people – their refusal to shake hands with women, pray together, their choice of clothing – were all challenged on the basis of the concept, by now a leitmotif, of the social danger posed by the presence of Islam in France – namely communitarianism.

Various sociological and psychological factors are advanced to explain religious radicalism amongst young people: their relationship to space and time, issues of memory or again the absence of a structuring father figure. In France, the suspicion of communitarianism underlies a large body of discourse which is also considered to be an assignation which confines these youths to this form of stigmatisation. However, on this point, Marlière (2008: 172-3), in his analysis of the feeling of injustice amongst young people in the poorer areas reminds us of the analytical fragility of this term:

45 [https://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2010/05/03/01016-20100503ARTFIG00798-burqa-le-trouble-passe-de-lies-hebbadj-.php].

The desire to set themselves apart is undoubtedly an issue amongst young practicing Muslims. But, with age, the people who practice Islam do so more through a concern for obligation, respect and observation of religious prohibitions: one has to make a choice between religious prohibitions and being successful in the present. To some extent, prohibitions are in contradiction with society in its ‘hyper-consumerist’ dimensions, at the level of ‘customs’ and financial questions (...). The fact of being a Muslim therefore goes far beyond the idea of being a communitarian because it is a situation which is ever-changing in which one constantly has to choose between ones ambitions, temptations, and the practice of religion as a project for a life after death.

Throughout the first decade of 2000, the issue of radical Islam was in the news in relation to the visibility of Islam in the public sphere. If it was not directly the question of radical Islam (the term used was fundamentalism (intégrisme in French)), a threatening image was brandished of religion in French society through numerous affairs (caricatures of Mohamed, withdrawal of the badge of some of the employees at Roissy airport, the affair of the halal Quick fast-food restaurant in Roubaix, the affair of the marriage cancelled in 2008). Generally speaking, these various angles of discussion tended to constantly bring the issue of Islam back to the need to root out the excesses and deviations, – in terms of attitude, ideology, demands, potential links with other social problems – which justified their non-observance of the norms of Western societies on religious grounds. The challenge which emerged from the media coverage ultimately becomes one of sorting out what is radical and what is not. The perspective is binary and the criteria disparate.

Since the 1990s, this media and political processing of Islam in France is regularly criticised (Perotti, 1991; Cesari, 1997; Babès, 1997; Khosrokhavar, 1997; Bigo, Bonelli and Deltombe 2008). Following the 11 September attacks, Geisser (2012: 8) discussed the ‘media hegemony of the experts and security think-tanks’, when referring to the French situation, which broadcast/disseminate a vision which is usually limited to Islam and religious extremism by surfing on the blurred frontier between the scientific field and expertise.

2.4.7 The explosion of definitions and models

In the academic field, the models which emerged focused on the actors, considered either as terrorists, or as assimilated thereto; this tendency was to be emphasised with the creation of the Islamic State, known as Daech in 2014. But after the series of terrorist attacks in France in 2015, the focus was mainly

47 In the winter of 2010 there were many cases concerning Islam in France. In Roubaix the PS (Socialist Party) Mayor decided to take the self-service restaurant, Quick, in Roubaix, to court for ‘discrimination’ after the fast-food chain of restaurants decided, as an experiment in Autumn 2009, to serve only Halal meat and to replace bacon with smoked turkey in 8 of its restaurants located in predominantly Muslim areas. The restaurant was merely ‘following the changes in the market’, the spectre of communitarianism was discussed and the fear of an Islamisation of France gained ground, against a background of regional elections in March 2010 and the danger of the electoral success of the extreme right-wing.

48 In April 2008, the District Court of Lille cancelled a marriage ‘for error as to the essential qualities of the person’ in accordance with Article 180 of the Civil Code. The annulment of the wedding quickly turned into a media scandal and inflamed the public arena because the error claimed in the ‘relative nullity’ procedure was the wife’s lie about her virginity. The question of virginity very quickly outweighed the lie and Islam found itself in the spotlight, denounced as an obscurantist practice by many political and civil society representatives. For example, Fadela Amara, former president of NPNS and Secretary of State for Urban Policy, speaks of a ‘fatwa against the emancipation of women’, using Islamic vocabulary. It is interesting to note that the figure of women is once again at the centre of a debate which, under the guise of wanting to defend the effective freedom of women to self-determine, in reality uses it to fuel the collective fantasies linked to Islam. The intimacy that should have been guaranteed and in whose name voices of indignation have been raised is now being exposed.
on anything potentially associated with radical Islam. This extended on another hand from avowed or potential adhesion to radical Islam, such as notable Salafism (a word which itself is so distorted that it is difficult to define the meaning and extent) or support for radical Islam (glorification of terrorism) of which the contours are difficult to grasp. These two tendencies shaped distinct models of radicalisation but can also constitute the poles of numerous typologies. In all cases, these two major perspectives indicate from the outset, circulation between several ranges of assessment of radical Islam. These refer on one hand to a wide-ranging definition of radical Islam (which may or may not include Salafism), and on the other a ‘real’ or presumed adhesion to the letter, with the central issue being the location of radical Islam in time and space: ‘the radicalised individual’ or ‘the person in ongoing radicalisation’, or who may become radicalised as an inhabitant of a ‘Jihadogenic urban space’ (Khosrokhavar, 2018). The extent to which the definition and the role of violence are specified and diversified in the different models of radicalisation will be shown in Section 4.3. 

The two main tendencies which we have described above, which are far from exhausting the step-up in models of radicalisation over the last twenty years in France, tend to intertwine in promoting the extension of the definition of so-called radicalised persons in an endeavour to grasp the place, time, and circumstances which lead people to take action.

Involvement in terrorist networks was scrutinised but also considered in a more general context. The attempts to modelise radical Islam multiplied. Over and above profiles of individuals, attempts are made to find what conditions adhesion to radical Islam and to think in terms of radicalisation, that is in terms of a process.

In the wake of the pioneering approach of Khosrokhavar, the emphasis is often on the feeling of injustice, the feeling of humiliation of young men in the working class areas where radical Islam prospers.

According to Laurence and Vaïsse (2007: 299), the relationship between Islam and terrorism, and more particularly between the threat of terrorism and the re-Islamisation of French Muslims, deserves our attention:

(...) to understand what combination of factors – the failure of integration, identity crisis, political and religious motivations – may lead a young French person to become involved in a terrorist network.

In their model, the authors focus on the protagonists of acts of terrorism and admit that:

(...) the radical networks still succeed in fanatising a few young confused Muslims; a characteristic example is the ‘group in the 19th district in Paris’ who, on 2005 succeeded in sending several young French people of Arab origin from the Buttes Chaumont to Iraq, where they took up arms against the Americans. These Jihadis of a new type, typical of a global confrontation, represent threats which were all the more serious for other countries as they were the bearers of European passports (Ibid.: 297-8).

Taking as a basis the number of detentions for terrorism offences, they report that the phenomenon remained marginal and involved about a dozen cases a year out of a population of 5 million people. On 31st December 2004, out of 361 people imprisoned in France for charges associated with terrorism, 103 were Islamists.

‘The birth of a terrorist in France is the outcome of a complex combination of factors and hazards which, in the last resort, are random’ (Ibid.: 299). The most political considerations, particularly the feeling of solidarity with the Muslims in the world, seen as victims, and the struggle against the domination of the West are presented by the authors as the most decisive reasons to which, in addition, we have psychological and cultural reasons along with the social and economic background. In all cases, we are reminded that religion can in no way be considered the sole factor of explanation of the process of
radicalisation. Three stages can be distinguished: favourable pre-conditions, (on this point, the accumulation of social problems does not alone constitute a pre-disposition), a political awareness at the time of conversion to the religion and contact with the recruiters. Joining radical Islam is conceived of as a means of rejecting one’s French identity and as the only protest movement. In that sense, Muslims are perceived as being the only ones to fight the system (Laurence et Vaïsse, 2007). Political awareness also constitutes one of the key conditions in the drift towards radical Islam, the move from political awareness to violent action can take place very rapidly.

In an analysis which tends to generalise Islamist radicalisation and to go beyond a focus on the terrorist actor, Shirali (2007: 139-155) defines radicalisation as a relationship to the religious amongst marginalised youth which is based on a detachment from everyday values, on the understanding of social relations in the light of the radical critique of a religious ethic, and on the idea of re-establishing social justice. She considers the phenomenon of radicalisation is opposed to any scientific or academic approach of the religion, in particular as a result of the central influence of an Imam or a preacher and envisages it as a form of emotional religiosity.

The incredible influence which such an ‘ideologising personification’ of the relationship to the world exercises on marginalised youths is reinforced by the weakening of social ties and a lowering in the horizon of the senses (Ibid.: 150).

This approach tends to focus on the instrumentalisation of the emotional religiosity of young people by the political interests of religious personalities. Furthermore, this emotional religiosity is characterised both by its propensity to transform itself into violence and by its ‘malleability to obedience’ which results in manipulation being central to this model.

**Radicalisation, the new avatar of young people in the banlieues?**

The study of radicalisation ‘from below’ reveals a link of complementarity between personal indoctrination (Kepel, 2012; Micheron, 2019; Rougier, 2020), in particular in areas of economic exclusion in the French suburbs and identity reaction in hyper-secularised European societies which marks a new step in the understanding of the radicalisation of young people of immigrant origin or converts adhering to the radical version of Islam (Roy, 2014). The study of radical Islam in prisons through individual trajectories enables an in-depth exploration of a central dimension of the phenomenon (Khosrokhavar, 2004; Combelle Siegel, 2006; Crettiez and Sèze, 2017).

As from 2015, there was a marked increase in models of radicalisation which was no great surprise given the succession of acts of violence perpetrated on French soil. One of the common features in several approaches to radicalisation in the 2010s was the mobilisation of institutional resources.

Given the rising production of institutional norms to counter radicalisation, some authors, such as Puaud, concentrate on the consequences of the focus on radicalisation; their central hypothesis is that the figure of the young radical Islamist has replaced that of the ‘racaille’ or scum (Sarkozy) and ‘voyou’ or hooligan (Hortefeux) to describe the young people in deprived working-class areas (Puaud, 2018). Henceforth, the author suggests that radicalisation be conceived of as an assignation, along the lines of the previous jargon of delinquency, criminality and problem behaviour referring in most instances to the young people in working class areas.

Puaud has drawn up a table reconstituting the phenomenon of radicalisation on the basis of meetings with professionals and interviews carried out with a number of ‘radicalised’ subjects. He states that in the majority of situations encountered it is not a question of Islamist radicalisation but of the appearance of a new radical offer which could lead to people of very different profiles becoming involved in the various

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49 As Romain Caillet and Pierre Puchot stress, the vast majority of literature devoted to the Jihadi question is based on court proceedings (Caillet and Puchot, 2017: 13).
sorts of violence. It should be noted that the people referred to in the book did not all take action. The difference between the profiles of the individuals in the panel is considerable: Quentin, aged 14, refused to observe a minute of silence, Brenda wanted to go to Syria, or Adel Kermiche, one of the two protagonists in the attack in Saint Etienne du Rouvray.

Even if it is possible to identify constants in their discourse, the profiles of the so-called radicalised subjects, or those who are on a path to radicalisation, are grasped primarily through existential peculiarities and it is thus relatively futile to attempt to draw a standard profile. The author does note that in September 2017, a confidential note from the Unit for the co-ordination of the anti-terrorist campaign (UCLAT) did list features shared at biographical level of the 257 men and 8 women who died after joining the ranks of Daech. The majority had grown up in areas cumulating social inequalities, 56% lived in a special priority area and ‘there is definitely a correlation between the cumulation of social, economic and educational inequalities and foci of radicalisation’ (Ibid.: 67). In line with other models, such as that of Bonelli and Carrié (2018), who support their approach on the basis of the biographical availability of the people whose contours are specified on the basis of the study of 133 justice files of juveniles pursued for affairs of terrorism or flagged for ‘radicalisation’. The material for the listing are as follows: intervention of social workers and juvenile courts at an early age; family environments considered to be defective or inappropriate; placement in an institution and/or in a foster family at an early age; dropping out of school or irregular attendance (low level diploma; no school leaving qualification); re-socialisation in marginal groups, in particular in local areas; petty delinquency offences; repeated prison sentences; generation of public housing estates.

Puaud argues that the accumulation of negative feelings around the issues of identity and social inequality emerge as central to understanding radicalisation (Puaud, 2018: 72). The 48 situations listed in his survey lead him to develop the following typology:

1) Radicalisation as a mental deficiency.

2) Initiatory radicalisation in which the desire to live a unique experience dominates (flashback on the group of 10 people in Vesoul who went to Syria at the end of 2014, but also Lunel and Strasbourg).

3) Metaphysical radicalisation. The projection of an outside-self relative to existence as a negative reality.

4) Political radicalisation. Awareness at an early age to the geo-political context. Precocity of concerns of a political nature (associated with forms of hyper-sensitivity).

5) Nihilist radicalisation ‘a form of social suicide’.

6) The radicalisation of exclusion which is due to the combination of social and economic difficulties.

We gradually witness an increase in the models of radicalisation to the extent that it becomes difficult to make an exhaustive inventory of them. In all cases the typologies become more complex featuring very different people and emphasising, in the majority of cases, the relatively marginal space for religion as such. This complexity is nevertheless based on a degree of consensus concerning the multifactor dimension of radicalisation and makes it difficult to classify these models.

Joining a community with radical ideas enables the expression of anger and gives one the feeling of being useful and being recognised. Religion seems to play the role of channel for expression, of restricted space of the credible, for meaning which ends doubts, reconsideration, reshapes a person around a central principle, a principle of coherence which is presented as the most attractive part in the trajectories of the young people who join radical Islam.
We propose an overview summarising the models of radicalisation which we base on several criteria. The empirical framework of the research, (the disciplinary fields, the trajectory of the researcher in terms of objects of study, studies on population and space, the perspective of radicalisation (central or marginal to another theme), the terms mobilised and the definition of radicalisation, and finally a salience stressing what is most important in the argument of the author.

In this second part, we concentrated on the way in which radical Islam is understood in France and the models of radicalisation which it has been possible to establish since the 1980’s. As noted in the introduction, this is difficult for several reasons; in particular due to the fact that ‘radicalisation’, a term in everyday use nowadays but one subject to numerous criticisms, refers to a reality substantiated over time as these models develop. Their study since the 1980s involves going back to the origins of the phenomena. This covers an increasingly broad range of experiences and realities as we consider both the interest which it represented for a section of French youth and the threat it constituted to society given the increasingly marked inclusion of the risk of radicality in the models. We have therefore attempted to update, chronologically, a fresco of the imagined image of radical Islam in France by taking as our basis two perspectives simultaneously. The first studies how radical Islam became an issue for discussion and research which is relatively united around multiple points of correlation between extremism and Islam on the basis of various occurrences (‘intégrisme’, fundamentalism, Islamism, Jihadism, etc.) and focuses on the evolution of the conceptions of the actors and of the rationales of radical Islam. The second endeavours to contextualise references to radical Islam (or the horizon which it constitutes) in more wide-ranging considerations and discussion about Islam in France.

These two perspectives have long converged to designate a population perceived in the main in the light of its social characteristics: living in ‘sensitive’ areas, young, male and often associated with delinquency. The various readings which we have taken also highlight the diversity of scales of value in the conception of the involvement in or the proximity with radical Islam.

We also note an evolution in the models with a tendency to break with rational choice theories. From this point of view Islamist radicalisation should be seen less as a strategy associated with socio-political aims in contrast to the models of the 1980s, 1990s and the early 2000s but instead from the standpoint of explanatory schemes varying considerably from one person to another and extending from an emotional register to rationales of social protest, possibly involving pathological forms (Basex, Benezech and Mensat, 2017).

The most recent models also show that the collective dimension of radicalisation is not systematic. It may indeed involve belonging to a group but it may also take the form of an individual commitment relatively distant from any group (‘the lone wolf’). It is nevertheless important to qualify this distinction between individual and collective given our limited knowledge of certain data concerning the way in which individuals may subjectively be linked to a collective and the importance, for example, of social networks and possibilities of reconstitution of a collective momentum in the process of radicalisation.

Research studies on women’s experience of radicalisation (Khosrokhavar, 2016; Khosrokhavar and Ben Slama, 2017; Cavillon, 2018; Casutt, 2018; Micheron, 2019) are far fewer than the studies on radicalisation of men or on radicalisation in general, with no gender specification. However, the latter do sometimes mention women without further in-depth work.

It would seem that the emergence of women in the collective action associated with radicalism is subsequent to that of men. We should however note that while women may have been overshadowed in the models of Islamist radicalisation in France, they regularly appear front stage in the major discussion which participate in a systematising of the link between extremism and Islam in particular as demonstrated in the ‘veil’/headscarf issue and its numerous repercussions in public debate.
Finally, as we have seen, we are now, under the banner of ‘radicalisation’, forced to take into consideration a relatively vast range of terminology which is highly controversial. Whatever the term used – radicalisation, ‘intégrisme’, fundamentalism, Islamism, Jihadism, fanaticism – we come up against the same problem, which is that of rivalry between expressions and arguments to designate and define the most problematic aspect of Islam. On this point the sensitivities, the approaches and even the criteria mobilised may vary considerably in describing rationales of action, positions and attitudes, which themselves may be located in larger entities. The aim is to identify the early warning signs of social danger and violence. We are always confronted with the same issue of circumscribing a phenomenon which, on one hand tends to catalyse the major questions of society which are not new (and therefore of understanding, or not, the continuity with these) and, on the other, of drawing a nuanced picture by outlining a certain number of features. As we have seen, this work of contextualisation is not based on an inventory of models of so-called Islamist radicalisation but proposes to try to unravel the various facets, models and concepts which shape the space of radical Islam in France.

The fact remains that the discussion about communitarianism and that of Jihadism (mainly linked with terrorism, departures to Syria and, in all cases, to violent action) constitute one of the central issues amongst the most recent models for radicalisation providing the interaction between these two major issues with a rich data content.

2.4.8 Conclusion

The forms of extremism associated with Islam has evolved considerably since the 1980s. At the outset in many European countries, it tended to be restricted to the ‘disaffiliated youth’ from the poor suburbs (France) or poor inner city areas (in the UK), overwhelmed by racism and prejudices express their willingness to fight, to take their revenge on society. But the phenomenon rapidly spread to the middle classes, whether Muslims or converts. In 2013, with the civil war in Syria, radical Islam underwent major changes. Before that it was restricted to a few hundred people, it has risen to several thousand.

3. Field Research

3.1 Data collection

In order to approach and study the rise of this radical milieu in France and more particularly the pattern of radicalisation among young Muslims, the main research tools used were literature review, archival research, and press review (exclusively based on the French situation). We should also be clear at this point that the work of Farhad Khosrokhavar, considering his long-lasting research experience in the field of radicalisation studies, has been a major source for the data collection.

As stated in the introduction to this report, the construction of the principal models associated with radical Islam among young people in France cannot be understood without a cross-cutting exploration of several fields of study. Before becoming a significant object of research, analysis and media attention in France, the question of radical Islam (long referred to as fundamentalism (fondamentalisme and intégrisme in French)) had appeared in two main contexts. On the one hand, it was discussed in the work of French islamologists through the detailed study of the ideological forms through which it passes, of the trends and movements of which it is a part and essentially relating to national contexts other than that of France. On the other hand, it was considered, with varying degrees of centrality, in the study of Islam in France for example on the fringes of studies on immigration, the banlieues50 or of youth in working-class

50 Banlieues are satellite towns near major cities. As they are often made up of high-rise flats and underprivileged populations, the term sometimes has a negative connotation, which is why we have preferred not to use the classic translation ‘suburb’. 
neighbourhoods. The heterogeneity of this bibliographical corpus reflects the longstanding French tendency to favour a double entry point – that of the spatial dimension, the space of residence, and that of the real or supposed ethnic dimension – before religious affiliation or assignment\textsuperscript{51} became a sociological factor of exploration.

Research on the Muslim population – which began to develop from the end of the 1980s (Kepel, Leveau and Wihtol de Wenden, 1987; Kepel, 1987; Cesari 1994, 1998; Galembert, 1995; Khosrokhavar, 1997) – remained relatively rare until the end of the 1990s and provided fewer socio-demographic elements than social portraits and trajectories at the frontier between the individual and the collective, the latter being understood in both cultural and religious terms (the terms are indeed interchangeable). For the most part, researchers examined negotiations and conciliation between ‘attachment to an imported tradition and rootedness in the French cultural soil’ (Cesari, 1998: 38), in other words, subjectivation trajectories and ‘identity tinkering\textsuperscript{52}’ in which Islam was seen both as a legacy, as an expression of modern individualisation, and as an instrument for the requalification of immigrant populations (Kakpo, 2005).

We have therefore taken into account research on immigration and the descendants of immigrants on the one hand, and on ‘Muslims’ on the other, in order to consider how and from what angles the issue of radical Islam might appear. It should be noted from the outset that the production of knowledge is more often than not based on a qualitative approach. In addition, the common denominator of these studies is first and foremost the absence, followed by the slow progression, of the number of studies on women’s experiences up until the turn of the 2000s.

Prior to the mid-1970s, the predominance of structuralist and Marxist approaches in sociology, which focused on economics and labour, shed more light on the male face of immigration. The experience of male migrants was nevertheless slow to emerge.

Linda Guerry, (2009), highlights the extremely marginal place of immigrant women in scientific production prior to the mid-1970s and points out, amongst other things, the influence of feminism on these new research orientations. Indeed, the issue emerged more through the work of feminists involved in immigration research than through research on women.

Furthermore, the increasing attention paid by ‘migration studies’ to the experiences of women, centred on family relations and relations with the world of education, seen as an alternative pole to the family in the socialisation of young descendants of immigrants. Social science research then significantly increased its focus on women, and work on immigrant women was published in the 1980s, emphasising their integration-oriented vocation (Guerry, 2009).

This belated and oriented attention can be explained in several ways. The feminisation of migratory processes as a mass phenomenon appeared at a later stage compared to the movement of labour, at the time when borders were closing and family reunification mechanisms were being introduced. It first affected a generation of women with a poor command of French, mostly homemakers, withdrawn into a form of ‘communal sociability’ (Tribalat, 1995) that had very little to do with the public authorities and public debate. However, this is not enough to explain the fact that women in migratory situations were viewed ‘in a surreptitious fashion and as part of the scenery’ (Gaspard, 1996: 25). The social images and representations of first-generation women were strongly tinged with colonial attitudes, though

\textsuperscript{51} Cf. the research carried out by Nancy Venel who uses the term ‘sociological Muslims’ to designate any individual born and raised in an Islamic cultural context. On the other hand, the tendency to ethnicise religious belonging is noteworthy in the Anglo-Saxon literature, which more often than not uses the term ‘Muslim’ to designate a population of North African origin and, more broadly, a population originally from a country of Muslim tradition.

\textsuperscript{52} Which more often than not gives rise to the formalisation of typologies based on types of practice and/or on the way people embed themselves within French society (Leveau, de Wenden and Kepel 1987; Cesari, 1994, 1998; Kakpo, 2005).
nevertheless far removed from the orientalist viewpoint that associated them with the harem and exotic sexuality, retaining only the aspects of confinement and the transmission and reproduction of tradition. As a result, ‘the Muslim woman never appears in valued positions [...] when she is not veiled, she wears a headscarf and sits in front of a loom, or else crouches in front of a charcoal stove’ (Barbara, 1992: 13).

Moving on from first-generation women to subsequent generations, the most salient feature is the insistence with which questions around the emancipation (Mounir, 2003) and empowerment (Quiminal, 1997) of girls continually arise. This is a central and recurrent theme that has permeated much of the literature on women of foreign origin, which is marked by assimilationist approaches to the experiences of young girls from the Maghreb53. Denouncing this stance, Guénif underlines the extent to which the latter are assigned to a model that can only fail54, and are constantly being related to a naturalised difference:

‘ethnically typical’ girls are required to be the typical models of emancipation so as to avoid the accusation of being atypical objects of an odious regression (Guénif, 2000: 94).

The ‘beurettes’ (French females of North African descent), a gendered category constructed in opposition to Arab boys (beurs) (Guénif and Macé, 2004), are most often simultaneously described as victims of the patriarchal system and as main actors in the process of integration/assimilation55. As Barbara had already noted in 1992, ‘the ‘beur’ girls ‘appear’, become visible, as if to compensate for the negative image of their brothers. People count on them for the future of the Maghreb community, for the future of a more accessible and secularised Islam. They are an object of choice for compassionate discourse’ (Barbara, 1992: 19). Rare are the works of research that, beyond a culturalist position, discuss the social experience of young girls, born of immigrant parents and the multiple illegitimacy to which they (and their male counterparts) are assigned by the subordinate condition of emigration. From this point on, first of all the beurettes, and by extension all descendants of immigrants from countries with a Muslim tradition, begin to upset the ‘image of the Muslim woman’ inherited from the colonial period, but remain trapped ‘in an outdated orientalist stereotype’ that wants them to be modern while remaining orientalised (Barbara, 1992: 18-9). They become the battered figureheads of the republican struggle against family ‘obscurantism’, a struggle already at work during the colonial period56: symbols celebrating the victory of the Enlightenment over indigenous obscurantism, embodying the tenacity of primordial bonds over the integrating endeavours of modern civilisation.

Guénif’s pioneering work highlights the frames of thought of this gendered and ethnicised category of the French population: the beurettes only exist within a binary schema opposing reproduction to rupture, family to society, customs to education, faith to secularism, virginity to sexual liberation, in a ‘timelessness’ and ‘space-lessness’ from which they cannot escape. Caught between these two antinomic poles, they ‘oscillate between an unhappy conscience and a rebellious attitude’ (Guénif, 2000: 51) while they simultaneously cobble together new configurations of belonging, which place them outside any injunction to conform. The subjectivity of young immigrant girls from the Maghreb, described by Guénif

53 In a book on the fate of immigrant children, in 2009 it was still possible to read: ‘North African girls, subjected to a traditional education which presupposes strict control of a young girl’s virtue, will employ strategies of avoidance or dissimulation in order to avoid being misunderstood by their friends. […] The alternative between acculturation, which involves gradual adoption of the dominant models, and the maintaining of traditions, means that the immigrant is faced with difficult choices’ (Attias-Donfut and Wolff, 2009: 179-80).
54 On this point, Guénif writes that girls are ‘assigned to emancipation without always being given the resources to do so’ (Guénif, 2000: 255).
55 According to Gaspard, the absence of women in studies on emancipation was counterbalanced by a representation that made them ‘the principal agents of integration’ (Gaspard, 1996: 24).
56 Delphy talks about a ‘double bind’: ‘we require it [the population] to show itself to be “the same”, yet we perceive it and label it as “different”’ (Delphy, 2008: 149).
as ‘artisans of temperate freedoms’, and their daily movements between family, school/university, home, peer groups and the workplace, have since been of greater interest to the social sciences, which are less concerned with measuring the extent of their integration (Todd, 1994). The flourishing academic output that followed this period around the phenomenon of the so-called ‘re-Islamisation’ of young girls, and the wearing of the veil in particular, is evidence of the reversal of this trend examining women’s religious practices less from the angle of an imposed legacy than as a process of individuation, freely initiated by each individual (Gaspard and Khosrokhavar, 1995; Amiraux, 2006).

Before the ‘Veil Affair’ in France, and the growing academic output it generated in relation to the experiences of Muslim women, studies on Islamic practices among women in France were extremely rare (one might cite in particular the work of Sossie Andezian). Several researchers have explained the lack of knowledge about women and Islam as being due to the private nature of religious practices. But it is also because research on immigrants and their descendants, which to a greater or lesser extent may have included the question of Islam or which might sometimes have mobilised the Muslim category, has long ignored women.

We believe it is important to underline these aspects which singularly colour the data landscape on Islam in France and contribute – we can at least hypothesise here – towards the lesser interest of the social sciences for women as actors of radical Islam in France.

As has been already explained, research on Islamist radicalisation has multiplied in all social science disciplines, particularly over the last five years. The aim of this work is not to make an exhaustive inventory but to contextualise the attention paid to this issue since the 1980s and to note the major trends that characterise these models.

In parallel to probing the academic literature and the national press to carry out our research on these models, we also mobilised several studies, conducted during the period in question, that provide background on major issues that border on or resonate with the construction of the problem of radical Islam in France.

This essentially consists of work carried out since the early 2000s on forms of combating racism and ethno-racial discrimination and the challenges of recognising the lived experience of these phenomena in France: a study conducted on antisemitism in France (particularly from the angle of the education issue and of a banlieue in the Ile-de-France region) and research on the political and civic participation of women from a country with a Muslim tradition and living in France and the UK. The research programme we conducted between 2011 and 2015 on north-south migration (between France and the Maghreb) is also part of the data collections that are mobilised in this work.

4. Key Findings

Models of radicalisation in France have changed very significantly since the early 1980s. Our strategy for revealing some pieces of these models was to follow the major debates on Islam, in which the questions of fundamentalism, of Islamism and of radical Islam have resonated almost continuously, explicitly or implicitly, due to a dialectic of meanings, ranging from the terrorist to the figure of the Muslim, through varying representations of what their susceptibility to radical Islam and the knowledge of Islamism might be. Issues around the rise in general based on the relationship to Islam, and around origin, place of residence and social trajectories, are particularly important when interpreting radical Islam, due on the one hand to the prolific production of ambiguous categories that bring with them an index of otherness linked to Islam in relation to problems such as ‘the banlieues’, delinquency, violence, communitarianism, etc., and, on the other hand, to the media and political slants placed on the question of radicalisation since 2012.
The three questions that structure this section each refer both to major factors explaining the phenomenon of Islamist radicalisation and to criteria that make it possible to circumscribe the phenomenon of radicalisation in a more or less broad fashion. While certain radicalisation models give predominance or primacy to one or the other of these factors, it is clear that the majority of the most recent models highlight the essential articulation of multiple factors in the understanding of radicalisation processes (Poli and Arun, 2019). The three major aspects, which for analytical purposes we will address separately, are in fact more often than not intertwined in practice.

The first question, on the place of narratives of injustice and humiliation in radicalisation models, asks how politicians, the media and social sciences authors have taken into account this dimension, which is complex and controversial in the public debate in as much as it raises fears of violent or potentially violent individuals being de-responsibilised. The question of the role of injustices is extended by that of the recourse in radical circles to the historical past, which remains, as we shall see, relatively discreet in French approaches to Islamist radicalisation. The persistence of the taboo surrounding France’s colonial past and the stakes involved in recognising the history of immigration in France are directly linked to the relatively modest attention that radicalisation models pay to this issue.

The second question concerning the role of conspiracy theories and eschatological narratives in waves of radicalisation forces us to consider at least two major aspects depending on the perspective of the models: on the one hand, the place that these theories and narratives occupy in ideological forms of radical Islam, and on the other, the way in which they are perceived as more or less essential elements of knowledge and factors of adherence in the radicalisation process. Furthermore, the conspiracy theory notion is the subject of many debates from which we will draw a certain number of threads so as to link them to our overall reflection.

Finally, the third question, concerning the circumstances under which radical circles contribute or have contributed to the escalation of violence, leads us to reflect on the way in which violence is viewed in radicalisation models. As we have already pointed out, these models relate to very diverse milieus and populations whose relationships to violence cannot be placed on an equal footing. The place – and even the definition – of violence differ, sometimes considerably, from one model to another, and even within the same model, which is why we will deal with the broader question of the role of violence in approaches to radicalisation in this final section before problematising, rather than answering, the question of the circumstances surrounding the escalation of violence by radical milieus.

4.1. What role do the historical past and narratives of injustice or humiliation play in radical milieus, and in what ways do they shape processes of radicalisation?

When, at the beginning of the 1980s, debates on radical Islam emerged in France through the central notion of fundamentalism, the predominant issues were the political and religious dimensions of the phenomenon, viewed from an international perspective. Fundamentalism was perceived as a threat from the outside, as a spectre that hovered over France and was linked to the proselytising activity of foreign preachers, imams or political activists. However, media coverage of the issue remained sporadic. It was particularly evident in the context of the demands of specialised workers in the automotive sector at the beginning of the 1980s, or of the debate, still in its infancy at that time, about the increasing number of places of worship in France. As we saw with the specialised workers’ strikes, the question of Islam and its visibility in the public space was quickly linked to a fundamentalist interpretation of the phenomenon against the backdrop of the breakthrough of political Islamism abroad. Islam and Islamism seemed to be one and the same, and were suspected of making use of social debates and the theme of injustice to establish themselves in France. What can be seen from the 1980s onwards is the rise of the register of threats, which regularly merged with the notion of fundamentalism to evoke very different Islam-related
phenomena. Indeed, confusion seems to have set in between fundamentalism, in the sense of Islamic ideological movements, and a set of issues, practices and expressions of Islam in France around which was developed the narrative of a threat to the Republic, in opposition to the theme of integration, seen as essential to the political treatment of the issue of immigration. On the periphery of knowledge (very limited at the time) concerning the scope of Islamism in France, fundamentalism became, in common parlance, the negative counterpart of integration and the register of extreme otherness associated with Islam and more broadly with the immigrant population, against a backdrop of international tensions linked to the crises then plaguing several Muslim countries.

At the dawn of the 90s, the ‘Islamic veil affair’ was headline news and placed Islam in the role of the enemy of secularism. Secularism was then seen as an instrument (Coq, 1995) with which to repel a political Islam that wished to impose values considered contrary to those of the West. In 1989, the press took up the case of three schoolgirls in Creil who had been expelled from their school for wearing the veil. In amplifying the story, the media, it was suggested, caused genuine stigmatisation of veiled Muslim women, resulting in a kind of ‘anti-Muslim passion’ (Khosrokhavar and Gaspard, 1995). The defence of women’s rights appeared to be one of the main arguments, against a backdrop of the principle of secularism deployed ‘like a battle flag, a symbol to which “true” republicans were commanded to rally without needing to question its content [...] fulfil[ing] the role of a dogma’ (ibid.).

Academic research on susceptibility to radical Islam in France was very rare at that time, but helped to highlight the link between feelings of injustice and humiliation and adherence to radical Islam. The model developed by Farhad Khosrokhavar at the end of the 1990s, shone a spotlight on the contempt and indignity felt by young people who were turning to radical Islam.

Radical Islamism invariably originates in a social context where young extremists feel robbed of their dignity by a society that gives them no legitimate opportunity to access the benefits of modernity and condemns them to disdain (Khosrokhavar, 1997: 221).

This model, which is rooted in the study of the diversity of attitudes to Islam among young people in France (and not based on actors involved in terrorist networks, as is the case with other models) conceives, among other things, radical Islamism as an internalisation of rejection that infuses relationships with oneself and with society to the point of producing a kind of counter-racism aimed at society at large, perceived in an absolute manner as anti-Arab and anti-Muslim. It should be noted in passing that when we consider the factors behind radical Islam, the logic of cumulative radicalisation cannot be readily compared with the anti-Muslim radicalisation of the far right. Indeed, in the models we identified, there is nothing to suggest a reading of radical Islam in response to, or as a counterpoint to, the anti-Muslim logic within the French far right. It is not the existence of one extremist group in particular that feeds Islamist extremism, but rather a dynamic of radicalising Islam, that is a structural part of French society, perceived as particularly racist towards Muslims.

In France, the feeling of humiliation and alienation, of being a victim of widespread hatred and of Western arrogance is the predominant approach in this model of radicalisation. It is the political and ideological dimension and the feeling of humiliation that appear to be the foundations of radical Islam.

The perceived status of the victim is fundamental, because it creates the link between the personal situation and that of Muslims throughout the world (Laurence and Vaïsse, 2007).

Radical Islam is conceived as a revenge for the indignity experienced, particularly through racism, but also for the indignity either directly experienced by parents through their immigrant conditions, or vicariously experienced via the war in Iraq or Bosnia, which feeds the image of a ‘cynical and immoral West’ (Khosrokhavar, 1997: 232). Religion becomes a way of escaping from a humiliating condition, a humiliation suffered in the face of America and Israel, a humiliation within a French society that is afraid of Islamisation. According to Khosrokhavar, it is the conjunction between the reference to a major political
development (such as the rise of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in Algeria) and the humiliation suffered, the feeling of personal offence, that activates the shift to extremism (Khosrokhavar, 2007: 148).

We would like to put forward here a complementary hypothesis concerning the response that radical Islam can provide to feelings of injustice and humiliation, and how these feelings can be all the more easily instrumentalised by the advocates of radicalisation. We should not forget that the institutional recognition of racism and discrimination was particularly slow to emerge in France.

For a long time, only speech and writings of a racist nature could be penalised. There was no specific law making it possible to punish discriminatory acts, such as refusal to supply a good or refusal to hire, or dismissal on racial or religious grounds. The ‘Pleven’ Law of 1972 partially addressed these shortcomings by criminalising a number of everyday acts57. But beyond the question of whether or not specific legislative measures exist, there is also the issue of the resources available to countries to encourage and possibly help victims to take legal action. In the 1970s, the UK created a specialised body, the Commission for Racial Equality, responsible for investigating and dealing with cases of racial discrimination.

While largely influenced by the rise in international mobilisation around the concept of human rights since the end of the Second World War, the orientations and achievements of the fight against racism nevertheless depend primarily on the national political culture in which it is embedded. In France, it was not until the end of the 1990s that a dynamic process of institutionalising the fight against racism and racial discrimination emerged (Poli, 2005). Although individuals were then recognised as having the right to express their experience of racism and discrimination within the framework of a dedicated mechanism, it was rare that cases could be settled on the grounds of racism, i.e., that this experience was institutionally recognised right up to the courts. On the one hand, it should be noted that these complaints were, more often than others, the subject of a withdrawal or a decision to discontinue action on the grounds of insufficient evidence, both on the part of the victims and on the part of the institutions. Furthermore, the way they were handled often resulted in the racial dimension of the case being set aside, with the latter becoming based on other aspects (social, economic, relational) of the situation, which was reminiscent of the major trend in public action against racism since the 1980s. The main challenge raised by the existence of the first system for processing complaints of racism or racial discrimination lay in the difficulty of linking collective conceptions of these phenomena to their individual formulations. In this respect, the merit of this first mechanism was that it highlighted the lines of tension between these two elements, which were often difficult to reconcile. The transmission of complaints to the public prosecutor’s office remained rare, partly due to the institutions in question (police, judiciary) considering it unnecessary to process the case, but also because of the reluctance of individuals to initiate a procedure that was lengthy, costly and sometimes considered too onerous in light of the situation experienced. Lastly, young people, to whom this first attempt to have the State take ownership of ethno-racial discrimination was primarily directed, seemed reluctant to make use of the mechanism.

For a long time, up until the early 2000s, the relative vacuity of the fight against racism and discrimination in France and the slow advent of measures dedicated to helping victims left the field open for the accumulation of feelings of injustice and humiliation linked to the experience of racism. The themes of rage, hatred and daily struggle against a backdrop of social misery in particular, marked the study of the experience of young people in working-class districts.

It is nevertheless the case that feelings of injustice and humiliation were more or less recognised as factors explaining terrorism, or the threat of terrorism, in public discourse and categories of public action.

57 The so-called Pleven Law was passed on 1st July 1972, to punish incitement to hatred or discrimination, slander and libel, and racial abuse.
In her analysis of speeches made by politicians, security professionals, opinion leaders and intellectuals published in the French and British print media between 11 September 2001 and 19 March 2003, Tsoukala (2008) highlights the divergence between the two public discourses regarding the causes of terrorist threats. In her opinion, public debate in Britain hardly ever addressed the motivations of terrorists and was anchored in the metaphor of war, which tends to reinforce ‘social cohesion and national unity, and justifies the adoption of emergency laws, which are considered essential for the security of the population’ (Ibid.: 286).

In France, Tsoukala notes that:

the dominant image certainly remains that of abject criminal acts, aimed at all humanity, but which do indeed relate to a set of causes. This search for the underlying motives is broadly consensual, both among the major actors of the political class and among many intellectuals. Terrorism is generally linked to the despair of the weakest, the voiceless of the South, victims of misery, of democratic deficit and frustrations linked to the regional crises in the Middle East. These evils are caused or at least maintained by a North which, locked away in its ivory tower, feeds inequalities and violence, thus laying the ground for the great confrontations of the future. In October 2001, French President Jacques Chirac summed up this point of view in the following terms: ‘If it is false and dangerous to establish a direct link between terrorism and poverty, everybody can clearly see that there is a sequence of linkages between terrorism and fanaticism, a fanaticism which prospers on ignorance, humiliation, frustration, and poverty58’ (Ibid.: 287-8).

It is worth noting that feelings of injustice and humiliation lose their centrality in the most recent models of radicalisation, around which will be played out a controversy concerning the importance of ideological-religious factors in radicalisation processes (Kepel and Roy, 2019; Ferret and Khosrokhavar, 2020).

4.1.2 The role of the historical past

In many respects, the French understanding of the forms of relationship with radical Islam, as gradually defined from the 1990s onwards, seems to be locked in the present time (Archer, 2000). Although during this decade claims related to international current events, Algerian in particular, the theme of colonisation or racism experienced by the first generations is more rarely addressed.

For a long time, immigration was presented as being divorced from any memory reference in the public sphere. It was talked about as a process, a phenomenon, a problem, much more than in reference to individuals. We should not forget that while France had been, since the mid-nineteenth century, the country with the highest level of immigration in Europe, it had long resisted including this factor in its national narrative. In the 1980s, the pioneering work of Gérard Noiriel, Yves Lequin, and Patrick Weil began to introduce the issue into historical research, but for a long time there was a gap between the highly obvious – France is a society by virtue of its history – and the absence of any shared historical perspective from which to grasp this situation.

Unlike United Kingdom, where the theme of immigration – associated with the decolonisation process – was very early on thought to be at the heart of the functioning of society and considered in terms of relations between individuals, France essentially saw it as a solution for the labour that was needed for its economic development, particularly during the ‘Trente Glorieuses’ (the 30-year period following the Second World War) (Lapeyronnie, 1993). It was only later that various initiatives were able to give substance and meaning to this experience. More specifically, the emergence of industrial society and the aforementioned change in the representation of the immigrant could be considered the beginning of the

development of the process of recognising immigration as a historical phenomenon. And during this process, the growing sensitivity to individual narratives, to personal life and to the subjectivity of the actors played an important role – something that could be seen in other areas of collective life, where the rise of individualism implied that in the analysis of collective life, the subjectivity of individuals should be given an increasingly central place (Grenier, Grignon and Menger, 2001).

It is in the context where questions were arising on the place of the history of immigration in the national narrative and on the narration of this history, and where history was beginning to get to grips with immigration, that increasing attention was being paid to the history of immigration, not only in research, but also in the action of public authorities and various associative projects.

The history of immigration had long been one of the illegitimate aspects of France’s history, and to an even greater extent, of how France’s history was taught. The first victims of this insufficient coverage in research and even more so in education, were the descendants of immigrants, in particular, those from the Maghreb.

Objectively speaking, the memory of the colonial sequence occupies a decisive place in the ‘war of memories’ (Stora, 1991 ; Liauzu, 2003 ; Blanchard, 2005 ; Le Cour Grandmaison, 2006 ; Blanchard and Veyrat-Masson, 2008), and the French presence in Algeria was a social issue in both France and in Algeria.

As Séverine Labat (2012) points out, the new modalities of migration demonstrated the complexity of reconstructing post-colonial social and national identities (Blanchard, 2005), embedded in translocal solidarities and a multipolar spatiality (Blanchard and Bancel, 2006: 25-9) that questioned the place of the nation-state in forms of allegiance and identity.

The integration of the colonial episode into collective French representations weakened by globalisation would make it possible to rethink the question of otherness, and thus that of national construction, within the framework of a Republic which, without sinking into communitarianism, would be able to recognise a form of diversity in French society (Labat, 2012: 82).

However, this idea of diversity has, more often than not, been transmitted through phenomena embedded in social relations that are essentially conjugated in the present.

In numerous studies on the experience of descendants of immigrant parents, it is a recurring theme to see how difficult it is to link two strong identity references, one referring to the country of origin and the other to France. The evolution of the meanings of the term ‘beur’ offers an interesting example. As Wihtol de Wenden and Leveau (2001) have pointed out, the term ‘beur’ is first and foremost the result of a self-designation that reflects a way of positioning oneself in French society, a state of mind, a mode of expression that above all characterises urban banlieues and a certain type of commitment to fundamental rights. The difficulty of having to juggle between two countries was certainly a key theme in the ‘beur’ literature and cinema that emerged in the 1980s59. However, the idea of a conflict between two affiliations that are hard to connect, or even reconcile, gradually became central to representations of the experience of young people from immigrant backgrounds, mainly with regard to the suffering of being caught between two cultures, and more rarely as an opportunity or an asset.

59 Akli Tadjer’s novel, Les A.N.I du ‘Tassili’, (‘A.N.I’ having the sarcastic meaning of ‘Arabes Non Identifiés’ (Unidentified Arabs) and ‘Tassili’ being the name of the ferry between Marseille and Alger) highlights the weight of prejudice, of preconceived ideas, and the everyday dilemma of ‘beurs’ having to cope with their dual identity. The ferry’s to-ing and fro-ing between the two countries symbolises the movement of the pendulum as the ‘beurs’ oscillate between the two rival cultures. Mohammed Kenzi’s poetry evokes themes of heartbreak, solitude, suffering and indifference in a discriminatory society. In Le Thé au harem d’Archi Ahmed, Medhi Charef emphasises the generational gulf between Algerian parents who emigrated to France and their children who grew up there.
The descendants of immigrant parents are, in fact, often presented as the powerless and unconscious victims of the denial that has reigned over the treatment in schools and universities of this specific history, that of the constitution of France’s population and national history. They bear ‘this ever suspicious absence, this original fault that is consubstantial with the act of emigrating’\(^60\). The need, indeed the duty, to build the conditions for transmission has long been the subject of local initiatives, at city or district level.

Young people, who cannot identify with their family history, then present themselves as desubjectified, stripped of their historic memory. They are strangers to their own foreignness, which doesn’t allow them to be where they are. They may then be confronted with an unknown imaginary representation-space and a break in temporality (Rude Antoine, 2001\(^61\))

Identity themes have become increasingly important, starting with the religious theme of Islam. In addition to the ‘social’ theme, which always suggests negative or disqualifying images of immigration, frequently tinged with racism, there is Islam’s ‘identity’, which is widely perceived as threatening. And, in this situation, immigration has appeared far less as a historically embedded phenomenon than as an element specific to the current situation, a set of problems and threats – poverty, exclusion, the banlieue crisis, the ‘galère’ (daily struggle) of young people, to use François Dubet’s expression (1987), along with delinquency, radical Islamism and terrorism.

And, as a result, the generic term ‘immigration’ has become confusing and a source of conflation, in that it makes it possible to reference cultural, religious and ethnic differences, as well as individual and collective trajectories by condensing the past and present of individuals. The debate on immigration frequently focuses on a disparate set of phenomena and logics, more or less artificially brought together under a single label – integration, diversity, multiculturalism, racism, communitarianism, banlieues – or else focuses solely on experiences without unity, treated in their specificity, without reference to an analytical framework that would integrate them; we then speak, for example, about ‘young people of immigrant origin’, Islam, or undocumented migrants.

These issues of recognition relating both to France’s colonial past and to the history and memory of immigration are reflected in the denial, or even rejection, of the ability of immigrants to pass this history on to their children and, more generally, in the very limited consideration given to these issues in the interpretation of all of the questions relating to immigration and Islam in France.

Whatever forms it may take, the Islam of the younger generations is defined as a break with that of their parents, which is in the process of disintegration, and is in any case limited to the private sphere and confined, willingly or otherwise, to a certain discretion.

Radical Islamism is thus considered to be an extreme form rooted in social exclusion and distance from the cultural norms of the parents. This perspective has undoubtedly helped to create an anomic view of young Muslims as attaching little importance to their families and family history, and a relative neglect of the analysis of the finer narrative of history within families.

The issue of the historical past is rarely addressed directly by interviewees in studies of radical Islam, but it is used by some authors as an explanatory model for radicalisation, particularly when western prejudices about Islam are discussed.

As Khosrokhavar, for example, points out,

\(^{60}\) Sayad (1991).

the western image of contemporary Islam remains distorted not only by historically inherited prejudices, but also by the vision of the immigrant population whose parents and grandparents came to Europe in the 1960s to seek work, often with the blessing of European countries experiencing labour shortages’. Similarly, from the standpoint of Islam, colonisation and decolonisation haunt the image of both the Self and the Other (Khosrokhavar, 2007: 39).

Even if the question of the historical past cannot on its own explain radicalisation, we feel it is fundamental to give it a systematic place in reflection on radicalisation and to examine its significance in subjective interpretations of radicalisation, in relation to family, local, national and international memories, traces of which can be found in ‘archetypal events’ (Khosrokhavar, 2007: 369), which remain a common feature ‘for Islamists’.

4.2 What roles have conspiracy theories and eschatological narratives played in the ‘waves’ of radicalisation?

Another research question guiding our reflection in this report is that of the role of conspiracy theories and eschatological narratives in radicalisation models in France since the early 1980s. We can straightaway highlight that in approaches to radicalisation the issues specific to eschatological narratives stand out more than those relating to conspiracy theories. It is nevertheless important to take epistemological aspects into account in order to understand this difference, which affects the way these two questions are treated and consequently makes it difficult to place them on the same level of analysis.

4.2.1 Conspiracy theories

The first part of this section examines the role that conspiracy theories play in radicalisation models. To begin with, we feel it is important to remember that the very idea of conspiracy theory raises important issues concerning the related risks of excess or default reaction. One is in fact constantly tempted to either minimise or amplify phenomena that reflect a form of extremism in our societies. This question of looking at things in an excessive fashion or by default is therefore not exclusive to the identification and understanding of conspiracy theories, in as much as it forces us to confront the complex discrepancies – specific to the modern world – that are regularly found between the objective and subjective dimensions, the real and the imaginary. To think in terms of conspiracy theories is thus to run the risk of skipping a level of analysis and, here or there, to slip into the ideology of pre-established interpretations, whatever they may be, in one direction or another. As Kreis (2015: 63) points out:

it would appear necessary, beyond academic quarrels and stances, for the scientific community to strive to establish a common definition of ‘conspiracy theories’ and what they comprise, or else, like Jack Z. Bratich (2008) and Lance deHaven-Smith (2013), we will have to give up on making them an object of study.

Additionally, Urbanski (2020) reasons, when tackling the analysis of the fine line between a theory asserting the existence of a conspiracy and ‘a conspiracy theory’, the latter expression can be a ‘powerful disqualifying label’.

We know, for example, that the theory whereby the Second Iraq War was primarily motivated by oil interests has been described as a ‘conspiracy theory’ by Tony Blair, with a

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62 As highlighted by Khosrokhavar’s interviews, this may take the form of experiences of racist insults (an inmate’s sister called a ‘filthy Arab’ in one case), or of Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) events in 1992 in Algeria, for another inmate.

63 The health crisis taking place at the time of writing, with its overflow of information and the need to constantly reconstruct some kind of coherency, is a major illustration of this.
distinctly pejorative connotation (Pigden, 2012). Similarly, Blair called a by no means absurd theory that Bush was planning to bomb the Al-Jazeera television station in Qatar a ‘conspiracy theory’ (a memorandum from the President had been leaked to the press, leading to criminal investigation). Might not the label ‘conspiracy theory’ therefore be a convenient way to disqualify ideas that are unpopular? (Ibid.).

In other words, a theory that suggests a conspiracy is not necessarily false, even though it is labelled as a ‘conspiracy theory’ and therefore disqualified. It is in this sense that Urbanski proposes several options for the study of conspiracy theories: either focus on the social threat they constitute by uncovering the irrational basis on which they are founded, or take the precaution of starting from a more nuanced conception that designates them as theories, justified or not, that assert a conspiracy, by studying their mechanisms of accreditation and disqualification. These two proposals encourage us in any case to be cautious, and to consider in a relatively modest fashion here how the notion of conspiracy theory is mobilised in certain models of radicalisation.

4.2.1 An initial instance of agreement between conspiracy theory and radical Islam

The link between conspiracy theory and radical Islam essentially emerged following the attacks of 11/09/2001. Indeed, 2002 saw the publication of ‘Les territoires perdus de la République’, a work dealing with anti-Semitism in certain schools in the banlieues and, among other things, discussing the idea of Jewish conspiracy as a recurrent theme in the discourse of the pupils. Based on teachers’ testimonies describing the verbal and physical anti-Semitism towards Jewish pupils and their difficulty in teaching the Shoah, the book gives a spectacular warning of the existence of a new anti-Semitism which mainly concerns pupils of North African origin and in some cases results in the denunciation of a Jewish conspiracy.

The media and political treatment of the book nevertheless sets aside the question of conspiracy, which is more firmly rooted in the association between Islam and communitarianism. As is often the case in France, debates on the behaviour of ‘young people from the banlieues’ and ‘young people from immigrant backgrounds’ play on tensions between two lines of interpretation, pulling the analysis either towards the social, inequality and injustice aspects, or towards the ethnicisation of social relations and the blacklisting of Islam, in particular through the theme of ‘communitarian deviations’. The majority of the articles tend to agree that a ‘community withdrawal’ is at the root of the problems:

Jewish high-school students insulted, humiliated, even beaten by fellow students of North African origin, demonstrative disruptions of fasting in class during Ramadan, teachers taken to task by students criticising – on the grounds of ethnic or religious affiliation – the content of lessons, black schoolchildren who say at the start of primary school: ‘This is a Black Power school’. The rise of racist and anti-Semitic incidents observed in schools mobilises the political class and causes it to fear phenomena of community withdrawal.

A few rare articles challenge the political dynamic of the denunciation of ‘communitarian deviations’ or ‘communitarisation’, terms employed by the Minister of National Education Luc Ferry. Two journalists in Le Monde of April 11, 2003 criticised ‘the erroneous debate on communitarianism’ that had taken hold in the political sphere:

In linking, even indirectly, ZEP and ‘communitarianism’, the minister is confusing two distinct notions: territory and community. Because what characterises ZEPs is that they are defined by the existence of a ‘zone’ educating pupils from underprivileged backgrounds […] We should also point out the contradictions of a certain sovereigntist discourse: it rightly

64 Le Monde, 27 February 2003.
65 Zones d’Éducation Prioritaires (priority education zones).
denounces racist and anti-Semitic attacks in schools, wants to regain ‘the lost territories of the Republic’ (from the title of a book by Brenner, 2002: Les territoires perdus de la République. Antisémitisme, racisme et sexisme en milieu scolaire), but at the same time points to ‘the Islamist offensive’ and ‘the North-African classes’ as being solely responsible. In such a way that, on the pretext of preaching the good word of the Republic, conflicts become ‘ethnicised’. A religious reading grid is pinned to situations that are primarily to do with the social relegation and violence in council estates in the banlieues. Even more serious: the pupils concerned are labelled as ‘young Muslim North-Africans’; they are locked into an ethno-religious category that no longer has anything to do with the republican vision.

The two journalists’ comments illustrate the interpretative dualism into which many politicians have plunged the republican vision which, on the one hand, seems to allow the harshest criticism to be made of an entire section of the population by using ethnic, cultural and religious identity elements to label it, and on the other, finds no political response other than to enforce their strictest obliteration.

Behind this debate, and as pointed out in the Minister of National Education’s comments above, it was urban policy – reduced to ‘positive discrimination’, as we have seen66 – that would fuel this phenomenon of community withdrawal:

If many young people no longer wish to integrate French society and the Republic and no longer cultivate community reflexes, is it not primarily because urban policy has built social and ethnic ghettos, because they are denied success at school and integration in employment, and because the cultures in which they grew up are despised?67

Faced with public action and the structuring of the group of teacher-authors, we see here the emergence of an explanatory schema that differs from the rise of radical Islamism denounced in The Lost Territories. The public action that was taken focused on the fight against racism and anti-Semitism, albeit under the cover of the fight against communitarianism and the broader theme of respect for secularism, which gradually gained ground over the course of 2003.

While The Lost Territories tends to focus on a denunciation of the rise of Islamism, sexism and anti-Semitism among young people of North African origin and has triggered a huge debate, the political response, following the introduction of a plan against racism and anti-Semitism, was to concentrate on strengthening secularism, followed by the drafting of a law prohibiting religious symbols in schools.

To some extent the question of conspiracy theories then remained on the fringes of studies of radical Islam. As we pointed out in the section on contextualisation, it was more the issue of antisemitism – which, as we have seen in the extensive research programme led by Michel Wieviorka, was likely to be based on delusional fantasy logics of Jewish hatred and conspiracy theories about their supposed omnipotence (Wieviorka, 2005) – that was to become the focus of attention. The link between antisemitism and Islam (and not radical Islam in particular) was among other things studied through the prison experience and was especially reflected in the increasingly expressed conviction that the West first and foremost supported Jews.

In what he was told by young Muslims he met in prison in the early 2000s, Khosrokhavar (2005) identifies two aspects of anti-Semitism: one general, the other specific to the prison situation, whereby the ‘Jewish’

66 In France, tentative measures of ‘affirmative action’ were introduced from 1981 under the initiative of the Minister of national Education, Alain Savary, to create ZEPs (priority education zones) and to allocate additional resources to educational establishments in deprived areas, or with the urban policy of the Juppé government in the middle of the 1990s, proposing ‘free zones’ where companies benefited from tax advantages to encourage them to set up and create economic activity in areas where none existed.

problem was visible ‘among imprisoned Muslims’. The general angle relates firstly to the attacks of 11 September 2001 and to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and only secondly to French society. The specific angle is the differential treatment of Muslims and Jews in prison (kosher and halal meat, religious practice), a treatment that is easy to observe and which in many respects relates to general characteristics of French society and institutions. In this representation,

the Jewish community provides Jews not only with economic but also symbolic means of defence: their value as Jews is exaggerated, whereas Muslims cannot publicly claim to be Muslims through fear of being stigmatised and suspected of fundamentalism or even radical Islamism (Ibid.: 184)

In his opinion, the dual nature, both internal and external, of antisemitism among young Muslims, which becomes a kind of outlet to escape from the weight of confusion between Islam and radical Islam, is thus very clear.

The theme of the impurity of the Jew in traditional Islam would have no anti-Semitic impact if it were not mixed with a modern register wherein the Jew is perceived as a vassal of the West or of the United States, and an ally of the enemies of Allah. The combination of these dimensions, internal and external, traditional and modern, gives rise to modes of Judeophobia that can vary significantly (Ibid.).

Once again, it is important to distinguish between positions circulating within the academic sphere and those found in public debate. Between 2002 and 2003, the conspiracy theme emerged in public debate through the denunciation of antisemitism at local, national and global levels - mainly in the school environment. In academic studies on radical Islam, which were still rare at this time but which were beginning to attract interest due to the debate on Islam in prison and anti-Semitism, the use of the term ‘conspiracy theories’ as such was seldom used. It should be noted, however, that the link between conspiracy theories and radical Islam emerged gradually from the growing attention being paid to antisemitism.

At the political level, as we pointed out in section 2.5, the defence of secularism remained the matrix for dealing with the question of Islam in France.

The approaches to radical Islam that developed in France in the middle of the noughties underlined a rejection of the West as a space of moral depravity. Hatred of the West could sometimes be illustrated or extended by forms of conspiracy theory. The idea of conspiracy also appeared more or less explicitly in the models of radicalisation developed by Khosrokhavar, when he highlights the image of the West among Al-Qaeda followers in prison. This is what he defines through the notion of the ‘obsidional representation’ of Islam (Khosrokhavar, 2007: 118), which refers to a dominant West that wishes to crush Islam and put Muslims in mortal danger. The interview with Mohammad is particularly illustrative of this tendency, which places the theme of hypocrisy at its core. Yet Khosrokhavar only refers to the idea of conspiracy when he mentions how some of the people he interviewed talked about September 11 (Majid: 187 or Mourad: 265), which was not the work of Bin Laden but of Jews or the CIA.

In contrast to this period, the question of conspiracy theories occupies a growing place in the development of the most recent models of radicalisation. The major campaign against conspiracy theories following the Charlie Hebdo attacks (7 January 2015) was for a time to strengthen the link between conspiracy theories and radicalisation in the public debate but without leading to targeted public action on this issue.

On Wednesday 7 January 2015, an attack on the editorial staff of satirical weekly Charlie Hebdo killed 12 people. Just a few hours after the tragedy, the Égalité et Réconciliation and Réseau Voltaire websites,
known for their links with the far right, attributed the attack to a Zionist plot\(^{68}\). That same day, the French Conspiracy Watch site published an article listing the first conspiracy theories relating to the Charlie Hebdo attack\(^{69}\). The very next day, several press organisations such as L'Express or Rue89 denounced the various conspiracy theories in online articles. It was also the next day, 8 January, that the Minister of National Education, Najat Vallaud-Belkacem, asked the pedagogical staff in French schools to organise a minute’s silence in homage to the victims. In the days that followed, in the press, teachers reported the incidents that had peppered this minute of silence and the debates that the event had generated. Some of them referred to the students’ challenging the ‘official version’ whereby the perpetrators of the massacre had been mandated by Al-Qaeda. Testimonies flooded into the media, particularly from teachers denouncing the protests of certain students during the minute of silence, echoing the period of the early 2000s.

When announcing eleven measures to be taken following the attack on Charlie Hebdo, the Minister of National Education insisted on the need to continue the work begun during the consultation. The fight against conspiracy was then initially based on the transmission of the values of the Republic. The problem of conspiracy was not considered to be a subject in its own right but as a support for the promotion of Republican values.

At the end of January 2015, the www.stop-djihadisme.gouv.fr website was made public by the Prime Minister’s office. Designed to inform, prevent and report radical behaviour, this site made the link between conspiracy and jihadism in its section on ‘The mechanisms of radicalisation’. Conspiracy was referred to as a hindrance to the values of the Republic:

Conspiracy theories stigmatise and slander individuals or groups of people. They can therefore reinforce the sense of injustice or betrayal of some people and fuel hatred. By touching on the legal limits of freedom of expression, such speech also affects the values of the Republic. They take many forms: negationism, racism, anti-Semitism, hate speech in general, and even incitement to terrorism.

Immediately after the attacks, we find here several superimposed frames: anti-Semitism, the values of the Republic and incitement to hatred or terrorism. In all of these cases, the denunciation of conspiracy is the result of the political approach.

At the same time, in January 2015, the National Education system introduced a ‘radicalisation’ mission, entrusted to the French office of health, social action and security, within the DGESCO (department in charge of school education). Resources were produced for educational teams by the national education department, such as a booklet entitled ‘Preventing the radicalisation of young people’, in which conspiracy is not mentioned, thus constituting a significant shift away from the vision of radicalisation put forward by the Prime Minister’s Office. An inter-ministerial group led by Matignon was quickly created to work on a major plan to combat radicalisation. The plan was inaugurated by the Prime Minister in May 2016 and the school system was called upon to play its part in the fight against radicalisation, particularly by teaching about the media and information and the fight against conspiracy. One of the measures of this plan aimed to ‘prevent the risks of conspiracy influence, violent radicalisation or desocialisation through an action plan that seeks to develop a culture of debate and discussion among pupils’. An unequivocal link was made here between conspiracy and violent radicalisation. According to the Prime Minister’s memorandum dated 13 May 2016\(^{70}\), the aforementioned plan had five main objectives: prevention, identification and reporting, intervention by local authorities and other institutions, improved awareness of all public agents, and the monitoring and exchange of good practices. Yet within the National

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\(^{69}\) Article published 7 January 2015 “Charlie Hebdo: les premières réactions complotistes” on [www.conspiracywatch.info].

\(^{70}\) [http://circulaires.legifrance.gouv.fr/index.php?action=afficherCirculaire&hit=1&retourAccueil=1&r=40895]
Education system, this link is rarely made in such a clear manner, even though radicalisation is the subject of public action. Indeed, from the beginning of 2016, the ‘conspiracy’ file would no longer be the responsibility of the office in charge of radicalisation at the DGESCO, but of the *Mission d’accompagnement et de formation* (mission of accompanying and training), which was to turn it into a ‘critical spirit’ issue, shifting it away from an interpretation that was strictly linked to radicalisation. But the ambiguity between these two issues against which the education system had launched public policies remained strong, especially for teachers.71

The challenge of drawing the contours of conspiracy theories also takes us towards a fundamental debate on the status of truth in our societies and on the imperative of verifying information that questions the notion of a crisis of confidence in the media. The search for truth has become an issue in modern societies. There are countless media outlets, programmes, TV series, etc., that specialise in fact-checking. There is a tendency to obsess over the facts, which also marks an accelerating trend towards immediacy. As Patrick Michel points out, we have moved into the era of post-truth. Truth has lost its value as a benchmark in public debate, to be replaced by beliefs and emotions aroused or encouraged by fake news that has gone viral, mainly due to social networks. These different logics surrounding the same phenomenon tend to encourage the idea that there is always another truth behind what we are shown, and help to transform the boundaries between the real and the imaginary. A major statistical and qualitative survey of 7,000 high school students from the Aix-Marseille, Créteil, Dijon and Lille academies (Galland and Muxel, 2018) studied the rise of a culture of necessary decoding or verification within information systems among young people and proposed another model of radicalisation: ‘fictional radicalisation’ (Cicchelli and Octobre, 2018), which directly highlights the links between conspiracy theories and radicalisation. The two authors draw two major conclusions from their study. Firstly, a relationship to the media among young people that is somewhat mistrustful due to the strong competition between established facts and alternative facts, official truths and alternative truths, that tends to render paradoxical the situation of young people with regard to the media. On the one hand, they express massive distrust of media discourse, believing that the truth is being hidden from them. 67% of them think that the media did not tell the whole truth about the attacks. On the other hand, they nevertheless continue to trust the traditional media (48%), even though they claim to have recourse to personal ideas (33%). During the interviews, many high school students expressed grave doubts concerning the ‘official’ nature of the media’s versions of the attacks. According to the authors, the survey also reveals a valorisation of personal ideas or opinions which is based in particular on juvenile media-cultures that offer them ‘narrative schemas for interpreting reality’, in which secrets, conspiracies and false visions are at the heart of overlapping enigmas. Finally, the authors point out that digital technology makes young people actors of information and cultural content through the possibility of transforming and sharing the meaning that they make of them, as a way of expressing their individuality. According to Cicchelli and Octobre, the ‘conspiracy mentality’ can be linked to five explanatory factors:72 a lack of economic integration (56% of those whose fathers are unemployed or have never worked adhere totally or partially to conspiracy theories and 59% in the case of the mothers); a feeling of discrimination (high-school students who say they have been discriminated against are more inclined to adhere to conspiracy explanations (58%) and those who have experienced ethnic-religious discrimination are even more so inclined (63%)); a feeling of injustice: high school students who feel that French society is unjust adhere much more strongly to conspiracy explanations (71%). In addition, those who refute the legitimacy of the republican motto are more likely to adhere to conspiratorial ideas: this is the case for 57% of those who attach no importance

71 On this matter see Sarah Haderbache’s M2 thesis ‘La lutte contre le complotisme comme politique éducative, entre relativisation et stigmatisation’ under the supervision of Cyril Lemieux, September 2017, EHESS Paris.

to the three elements of the republican motto; failure at school: more high-school students who are dissatisfied with their educational orientation seem to adhere to these theories (57%); the influence of religion: the level of conspiracy is higher among young Muslims (64%), among those who have received an education in which religion was very important (60%), among those who make the religious community their first horizon of belonging (58%), and those who attach considerable importance to it in their cultural activities (62%), or who feel very close to immigrant communities (58%).

The ‘informational radicality’ that concerns approximately 9% of the young people in the study relates to a remoteness from traditional media, which goes hand in hand with an adherence to alternative truths, a permeability to conspiracy theories and participation in the distribution of Daesh videos (through consumption (45%) or the rebroadcasting of videos (4%), Cicchelli and Octobre, 2018).

Conceptualising radicalisation on the basis of young people’s conspiracy theories nevertheless tends to reduce the phenomenon of radicalisation to a particularly broad generational and ethnic set. Moreover, this type of model tells us nothing about the link or shifts between the climate (the conspiracy mentality and, within it, informational radicality) and the serious acts, the acts of violence linked to radical Islam.

In any case, the relative success of conspiracy theories among the young people in the panel remains overwhelmingly independent of an aspiration to radicalisation. ‘Conspiracy explanations, in other words the existence of hidden reasons, underground links, occult forces, secret pacts, are particularly effective in that they are said to lift the veil on a reality that is allegedly hidden from us all. A disturbing, worrying, even terrifying reality that only the bravest, the pure of heart, the most honest citizens are supposed to be able to look at without failing’ (Nicolas, 2016). We can therefore see that the question of conspiracy theories can be linked to other explanatory factors that are as varied as a taste for adventure, a form of heroism, or paranoid delirium.

For example, susceptibility to conspiracy theories is considered to be one of the factors used by Daesh in its recruitment strategies, supported by an interpretation of international current events and combined with a search for self in humanitarianism or a new ‘revolutionary romanticism’. According to the former spokesman of SOS-Racisme (Malek Boutih), one of the factors of ‘voluntary and positive commitment to jihadism is adherence to a political project, to an ideology of rupture with decadent western societies. What Daesh offers echoes the contestation of American imperialism, conspiracy and anti-Semitic theories, elements present at different levels in the imaginations of the young (Palestinians oppressed by Jews supported by the United States, the media infiltrated to format consumers, etc.). Its discourse is judiciously based on the reality of the multiplication of international conflicts and diplomatic ambiguities: chaos in Iraq, war in Libya, the financing of armed groups by certain Gulf countries. Young people’s sensitivity to international and geopolitical issues explains why many have been lured by the propaganda surrounding the martyred Syrian people, decimated in the indifference of the international community and under the gaze of leading world powers. And this lure works just as well with young girls in search of purity, eager to become involved in humanitarian work, who have a very idealised and naive vision, as it does with young men who are filled with “hatred” of the French state and dreaming of taking action. No matter how violent the jihadist action may be, it drapes itself with the attractions of something that resembles a new revolutionary romanticism’ (Boutih, 2016: 82-3).

Bouzar (2016) also makes conspiracy theories a key piece of the puzzle of warning signs among young people seduced by radical Islam by contrasting them with religious signs. She believes the first indicator that should be taken into consideration is when a young person begins to look at the world through a completely paranoid reading grid. Her analysis is based on a panel of one thousand young people monitored by the CPDSI (Centre for the Prevention of Sectarian Deviations linked to Islam). Seeing the Internet to be the most essential, albeit non-exclusive, means of disseminating these theories, she points out that a sort of ‘first layer’ of susceptibility to radical Islam is created through propaganda which consists in convincing young people that they live in a world corrupted by lies, and that they should not trust any
adult. This invitation to break away is based on proven or likely scandals relating to food, drugs, vaccines, history, politics, etc. After instilling this initial doubt, there follows an explanatory phase that encompasses ‘these lies’ within a global conspiracy theory that makes secret societies – protected by Israel, such as the Illuminati, who have ‘put to sleep’ or ‘bought’ all adults, in order to monopolise power and science – the main protagonists of all the mysteries of power. ‘These secret societies supposedly invented HIV and the Ebola virus, organised unemployment, added chemical substances to food… At this stage, the young person has the feeling that he/she is more discerning than the masses, that he/she is the only one to see clearly, that all of the adults around him/her are corrupt, and that he/she should therefore distrust them’ (Bouzar, 2016: 169). The use of an approach to Islam as the only thing defying these dark forces and as the only thing capable of saving the world only takes place downstream of this form of disengagement. In other words, conspiracy theories pave the way for the reception of ‘non-negotiable or non-debatable values’ within the jihadist discourse that have been highlighted by researchers such as Marwan Shehadeh and Mohamed Abou Roumane.

Also noteworthy is the important investigation led by Alava, Najjar and Hussein (2017) about radicalisation and social media, which shows through a corpus of language interaction voluntarily derived from Facebook interactions (12 people in the process of radicalisation and 6 people out of this process) and the lexicometric study of the public discourses of radical groups (jihadists, racists), that conspiracy theories are one of the three key phases of the radicalisation trajectory on the Internet. According to the three authors, the radical conversation is indeed structured in most cases in three phases (rupture discourse – conspiracy theory – Salafist discourse) (Ibid.: 36).

In France, we can therefore see that radicalisation models approach conspiracy theories in very different ways: they are given relatively fleeting consideration in models that emerge from public policies fighting different phenomena (anti-Semitism, radicalisation within the range of its various conceptions by the State), and more often than not covered by the register of secularism. The overhaul of public action relating to secularism allowed the State to avoid moving towards more specific registers associated with the question of differences and was a sign of the principle of secularism being mobilised as a rallying point for its action.

4.2.2. The eschatological narratives

In the late 1990s, Khosrokhavar emphasised the singular relationship to death that was associated with adherence to radical Islamism. The centrality of the discourse on the afterlife also symbolised a rupture with the world and more particularly with modernity. ‘In radical Islamism, death becomes an obsessive form that is rooted in profound failure’ (Khosrokhavar, 1997: 234). This focus on death is one of the forms of expression of opposition to society that can be summed up as a racist entity. The inclination towards radical Islamism can be translated here into a sort of extreme fervour which does not necessarily take the form of radical activism but which can lead to mental confinement causing one to relate any aspect or activity of daily life, any relationship, back to religion. The obsession with death appears to be a social phenomenon that catalyses all the failures and all the real and imaginary barriers that mark the existence of certain young people through their social conditions and through being assigned to the difference (ethno-racial, religious) to which they are reduced. Here we can once again refer to the very slow and ambivalent process of recognising ethno-racial discrimination in France.

The theme of death clearly reappears in the first major investigation that Khosrokhavar carried out in prison with male inmates who were members of the Al-Qaeda movement. In his opinion, Islam-related extremism is based on a subculture of death (Khosrokhavar, 2007: 120) which constitutes a kind of

supreme revenge on the dominant West, a sort of horizon of expectation (Koselleck) that marks an absolute distance from western morals and values.

Through the relationship with death, there is also a dimension of subversion. The most recent models of radical Islam, which concern what has more recently been called jihadism, give a central place to the culture of death.

According to Jeffrey (2017),

Jihadists deliberately seek death in situations of self-sacrifice. They want to be martyrs, inspired by Allah, a God in whose name they allow themselves to inflict the worst cruelties, the worst punishments. [...] They act with total impunity and feel no guilt.

Thomson (2016), who was able to interview young French jihadists, reports that most of them construct a murderous legitimacy on the basis of a global vision of unanimous sharing of the ideas of the coalition against the Islamic state. The figure of the enemy can therefore be expanded as far as one wishes, making it possible to find a connection between what is good and the death of others. As Crouzet and Kepel point out, ‘if the victim is evil, the killer is innocent’ (2015: 9).

Interpretations of the eschatological vision of radical Islam are undoubtedly even more variable and complex than the principal models suggest. While confinement in a mortiferous dimension seems to be guided by a feeling of failure that combines with all moments of life, the conception of a pleasure or of a disinhibition to kill and to seek death has taken on considerable importance, especially with regard to the young people who have departed for Syria.

According to Roy, contemporary jihadist itineraries correspond to a form of nihilism that places death at the very heart of the individual terrorist’s and jihadist’s project and on which his approach to the ‘Islamisation of extremism’ is based (Roy, 2016). Daesh (the Islamic State) offers young volunteers a narrative construction in which a suicide attack is an objective and which plays on the fear of Islam in the West. Roy sees young people’s mortiferous projects as stemming from a generational nihilism that tends to relate modern life to a kind of emptiness.

In another vein, Blin (2018) describes the journey of young jihadists to Syria as a sort of initiation rite in response to a revolt against society and the family. This mobility founds ‘an exotic rebirth of the self’ that draws on the western imaginary of the East and makes it possible to transcend the feeling of being rejected by society. ‘Jihadists instrumentalise Islam in the same way that the West plays with the East’ (Blin, 2018: 199). Blin here brings their imaginary relationship with Islam closer to the fantasised vision of the Muslim religion of western travellers in the 19th and 20th centuries. In this sense, radicalisation is based on the same logic of exoticising the Other that marks a literary and artistic genre (the voyage to the East) and is part of the movement to define French identity in reference to the Other.

For these people suffering from illnesses of identity and the imaginary, Islam fulfils the same function as that of the East for our travellers of the past, who were confused by modernisation, nostalgic for a mythical past and dreaming of finding a paradise lost on the roads of the East. The oriental mirage of the European jihadist joins that of Victor Hugo when he asserts that ‘the East was once the paradise of the world’ (Blin, 2018: 2014).

4.3. The role of violence

In this work of contextualisation at a national level, one final question consists in explaining the role that violence plays in radicalisation models, and in attempting to identify the circumstances under which radical milieus contribute towards the escalation of violence.
4.3.1 The encounter between violence from here and elsewhere

As we have already pointed out in the first section of this report, the transnational aspect of violence was to become an integral part of the conception of radical Islam from the early 1980s onwards.

The radical Islamist movements that have been emerging in the Muslim world since the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 have gradually become, particularly with the advent of Al Qaeda, a veritable symbol both among young second- and third-generation immigrants suffering from social disaffiliation and from discrimination in many areas of social life and among young converts. The ideological support and the horizon of meaning that these movements offered meant that they had taken over from an anti-imperialist dimension by designating Europe and the United States as enemy figures.

The profiles of certain individuals tried for acts of terrorism during the 1990s marked the meeting point between radical ideology and that associated with settling scores, banditry and various forms of criminality in the banlieues. Reciprocal instrumentalisation thus seems to have been at play between various groups.

With regard, as we have seen above, to the intertwining of spatial dimensions (the space of the banlieues), origin and gender, and religion in the process of categorising immigration in France since the 1970s – a question that was to be the initial entry point for the debate on radical Islam in the 1980s, which section 1 supports by drawing up a socio-historical fresco of the major models of radicalisation from one decade to the next – it is important to take account of this overlap by considering the links between violence and radical Islam from different angles.

Suburban space, ethnicity, Islam, and gender structure the question of radical Islam in the form of an entanglement created by these four major registers that constantly operate as synonyms of one other.

The question of the role of violence in models of radicalisation can henceforth be considered from several perspectives so as to highlight the links and connections between Islam and violence, between Islam and radical Islam, and between radical Islam and violence. Indeed, we wish to underline how radicalisation combines various conceptions of violence that intersect with the radicalisation of Islam as Kepel argues and the Islamisation of radicality as Roy claims to take up the categories of a controversy that has marked debates on radical Islam in France in recent years.

We might first consider not only in what way the debate on urban violence was to gradually join with that of Islam through the theme of delinquency in the banlieues, but also the links between delinquency and radical Islam based on the pathway of French terrorists in the 1990s.

The central nature of the urban theme in the French debate is largely due to the development of delinquency prevention policies which, as from the 1980s, led to local authorities and associations becoming involved in the prevention of violence.

Without going into the many nuances of urban policies, we believe it is important to focus on the expression ‘urban violence’ which became a central category of institutional discourse on juvenile delinquency at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s and which gradually became commonplace throughout society, clearly orienting public action. The intelligence services were given the task of mapping ‘sensitive neighbourhoods’ in France in an attempt to measure the extent of ‘urban violence’. These were steeped in the threat associated with Islam-related forms of religiosity, causing the institutional expertise on urban violence to deploy a dual presumption of the guilt and danger of young people of North African origin.

The confusion between young people of ‘immigrant background’ living in working-class neighbourhoods and the theme of delinquency was recurrent. At the beginning of the 2000s, Jean-Claude Carle and Jean-Pierre Schosteck, rapporteurs for the Senate’s commission of inquiry on juvenile delinquency, referred to

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the ‘higher rate of delinquency among young people from immigrant backgrounds’\(^7\). The two rapporteurs reappropriated the categories and results of a sociological survey (Roché, 2000) which distinguished between young people of ‘French origin’, ‘mixed origin’, ‘other foreign origin’ and ‘North African origin’ and emphasised the fact that ‘adolescents whose parents were both born outside France commit 46% of serious crimes. The explanations that the authors of the report retain with regard to the ethnic aspect of the delinquency phenomenon reflected the oscillation, and to an even greater extent the paradox, raised by this approach via ethnic categories, banned elsewhere in the French context. We might indeed recall here that the idea of young people from the banlieues as victims of racism and discrimination has long been challenged. The denunciation of racism has often been weighed against, and consequently called into question by, the issue of urban violence and delinquency and the role of young people as actors of insecurity. The idea of a conditional treatment of racism and discrimination has thus become established in France on the basis of an increase in the demands and requirements that the populations concerned be integrated.

Moreover, the very nature of the debate surrounding the immigration issue – sometimes raised to shed light on problems in the banlieues, sometimes linked to the conditions for acquiring French nationality – has challenged the place of young descendants of immigrant parents in French society and reflects the tension between rejection and reception that persists from generation to generation.

### 4.3.2 Violence: a question of the fine line between radicalisation and non-radicalisation

The issue of violence plays a central albeit non-exclusive role in the process of modelling radical Islam. In particular, approaches to radicalisation propose diverse articulations between ideology and violent action. It is not sufficient to understand the phenomenon of radicalisation through a posteriori vision following an act of violence; it also means seeking an understanding of the mechanisms that lead to the act. As a result, through logics of security and of the prevention of radicalisation, forms of interpretation of radicalisation (State and institutional forms in particular) contribute to removing violent action from its definition. The temporal and practical scope of violent action can therefore change significantly and shift from the idea of an act to the idea of a project, an intention, support or even susceptibility.

Many approaches have attempted to offer a general perspective on the transition to violence – be they theories of relative frustration (Gurr, 1970), resource mobilisation (McCarthy and Zald, 1977; Tilly, 1978) or links between culture and violence (Adorno et al., 1950), to name but a few – yet without taking into account political and social mediations, or the temporality of the transition from susceptibility to violence to the violent act. The problem with these broad approaches to violence is the monocausal perspective through the rise in generality that they propose of the phenomenon, which tends to make us lose sight of more contextual elements that, to varying extents, relate to the question of the historical past. These are all issues that the modelling of radicalisation has to face, while at the same time partially overcoming it by highlighting a whole range of factors that explain the escalation of violence.

It should be noted that all models of radicalisation offer a perspective on the issue of violence, though with varying degrees of centrality and while also offering more or less clear explanations of its definition. While violence is central to definitions of Islamist radicalisation, the opposite is less true. Without attempting to go through all the models of radicalisation, which, as we have already stated on several occasions, given their number is an extremely ambitious undertaking, we can identify certain definitions of radicalisation which establish a link between radical ideology/vision and violence as consubstantial with the phenomenon. Crettiez (2016) defines radicalisation as:

the progressive and evolutionary adoption of a rigid way of thinking, an absolute and non-negotiable truth, the logic of which structures the vision of the world held by actors who use repertoires of violent actions to make it heard, more often than not within clandestine, formalised or virtual structures that isolate them from ordinary social referents and reflect back a grandiose projection of themselves’ (Ibid.: 712).

This is also the case for Sommier, for whom this notion refers to ‘the change of beliefs, feelings and behaviours in directions that increasingly justify violence between groups and require sacrifice in defence of the in-group’ (Sommier, 2012: 16). For Khosrokhavar, the term radicalisation refers to ‘the process by which an individual or group adopts a violent form of action, directly related to an extremist ideology with political, social or religious content that challenges the established order at a political, social or cultural level’ (Khosrokhavar, 2014: 8). We can see that, depending on the author, the relationship with violence is more or less explicit when it comes to the type of action or even the transition to action, which leads Ollitrault to point out that:

As it (the concept of radicalisation) is commonly used, it refers both to the fact of having opinions or practices considered to be radical, religious practices in particular (we then speak of ‘fundamentalism’), and to the fact of committing violent acts (or ‘terrorism’). But, of course, one does not imply the other (Sémelin and Ollitrault, 2016).

As Bonelli and Carrié’s examination of the individual paths of terrorist profiles shows, while adherence to ideas and practices considered radical can lay the ground for recourse to violence, the transition to violent acts can be very brutal and combine with a relatively light ideological baggage (Bonelli & Carrié, 2018), leading to an explanation of the circumstances, in a broader sense, of the escalation towards violence in biographical factors through the notion of biographical availability.

All of the authors we have cited emphasise the fact that the transition to violence is a central feature of radicalisation and an element of distinction in relation to other phenomena. The link between violence and radical ideology is thus considered to be the lynchpin of radicalisation. On this point, over recent years there has been growing debate in France regarding the distinction between fundamentalists and radicals, and between criminals and radicals, a debate guided by the challenge of ever more accurately identifying potential recruits for Islamic state. Here the focus shifts from the study of the circumstances behind the transition to violence, to the study of the antechambers of radicalisation, which leads to the analysis of the profiles of individuals who are potentially very different but who are linked by their belonging to a radicalised milieu or movement.

One illustration of this debate is that of so-called Salafists, whose identification criteria are not always explicit. As several authors have emphasised, the vast majority of Salafists do not radicalise. It is a case of sectarian religiosity that is more often than not non-violent. The assertion of a shift away from the dominant norms of society through a way of life ostentatiously at odds with the majority cannot in itself be considered as a form of radicalisation or as a systematic precondition for radicalisation. However, Khosrokhavar (2013) points out from his research in prisons that inmates who live their faith in a fundamentalist form and who adopt ostensibly religious practices or clothing are often spontaneously identified by the prison administration as radicalised, thus giving rise to excessive surveillance, or even restrictions that can then lead to a radical stance.

Conversely, violent action without radical ideology takes several different forms (delinquency, violence more or less linked to a situation or to mental disorder, etc.); radical ideology may remain at a purely theoretical level and, for many people, not lead to violent action. Other research on radical Islam tends to intrinsically link violence to religious ideology, or to a set of religious practices (Rougier, 2020) which constitute a risk of radicalisation that tends to broaden the dialectic of forms of violence.
In any case, the place that ideology, perspectives, beliefs, and even radical practices have taken in the most recent models of radicalisation highlights circumstances of escalation towards violence that pull more or less towards a social (the family, the social trajectory, the humiliation suffered), religious, infra or supra-political, affective, psychological, etc., register, even if it is often difficult to measure the weight of each factor in the process or in radicalisation trajectories.

The fundamental motivation for resorting to violence therefore remains to be determined. For anthropologist Alain Bertho, in the absence of other radicalities, the fighting ‘We’ of jihadists ‘enduringly and powerfully embodies a strategy against globalisation and the powers that control it’ (Bertho, 2016: 99) and ‘aims to convert all the violence suffered into a violence that mobilises and purifies’ (Ibid.: 101). For Benslama, religious radicalism is the consequence of a certain humiliation of the Islamic ideal (Benslama, 2015) resulting in withdrawal and in the denial of the culturally different Other. It is through this declared revolutionary dimension that violence seems to be legitimised for young people who allow themselves to be seduced by radicalisation. As models of radicalisation are produced, the idea of a shared or relatively unified ideological-religious baggage weakens, giving way to a very wide range of pull factors that underlie radicalisation, in the sense of adherence to or sympathy for the Islamic state, which manages to link responses to the intimate and factual history of the subject undergoing a socially common trial.

Elsewhere, Khosrokhavar’s long-term work on prisons has revealed a new model of radicalisation which challenges the ‘normality’ of a significant number of the people involved, whether radicalised or recruiters. He has shown that many individuals, either psychologically fragile or in proven pathological situations, can be fascinated by radicalisation. This observation is linked to another, which concerns the topos of radical Islam. While past models (especially from the 1990s and early 2000s) relate to structured groups where instrumental rationality seems to dominate, the recent models of radical Islam (from the 2010s onwards) feature a variety of profiles which include very psychologically fragile members. At the same time, the issue of mental disorders is significantly transforming the representation of relationships with violence by opening up new logics of action to the followers of radicalisation and an interpretation of violence that is more emancipated from an ideological-political dimension.

5. Conclusions

Our first step in studying the major models of radical Islam since the 1980s was to contextualise the way in which they were deployed from a double entry point: on the one hand, an entry through the increasing attention paid to Islam as a component of French society, which has been ambivalently reduced to an extreme of otherness, of foreignness (as a radical form that opposes modernity and expectations of integration); and on the other hand, an entry through terrorism or violence by Islamist groups from abroad or from France. These two major approaches reflect the cumulative frameworks of Islamist radicalisation in a given historical and spatial context, namely that of France since the 1980s.

The first section thus highlights the process of the state’s scrutiny of Islam in France along with the key moments of dialogue and, above all, the tensions that play out between the Muslim population in France and the state, in which various perspectives on radical Islam emerge. In terms of research, approaches to radical Islam as a phenomenon affecting French society were initially part of the work on Islam in general, before becoming the subject of studies and research in their own right. Before radicalisation was mentioned – a term that became established in France from the middle of the noughties – a series of expressions was used to designate a phenomenon which, despite the studies of islamologists and political scientists (more often than not relating to foreign countries) and academic work on Islam in France attempting to dispel risks of confusion with the help of glossaries offering definitions of the phenomena or trends in question, remains difficult to circumscribe: the ‘fundamentalism’, ‘intégrisme’ and ‘communitarianism’ of a fraction of Muslims in France were increasingly called into question and led to
numerous amalgams. It therefore became difficult to counter the effects of the French debate on Islam, which catalysed ingredients which, as from the late 1980s, solidified an ideological division between republican and differentialist logics. The issue of radical Islam subsequently received renewed attention following the multiple attacks that marked the second decade of the 2000s in France and abroad, and the adherence of several thousand young French people with Jihadism. Recent years have thus seen a large increase in the number of models of Islamist radicalisation in France, which, in many cases, coincide with the profiles of individuals directly involved in acts of terrorism and more marginalised individuals, perceived as ‘radicalisable’ or actors of radicalisation. This tendency has contributed to a general increase in the phenomenon, which has in the meantime, become an object of public policies. The fields on which academic research is based are gradually describing a space of radicalisation that brings prison and the working-class neighbourhoods of several cities in France to the fore.

Secondly, we put some of the major models that we had been able to identify – particularly the most recent ones – to the test, using three questions. The first question focused on how historical memory, feelings of injustice and humiliation affect the progression of the phenomenon of radicalisation in France. Injustice and humiliation are at the heart of many radicalisation models, with varying degrees of centrality. Until the 2000s, it was essentially the political cause that was considered to be the epicentre of radical Islam in France, notably through the influence of foreign Islamist groups, first and foremost of which was the GIA (Groupe Islamique Armé). At the same time there were numerous shifts between Islam and radical Islam, based on the incessant focus on the theme of the integration and inassimilability of Islam in French society, from which emerged a cultural and religious focus on these issues, pushing the question of injustice to the background, or at least isolating it from the issue of Islam. The question of the feeling of injustice and unworthiness appears more clearly in the interpretation of a ‘re-Islamisation’ of society, of neo-religious Islam-related forms among the youth of working-class neighbourhoods. Indeed, some studies emphasise the way in which a new relationship with Islam plays the role of a positive structuring pole in the face of the injustice and failure felt by these young people (Khosrokhavar, 1997; Tietze, 2002), while taking care to highlight the nuances between neo-community forms and a susceptibility or adherence to radical Islam. We find the same interest in the question of Islam and the perimeter of its radical dimension in research on youth in working-class neighbourhoods. The feeling of humiliation and the denunciation of unworthiness appear as a major argument in models of radicalisation based on the analysis of the subjectivities of the actors, and relates in particular to the idea of a revenge to be taken on society and, more broadly, on the West. It is in fact the encounter between a political and ideological dimension and the feeling of humiliation (related to the lived experience of racism and discrimination) that would appear to constitute the cornerstone of the drift towards radical Islamic movements. The gallery of portraits of ‘radicalised’ young people converge on the idea of a social and identity-based malaise.

Unlike this relatively omnipresent feeling of injustice and humiliation, the question of the historical past is rarely present in radicalisation models. As we have pointed out above, Islamist radicalisation does not easily fit into a socio-historical perspective, whether it is a question of the place of the historical past in the analysis of radicalisation processes by actors or in the analysis of researchers. This observation is a reason to further study the role of the aporias of recognition of the historical past, colonisation and immigration within radicalisation phenomena and how they participate to a greater or lesser extent in a process of sedimentation of feelings of injustice and an imaginary of injustice among young people seduced by jihadism. The sociology of individuation, which questions the way in which each historical society manufactures its individuals through a series of ordeals, seems to us to be particularly heuristic...
for overcoming these biases. Systematic attention to the ordeals that individuals face throughout their lives brings out the singularity of biographies by referring less to the intimate and factual history of the subject than to a particular way of dealing with socially common ordeals, even if it is important to take these two aspects into account when studying radicalisation.

Our second line of questioning was the role of eschatological narratives and conspiracy theories. While the former has occupied a central place in the perspectives on radical Islam and in the attraction it constitutes for many young people, the latter has become more recently a core element of the portrayal of Islamist radicalised people. As we have shown, conspiracy theories were initially both a focus of attention in public debate and the academic sphere and a (fleeting) register of public action in the face of the resurgence of anti-Semitism in France, particularly in schools. This association with anti-Semitism since 11 September 2001 was partly based on the attraction of radical Islam among a section of young people of North African immigrant origin. This debate thus gave rise to a model of radicalisation among young people, based on the climate of anti-Semitism in France in the early 2000s, in which anti-Semitism and fascination with terrorism were intermingled. However, models based on the question of radical Islam during the noughties seem to set aside the issue of conspiracy theory as such and focus mainly on the vision of moral depravity in the West (which may, however, be based on forms similar to conspiracy theories, with Jews and other invisible powers being considered as trying to eliminate religion). This does not mean that conspiracy theories are absent from discourse and analysis, but it is a more general perspective, of non-negotiable reality, that is put forward in the small number of models that appear to be more concerned with the influence of ‘recruiters’ in the phenomenon of radicalisation – which sometimes directly relates to a form of credulity and a form of alienation in respect of a certain conception of Islam (Shirali, 2007) – than with conspiracy theories.

However, the models developed in the post-Charlie Hebdo period mark a turning point on this issue. First of all, it is important to note the development of an increasing number of studies on radical Islam that relate to efforts to model the phenomenon. While this report is far from being an exhaustive analysis, it does propose to highlight their main features. Some of these models nevertheless underline the important place that conspiracy theories take in the phenomena of Islamist radicalisation among young people, sometimes even making them the core of the model (‘fictional radicality’).

A third line of questioning in our work was the question of violence, which we tried to apprehend from different angles, even if these are only the first steps taken in each case.

Violence, be it the act of violence, a project or an adherence (ideas or attitudes), is a central element in representations of radical Islam, but because of the nuances that these different relationships to violence take on, it is the subject of considerable debate. The imperative of detection has in fact led to the increasing inclusion of violent intent or support for violence in the identification of radical Islam, in particular due to membership of a network or group.

The case of prison is a useful illustration of this trend. The logic behind detecting radicalisation among inmates has placed additional responsibility on prisons and prison officers. The measures implemented to separate and isolate certain profiles of individuals and to counter possible attempts at radicalisation have led to the creation of special units (radicalisation evaluation units or ‘QERs’), which are discussed in detail in report Case Studies of Interactive Radicalisation: France (Conti, 2020). In any case, the interpretation of the criterion of the transition to violent acts along with the ideological support of radical Islam have led to prisons targeting not only inmates imprisoned ‘for criminal association with a view to carrying out a terrorist act’ but also prisoners likely to espouse radical ideas. This threat has evolved in line with the

77 ‘The ordeals are the historical challenges, produced socially, represented culturally, unequally distributed, that individuals are forced to face up to’ (Martuccelli, 2019: 116).
media and political attention given to radical Islam in France. An increasingly complex task, the challenges of which can be seen in the evolution of models of radicalisation among young people, is therefore that of considering a radicalised, a ‘radicalisable’ and a non-radicalised population within the same movement.

In any case, it is important to highlight the tendency in the most recent radicalisation models to shift from a definition of violence as a transition towards violent acts, to a definition of violence as a prediction or risk, which brings together within the same model, individuals who sometimes have very different profiles with regard to their relationship with violence.

The common thread of the reflection is one of paying particular attention to potential interactions between the two forms of radicalisation (Islamist and anti-Islam) and to the reciprocal chains of events and types of articulation that they involve. Yet it has to be said that in the case of France, these cumulative logics, which cannot be reduced to a binary vision of movements and counter-movements, take place with the State through its attempt to constantly mediate an anti-Islamic dynamic, whether as a strategy of reappropriating the relative success of the far right, an adjusted political orientation in order to defuse it, or as a more direct role in the continuity of colonial representations or a persistent lack of knowledge about Islam. On this level, when we look at this from the standpoint of Islamist radicalisation, we can say that the far right remains in the background of the cumulative logics. Indeed, we hypothesise that the opposite, i.e. the analysis of the cumulative logics of radicalisation from the point of view of anti-Islamic extremism, takes us back to a completely different perspective and brings more to the foreground the interaction with Islamist radicalisation as a basis for justifying the development of its ideology.

The analysis of the role of violence in radicalisation models is in fact extended by the issue of an escalation of violence between Islamist and anti-Islamist groups. On both sides, it should first be noted that in the vast majority of cases, the victims of violence are outside of extremist groups. As far as radical Islamism is concerned, the victims of violence in France have been: users of public transport, pedestrians near a tourist site, soldiers, children and parents of children attending a Jewish school, journalists, the cartoonists and staff of the newspaper *Charlie Hebdo*, police officers, customers of a kosher supermarket, people sitting at café and restaurant terraces, spectators at a concert and a football match, spectators at a fireworks display, a priest, supermarket customers, and prison guards and police officers and staff at the Paris police headquarters. The victims of the most recent Islamist attacks (2020-2021) are representatives of state institutions (a history-geography teacher and police officers). The locations of the attacks are scattered throughout France, from Paris to the provinces, from large cities (Nice) to towns or villages of a few thousand inhabitants. In other words, the violence of radical Islamism seems to be able to strike anywhere, anytime. Regarding violence by extreme right-wing groups, we find a completely different trend, which, particularly over the last five years, points to an increase in acts of violence against Muslims, and in thwarted projects or successful terrorist attacks against Muslims (particularly attacks on mosques). The CNCDH report (2019: 29) emphasises that:

(...) the general feeling towards Islam as a religion – which had clearly improved between 2014 and 2018 – is somewhat deteriorating during this wave of the survey. Although the proportion of French people who have a *positive opinion* of *the Muslim religion* remains stable at 31% (+1 point), 35% have a low opinion, a significant 6-point increase. This increase is essentially due to LREM supporters (+13 points to 28%) and to French people positioning themselves *on the right* (+14 points to 44%): this is maybe a consequence of the President of the Republic highlighting the question of immigration in the public debate in September 2019, which led to numerous polemics relating to Islam in the weeks preceding this wave. It is nevertheless RN sympathisers (65%) and people positioning themselves *very much on the right* (66%) who have the most negative opinions towards Islam.

However, the homogenous vision of extreme right-wing discourses that converge on negative representations of Islam requires qualification. As Frigoli and Ivaldi have shown, certain fringes of the extremist web in fact perceive the Muslim religion as an objective ally in the cultural struggle against a common enemy: a society considered to be decadent (Frigoli and Ivaldi, 2017).

If we consider the DARE point of view, which consists in challenging the hypothesis of an escalation of violence between Islamist and anti-Islamist groups within the framework of (or surrounding) the phenomenon of radicalisation, we must distinguish between two different logics. On the one hand, acts of extreme right-wing violence which seem to increasingly target the Muslim (and also migrant) population, and on the other hand, violence perpetuated by radical Islamists which in no way targets representatives or representations of far right-wing groups, but instead representatives of the State.

The historical plunge into the major models of radical Islam among young radicalised Muslims in France over the last forty years has led us to reflect on the development of these models against the backdrop of a public debate that focuses on the debate on Islam in France, ascribing changing contours to radical Islam. We can see here the construction of a fairly clear one-upmanship between the state’s and the media’s obsession with Islam, the negative figure that Muslims represent in French society, and the extensive violence borne by radical Islam in France or by so-called radicalised French people in other countries.

This socio-historical fresco aimed at starting with the context in order to sketch out a historicity of the meanings given to Islamic radicalisation in France. This allowed us to draw attention to different turning points concerning the representations of Islam as a threat. It also confirms the central role that feelings of injustice and humiliation play in the rise of radical Islam in France. On the other hand, we find a relative aporia of questions concerning the role of the historical past both in terms of collective memory and family memories.

In light of these remarks, it would appear crucial for the social sciences to include more historicity and reflexivity in relation to these models and to clarify the distinction between Islam and radicalisation, following the example of Villechaise and Bucaille’s work on forms of negotiated inclusion among young ‘salafised’ Muslims (Villechaise and Bucaille, 2018), while at the same time freeing the study of Islam in France from this focus on radical Islam.

6. References


