3. Indicators of Radicalisation
The indicators of radicalisation are never immediately evident nor are they set-in-stone. In this regard, it is important to note here that whilst this toolkit is focused on raising awareness of, and engaging with, radicalisation among young people, changes in behaviour or personal appearance are more likely to be evident to those with whom they share close relations (e.g. family, friends, educators). This emphasises the focus of this toolkit on fostering dialogue, inclusivity and a strengthened relation between educators and young people. A number of similarly-themed toolkits (i.e. targeting radicalisation) in circulation have provided a list of indicators that are identified with radicalisation, such as:
- disrupted academic/school performance,
- anti-social behaviour,
- change in appearance,
- a lack of a sense of belonging,
- marginalisation
However, the risks associated with taking such indicators at face value include singling out and alienating young people who may simply be passing through a period of transition.
Due to the difficulties associated with identifying firm indicators of radicalisation, this section provides an overview of current trends in social media engagement and radicalism. This reflects the content of many of the interviews with young people conducted by the DARE project. These interviews highlighted a deep suspicion of mainstream media and respondents across the political spectrum stressed the importance of ‘doing your own research’. Many interviews also showed that the information young people had access to was, in some cases, dependent on existing friendships in the offline world and the information shared among these contacts in the online world.
What emerges across a number of the DARE national reports is that engagement with information on social media platforms also presents opportunities for dialogue that don’t always exist for young people in their everyday lives. For example, in the DARE national report from Malta, the relatively small size of the island and social stigma associated with the labels ‘extreme right’ and ‘extreme-right’, have made it difficult for some young people to talk about issues that are important to them. Here, social media platforms, such as Facebook and Twitter, allow people to engage anonymously with others and with less fear of reprisal. One respondent, who is affiliated with an extreme-right group, describes Facebook as the ‘real battleground for ideas’. By contrast, Vanessa, a respondent in the German study, states that people ‘beat each other up’ on Facebook. Participants also noted that extreme-right followers’ social media engagement is evident, citing the ability to remain anonymous as part of the appeal of this medium. What the interviews indicate is that social media platforms are important for young people to experiment with ideas and information that is largely absent or contested in their everyday lives.
Much of the recent scholarly literature has highlighted the permeability of the internet to extremist groups and its role as a recruiting ground for alienated and vulnerable young people (Pantucci, 2014; Gunaratna, 2016; Kūlis, 2016; Wiskind, 2016; Ramakrishna, 2017). Many former members of extremist groups have also highlighted their own vulnerability and sense of alienation as being the primary driver for joining such groups. Many cite the brotherhood and protection one feels on joining such a group and the ‘sense of power out of having 50 guys behind you’ (Interview with Onni – see video in Session 5). Lee a participant in the UK study who formed his own group following a stint with the EDL, describes the experience of being part of the group as “people putting you on a pedestal, telling you you're the best thing since sliced bread” (pp.41-42). Similarly, in the Malta study, Charles who is a former member of the extreme-right group Imperium Europa, describes the sense of brotherhood that comes from being ‘collectively stigmatised. It’s like with your family, you may disagree and argue with them at times, but in the end you understand one another’ (p. 22). The following video provides an interview with Christian Picciolini, a reformed former leader of a prominent neo-Nazi group in the US. Picciolini was radicalised as a vulnerable young person at the age of 14 and went on to commit violent acts and recruit other vulnerable young people.
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Guiding questions:
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The case study below provides an example of a widely-publicised attack in Woolwich, London in 2016 carried out by two radicalised young people. The case is particularly significant since it highlighted the process by which extreme-right and Islamist groups might use such events to recruit people to their cause, as well as continuing to be used today to justify extreme views and actions. The case study is followed by a brief overview of the implications of this kind of use and engagement with social media platforms.
In reading the case study and the hyperlinked articles, consider the following questions:
- What are the different ideas of justice this case is dealing with?
- How is the incident used to justify very different actions and reactions?
Users of this toolkit should attempt to approach this case study from the different angles being presented. What are the other questions that need to be asked to better understand the context of this incident and the reactions to it? Who are the main protagonists and what is their background? How do these details change your overall perception of the incident and its aftermath?
Case Study
Radical/Extreme groups and their exploitation of Social Media
On 22 May 2013, British Fusilier Lee Rigby was off-duty in Woolwich, South-East London when he was brutally attacked and killed by British born Michael Adebolajo and Michael Adebowale, both of Nigerian descent who were raised Christians and then converted to Islam. The two assailants ran Rigby down with a car, then hacked him to death using knives and a cleaver. The assailants dragged Rigby's body into the road and remained at the scene until police arrived.
The murder of Lee Rigby resulted in an elevated level of social media engagement with the event because of the graphic nature of the incident. The attack was particularly significant because of its visibility, the extreme violence, the casualness of the act and its weaponisation of everyday objects. The incident stirred up emotions and reactions across both ends of the spectrum, being used by Islamist groups to urge further similar action, as well as a way for white supremacists to legitimise violence. The relevance of the event is still evident today in the series of other knife attacks emulating the murder of Lee Rigby, that have followed, as well as its contemporary use in anti-Black lives Matters movements. How and why do young people have such varying responses to such incidents?
The murder of Lee Rigby resulted in an elevated level of social media engagement with the event because of the graphic nature of the incident. The attack was particularly significant because of its visibility, the extreme violence, the casualness of the act and its weaponisation of everyday objects. The incident stirred up emotions and reactions across both ends of the spectrum, being used by Islamist groups to urge further similar action, as well as a way for white supremacists to legitimise violence. The relevance of the event is still evident today in the series of other knife attacks emulating the murder of Lee Rigby, that have followed, as well as its contemporary use in anti-Black lives Matters movements. How and why do young people have such varying responses to such incidents?
The Implications of the Event
Since the attack took place in 2013, the event has generated extensive interest among scholars and practitioners as a result of: the social media reactions to the event (McEnery, McGlashan and Love 2015) and the discursive symbolism characterising the attack (McGarry 2013). This is particularly relevant as it analyses the way public opinion has been shaped through the coverage of the event on social media and traditional media. The attack on Lee Rigby provoked public outrage and fuelled widespread anger, contributing to the further stereotyping of Muslim communities as violent extremists (Larsson, 2007)[1]. Twitter and online forums, as well as social media portals such as Facebook and LinkedIn have become popular platforms for the generation of online hate and scaremongering, due to the ease of accessibility and the possibility of maintaining anonymity (Christopherson 2007).[2]
Following the attack on Lee Rigby, Twitter was used to harass and threaten Muslims with reprisal attacks.[3] Innes et.al (2016) analysed Twitter messages following the attack to understand how Twitter was being used to disseminate propaganda.[4] In the dataset concerned with the aftermath of the murder of Lee Rigby, they note that whilst twitter activity related to Islamist groups had increased in response to the event, the substantial proportion of data detected recruiting activities were undertaken by Extreme-right and Hard-Left groups trying to mobilise supporters. Recruiting in this context is taken to mean not only formally joining or affiliating with a group, but also sympathising with a particular ideology. Innes et.al. (2016) note that ‘[t]he instigation of recruiting activity can be observed occurring quite rapidly after the attack on Fusilier Rigby. By 18:00, social media channels were being used by representatives of the English Defence League and allied groups to organise a protest on the streets of Woolwich that night”.[5]
[1] Larsson, G. 2007. “ Cyber-Islamophobia? The Case of WikiIslam.” Contemporary Islam 1 (1): 53–67.
[2] Christopherson, K. 2007. “ The Positive and Negative Implications of Anonymity in Internet, Nobody Knows You're a Dog.” Computers in Human Behavior 23 (6): 3038–56.
[3] Awan, I. (2014), Islamophobia and Twitter: A Typology of Online Hate Against Muslims on Social Media. Policy & Internet, 6: 133–150. doi:10.1002/1944-2866.POI364
[4] Innes, M., Roberts, C., Preece, A., & Rogers, D. (2016). Ten “Rs” of social reaction: Using social media to analyse the “post-event” impacts of the murder of Lee Rigby. Terrorism and Political Violence, 1-21.
[5] Innes, M., Roberts, C., Preece, A., & Rogers, D. (2016). Ten “Rs” of social reaction: Using social media to analyse the “post-event” impacts of the murder of Lee Rigby. Terrorism and Political Violence, 1-21.
Following the attack on Lee Rigby, Twitter was used to harass and threaten Muslims with reprisal attacks.[3] Innes et.al (2016) analysed Twitter messages following the attack to understand how Twitter was being used to disseminate propaganda.[4] In the dataset concerned with the aftermath of the murder of Lee Rigby, they note that whilst twitter activity related to Islamist groups had increased in response to the event, the substantial proportion of data detected recruiting activities were undertaken by Extreme-right and Hard-Left groups trying to mobilise supporters. Recruiting in this context is taken to mean not only formally joining or affiliating with a group, but also sympathising with a particular ideology. Innes et.al. (2016) note that ‘[t]he instigation of recruiting activity can be observed occurring quite rapidly after the attack on Fusilier Rigby. By 18:00, social media channels were being used by representatives of the English Defence League and allied groups to organise a protest on the streets of Woolwich that night”.[5]
[1] Larsson, G. 2007. “ Cyber-Islamophobia? The Case of WikiIslam.” Contemporary Islam 1 (1): 53–67.
[2] Christopherson, K. 2007. “ The Positive and Negative Implications of Anonymity in Internet, Nobody Knows You're a Dog.” Computers in Human Behavior 23 (6): 3038–56.
[3] Awan, I. (2014), Islamophobia and Twitter: A Typology of Online Hate Against Muslims on Social Media. Policy & Internet, 6: 133–150. doi:10.1002/1944-2866.POI364
[4] Innes, M., Roberts, C., Preece, A., & Rogers, D. (2016). Ten “Rs” of social reaction: Using social media to analyse the “post-event” impacts of the murder of Lee Rigby. Terrorism and Political Violence, 1-21.
[5] Innes, M., Roberts, C., Preece, A., & Rogers, D. (2016). Ten “Rs” of social reaction: Using social media to analyse the “post-event” impacts of the murder of Lee Rigby. Terrorism and Political Violence, 1-21.
Jihadist groups, like ISIS, have mastered the use of online networks and social media platforms for the purposes of recruitment. Such groups are conscious of young people’s level of online engagement and their reliance on social media, which sometimes serves, as their main source of information and news. This has made the internet a valuable recruiting ground for such groups (see Session 4 for more on media and radicalisation).
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This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 725349
