CASE STUDIES OF INTERACTIVE RADICALISATION

France

BARTOLOMEO CONTI
DARE: Dialogue about Radicalisation and Equality

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Bartolomeo Conti, EHESS, France

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Executive Summary

This report investigates the cumulative effects of counter-radicalisation policies in prison. More specifically, it analyses the historical evolution of the fight against radicalisation in prison, and then interrogates French institutions’ role in the spiral of the radicalisation process. Although imprisonment remains a contentious as a factor in radicalisation, prison is considered a primary site of Islamist radicalisation and has become a leading target in the policies set up to fight it. It is notably in prison, a milieu dominated by a binary vision, the "us versus them" mentality, and mistrust, that the role of the state in producing ‘cumulative radicalisation’ can be investigated.

Main Findings: Firstly, from a historical perspective, the report describes how prison became one of the main targets of French policies to fight radicalisation. It shows how the idea of prison being a central point for the spread of radical Islam translated into a political and ideological debate, focusing on the relationship between France and its Muslim population. Three main concepts - all integral to the ‘Muslim issue’ - contribute to the spread of this idea: ‘Islam and prison’; ‘proselytism’; and ‘marginalised youth from poor suburbs’.

Secondly, the report investigates the development of the French model to fight radicalisation, centred on prevention. The focus on prevention is based on the idea of identifying, as soon as possible, any changes which could be interpreted as the first signs of radicalisation. In prison, as in society, detection becomes crucial to fight against radicalisation; as a consequence the number of suspicious individuals grows, since any detainee has the potential to end up being monitored. The injunction to detect ends up further stigmatising ‘at risk’ populations, such as Muslims and the youth of marginalised suburbs.

Thirdly, the report shows a clash between two opposing views. On the one hand, Islam is perceived by most Muslim detainees as a resource; a source of comfort, appeasement and repentance, as a help in confronting prison and a means of redemption. On the other hand, narratives and policies designed to fight radicalisation have made Islam in prison a subject of mistrust and suspicion. These conflicting views lead to the breakdown of trust in the relationships between the detainee and prison administration, nurturing the feeling of persecution, stigmatisation and rejection of Muslim inmates. These feelings of injustice and discrimination reinforce among detainees a radical discourse in which society is seen as racist and discriminatory.

Fourthly, the prevalence of security and surveillance reduces the space for dialogue and trust between detainees and prison staff. Professionals are confronted with a difficult choice between respecting their professional ethos and the relationship they have built with detainees, on the one hand, and supporting the detection process of radicalisation on the other. The demand to detect undermines the relationship of trust between detainees and professionals and blurs the separation between the intelligence staff and the professionals responsible for the detainees’ care.

Finally, as the main actor of a process of labelling and categorisation, the state significantly reduces any possibility of rehabilitation. In particular, labelling makes it more difficult to detach oneself from or exit jihadist ideology or affiliation.

This case study shows that institutions may be an active actor in the spiral of the radicalisation process since the fight against radicalisation may produce discriminatory narratives and practices that increase feelings of stigmatisation and injustice and reinforce a culture of mistrust and suspicion not only in prison but more generally in French society.
1. Introduction

Cumulative extremism (Eatwell, 2006) or cumulative radicalisation (Bartlett and Birdwell, 2013) is mainly understood as a binary process involving movement-countermovement interactions. A plurality of concepts (reciprocal radicalisation, co-radicalisation, reactive co-radicalisation) has been created to describe ‘the way in which one form of extremism can feed off and magnify other forms [of extremism]’ (Eatwell, 2006: 205). At the core of these concepts is the idea that different forms of extremism interact and can potentially produce a spiral of violence. These concepts, and more generally the theories of cumulative radicalisation, have gained particular traction in some countries, especially in UK, and become part of the academic and political debate seeking to explain the dynamic between extreme Islamist groups and anti-Muslim/extreme right-wing movements. In France, in contrast, ‘cumulative radicalisation’ or ‘cumulative extremism’ have been prominent in neither political debates nor in studies on radicalisation, nor in policies or plans to counter radicalisation. In short, the concept of ‘cumulative radicalisation’ is not used in public debate to explain how Islamist and anti-Islam(ist) extremism interact and can potentially produce a spiral of violence. The lack of attention to these theories is due to the French national context and the way the wider cultural, social and political environment has shaped the radicalisation process. Central to this is the formulation of the ‘Muslim problem’ over the course of the last 30 years, in which institutions and the media have played an active role (Deltombe 2005; Hajjat and Marwan 2013). Thus, in France, anti-Muslim narratives and practices are adopted, not only by the far right but also by a large spectrum of other actors, who use a certain interpretation of the controversial concept of ‘laïcité’ to counter Islamism, but also Islam more generally. When considering the existing political opportunities which frame radical discourses, it is clear that while Islamist discourses are totally illegitimate in the public sphere, anti-Muslim discourses are rooted in the public debate and supported by various political parties and sometimes even in public policies. The French state does not play the role simply of a mediator or observer between opposing groups, but may also be considered an active actor in constructing the spiral of the radicalisation process, both on ideological and legal grounds.

Consequently, when examining the French case, the theoretical field of cumulative radicalisation needs to go beyond the binary process involving two opposed groups, and examine a ‘broader process of “coevolution” involving multiple actors’ (Busher and Macklin, 2015: 893). The movement-countermovement challenge is only one dimension of the interactions leading to violent polarisation, as the social movement literature and part of French academic literature on radicalisation suggests, the role of the state must also be considered. As Alex Schmid states (2013: 37), ‘Political violence needs to be situated in the broader spectrum of political action – action by those holding state power as well as non-state militant actors ... Government actions and counter-terrorism policies (...), can exacerbate a critical situation, causing radicalisation on the other side of the conflict or reinforcing existing radicalisation even further’ (2013:13-37). This wider perspective on when and why the ‘spirals of violence’ occur is adopted in this case study in order to move beyond the idea of a binary cumulative radicalisation and broaden the spectrum of polarisation processes within society to other actors. Specifically, this study focuses on the prison as a social space where the role of the institutions contributes to the ‘radical coevolution’ of, if not cumulative, radicalisation.

Prison, described as a space of ‘war’ dominated by a binary logic (Chauvenet, 1998:91) or as a theatre of erosion and eventually of mutual destruction (Khosrokhavar, 2016:25), is a relevant milieu to observe the construction of ‘spirals of violence’ through the ideology and the practice of violent actions. These spirals of violence are not only a result of the dynamics of situational interactions (Malthaner, 2017), at the micro-sociological level, but also a consequence of public policy and public debate at the macro-sociological level. Prison is therefore a space to analyse, first, how micro and macro levels interact, and, subsequently, the way the fight against radicalisation may affect social relations and eventually produce an overreaction leading to the co-production of ideological radicalisation and violence.
This case study seeks to examine policies to fight radicalisation and their consequences, by addressing the following questions: Are prevention policies, detection measures and other processes to handle radicalisation themselves sources of radicalisation? Do prevention measures and tools, detection and management of radicalisation in prison contribute to an increasing sense of injustice, thereby reinforcing radical discourses, ideas and practices? Does the state participate in heightening radicalisation, and therefore, in co-producing it? Does the fight against radicalisation in prison create violent forms of withdrawal and die-hard behaviours, and, in this way, become counter-productive?

The case study will first examine how the notion of ‘prison radical’ developed starting with the quest to identify ‘proselytes’, progressing to the search to detect ‘radicalising’ or ‘radicalised’ individuals and finally even ‘potential radicals’. The study will also provide an analysis of the concept of prison as a place of radicalisation, and even of terrorism and how this is linked to the idea of a ‘prison Islam’. These notions will also be considered in relation to the construction of the ‘Muslim issue’ (‘le problème musulman’) depicted in the media, academia and politics. The domino effect, the escalation, which encourages mistrust, a de-humanisation of the Other, the binary logic of friend/enemy, and even violence, will also be addressed. In particular, the establishment of prison districts where radicalisation is assessed, the ‘QER’ (les Quartiers d’évaluation de la radicalisation), concentrates all ethical and legal issues around the fight against radicalisation in a single entity.

2. Field Research

2.1 Data collection
This research is based on three types of sources which helped analyse whether and how prevention of radicalisation in prison is a source of radicalisation in itself, and, more specifically, whether and how measures and tools employed in prison lead to a sense of injustice which reinforces radical shifts. The sources are: academic literature (research on this issue has been produced in France since the nineties); official documents and reports from French institutions; as well as three empirical research studies conducted over the last five years in French prisons.

Researching and collecting academic literature was the first step in the data collection. French literature linked to radicalisation, specifically ethnographic studies of radicalisation, was targeted. Focusing on empirical studies helped to reduce the number of articles, books and reports on the subject of which there has been a large number in recent years. Literature focusing on prison was also examined, more specifically, the link between prison and religion, stigmatisation and discrimination as well as the conflictual relationships between detainees and prison guards. Finally, literature which referred directly to radicalisation in prison and the impact of the fight against radicalisation was also reviewed. Research and literature collection were undertaken to achieve two objectives. The first was to understand the historical causes, which have led to prison becoming a ‘place of radicalisation’, if not ‘the main place of radicalisation’, from the introduction of the ‘proselyte’ figure, during the nineties, to the development of new categories of the ‘radical’, the ‘radicalised’, the ‘radicalising individual’ and the ‘potential radical’.

The second objective was to focus on the new and unprecedented situation in which prison became the focus of attention in the fight against violent extremism following the attacks in France and the emergence and dissolution of the califate in Iraq and Syria. Since then, the prison system has undergone

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1 The employment of these categories (‘le radical’, ‘le radicalisé’, ‘en voie de radicalisation’, ‘le radicalisable’) - which correlate with what, in McCauley and Moskalenko’s terminology, would be an ascent towards the top of the narrative pyramid’ (2008) - have a direct impact on the detainees’ daily lives. More importantly, they have legal implications (Besnier and Weill, 2019) since they are subject to specific treatment depending on the legal category to which they belong.
multiple reforms, including spatial reorganisation as well as the reconfiguration of detention practices designed to meet the urgent need to prevent and fight against the ‘contagion’ of radical Islamism.

The second type of source includes reports and policies produced by French institutions, focusing – in the context of a large legislative output - on those produced in the past five years. Measures to fight against radicalisation have been designed to transform prison life and relationships. Particular attention is paid to the highly controversial so-called ‘QER’, the districts of evaluation of radicalisation, which play a central role in the detainees’ imaginary and practices. Some reports require specific mention as key analyses undertaken recently by the Controller-General of prisons (2016; 2018) and the International Observatory of Prisons (https://oip.org). The report ‘Sociological investigation of the QER in French prisons’ delivered to the state prison department in 2018 has also proved to be essential in understanding the implementation of the fight against radicalisation in prison.

The third type of source comprises three ethnographic studies conducted in two French prisons in 2015 by the author. Including this research allows actors’ voices to be included in the study, which is essential to understand the complexity of their motivations, visions and relations (Blom, 2011). These ethnographic studies were conducted according to the principle of getting as close as possible to the actors themselves, not only the detainees but everyone who has a role in constructing the ‘negotiated’ social space of the prison, especially, of course, the prison guards (Chauvenet, 2010; Khosrokavvar, 2016). Detainees are either convicted of terrorism, often ‘radicalised’, sometimes ‘radicalising’, or, on the contrary (and despite being exposed to the same environment and having similar vulnerabilities), refuse to address social and political injustice of personal injury by adhering to a vision promoting ideological violence.

The first case study is ‘Detection and supervision of detainees’ Islamist religious radicalisation’, commissioned by the prison state department and undertaken between 2015 and 2016 (Conti, 2019). This research action was two-fold: updating tools to identify ‘radicalised’ detainees; and designing a social reinsertion programme for them². Ethnographic research consisting of observations and interviews was undertaken to map living conditions in detention, the functioning of the prison, relationships between detainees and prison staff and, finally, the methods developed by prison staff to detect Islamist radicalisation. A group of fifteen detainees, suspected of radicalisation or sentenced for terrorism, was established based on a multi-disciplinary approach reflecting the plurality of the causes of radicalisation. The detainees voluntarily participated in a two-month programme centred around life in detention, on the difficulties they face in society, on the question of citizenship and violence, and also on the obstacles they sometimes encounter when taking steps towards reintegration into society.

The second ethnographic study on ‘Challenges to the delivery of educational knowledge in prison’ was undertaken between 2017 and 2018 following a request from prison teaching staff who were increasingly confronted by challenges to educational activity, especially from student-detainees invoking God as a hypothesis to explain the world. A study was thus conducted to map modalities and forms of challenge and to make recommendations on setting up an experimental and operational action plan. Observations and about thirty interviews were conducted with detainees, teachers, guards, probation officers (CPIP), medical staff and managers in order to contextualise the phenomenon of challenges to educational action. Experimental modules for detainees were then set up according to the research findings.

Finally, reference is also made to the ethnographic research undertaken within DARE, which among other issues addresses the consequences of the fight against radicalisation in prison and its cumulative

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² This action is described in more detail in Conti, 2019 and the parliamentary report of Benbassa and Troendlé, Information report on the fact-finding mission concerning the dis-indoctrination, disengagement and reinsertion of jihadists in France and Europe, July 2017, p. 51.
dimension. During this two-year study, in-depth interviews were conducted with eighteen detainees, observations, as well as collective activities, were also undertaken. Guards and other prison actors (teachers, psychologists, managers, CPIP, etc.) were also consulted and interviewed during the research. The prison space is thus reconstructed by crossing, even opposing, the actors’ perspective who constitute, altogether, the prison universe.

3. Setting the scene

Whenever I enter a cell, the detainee must remove his prayer mat without me telling him to do so, or otherwise I walk on it... Lots of Muslims are in prison and they are all the same, they make detention hell... Neither side wants to live together. We are trying to integrate people who don’t want it. Islam is an overwhelming religion, scary.... Tomorrow you receive a wanted individual, a terrorist, and he has to behave, otherwise he will be taken handcuffed to the shower, and he will end up in solitary confinement...Our job is getting harder and harder because detainees have too many rights: prison cannot only be a place where you are deprived of your freedom! (Prison officer)

Here there is religious, ethnic and social racism. In prison discrimination is everywhere. There is the law which applies to the White people and the law which applies to the others. This is where people become anti-French. This is a jihadists’ factory. You push youngsters too far and you make them become extremists. I chose not to go that far. I don’t want to tell them to fuck off. I want to be in control and Islam helps me to do so. I came closer to Islam in prison...Some get de-socialised through religion, I don’t. A good practice helps you to socialise, not to become aggressive...Detainees have no rights. (Detainee)

These testimonies, which were collected in prison, as part of the study focusing on ‘Challenges to the delivery of educational knowledge in prison’, show the growing importance of ‘radicalisation’ in prison and tensions stemming from the fight against radicalisation in detention. Although the role of prison in the radicalisation process is still contested (Khosrokhavar, 2016; de Gaëtambert, 2020; Micheron, 2020), collective imagination and French institutions consider prison to be one of the prominent places of Islamist radicalisation. Accused of being a ‘jihadists’ factory’, or a ‘terrorists’ incubator’, prison has become a primary target in the fight against radicalisation. Recently, France has developed a model centred around the prevention of radicalisation, which has broadened the fight against radicalisation to include, not only jihadists or ‘radicals’, but also potential radicals or ‘radicalising individuals’ (Bui-Xuan, 2018; Sèze, 2019). Additionally, specific measures have been adopted to restructure the space and relationships inside prisons. During the past few years, in particular, tools have been developed to detect ‘proselytes’, ‘recruiters’, then ‘radicalised individuals’ or ‘radicalising individuals’ and finally ‘potential recruits’ or ‘potential radicals’. The change in vocabulary shows the shift towards increasing securitisation with the finger pointing more and more upstream to the source of the threat. Prison staff are now required to identify any ‘behavioural changes’ which could be interpreted as the first signs of radicalisation as soon as possible. They are also required to detect not only the visible manifestations of radicalisation, but also the non-visible, the hidden part. The number of potential suspicious individuals is growing as any detainee has the potential to end up being monitored. Being a Muslim - devout or not – is the common denominator for becoming monitored. Nevertheless, the idea, indeed the fear, that some would hide their adherence to radical Islam, has the consequence of broadening the category of 'Muslim' to individuals beyond their actual adherence to Islam (Roy, 2002; Desrosières, 2008), and in particular people who are included in the ‘risk group’ or ‘targeted populations’ such as the residents of suburban areas, Black people and marginalised individuals.
In a period of growing anxiety and mistrust, in which the acceptability threshold is being constantly reduced (Fassin, 2017; CGLPL, 2018), religious practice, provocation, political opposition, as well as other forms of challenge become more quickly stigmatised, even labelled and categorised as ‘radical’. The fight against radicalisation may then produce discriminatory narratives and practices targeting, among others, devout Muslims, but also ‘marginalised’ individuals, increasing the feeling of stigmatisation and injustice which already exists behind prison bars (Khosrokhabar, 2016). A culture of mistrust and suspicion prevails in the prison, with an increasingly war-like approach, where security logics slowly incorporate social logics (Ragazzi, 2016).

3.1 Historical context

Mohamed Merah (responsible for the terrorist attacks in Toulouse in 2012), Mehdi Nemmouche (who committed the terrorist attack at the Brussels Jewish museum in 2014), the Kouachi brothers (the perpetrators of the terrorists attacks on Charlie Hebdo, Paris in 2015) and Amedy Coulibaly (who committed the terrorist attack in Montrouge and kosher supermarket, in Paris in 2015) all have a prison background. Many other young French people, who have been convicted of criminal offences relating to intent to commit terrorist acts (Trevidic, 2013; Besnier and Weill, 2019)3, or who went to fight in Syria, have also spent time in prison (Thomson, 2016; Khosrokhabar, 2016 and 2018; Crettiez and Séze, 2017). Many testimonies from family members of young people who participated in terrorist attacks or became members of jihadist groups, also mention their religious and behavioural change following their stay in prison (Conti, 2018).

The idea that prison is a central point for the spread of radical Islam is widely accepted in French society. This image of a prison from which ‘terrorism originates’ is supported by researchers such as Kepel (2015), who defines prison as an ‘incubator’ of French jihadism, and Micheron (2020), who describes prison as the rear support base of jihad in France. The hypothesis of ‘prison incubator’ is the continuation of the ‘Republic’s lost territories’, now under the control of Islamism (Rougier 2020). This idea became one of the key factors in the fight against radicalisation4, as well in media and political discourses. However, while there surely is a correlation between detention in prison and radicalisation trajectories, it is difficult to establish with certainty that prison is the cause of radicalisation. Simply, the role of prison in the radicalisation process is still debatable and requires substantiated answers given the complexity of the phenomenon. Two recent studies have questioned the extent of the correlation between radicalisation and prison, by quantifying the link between delinquency and jihadism in the French context. Barros and Crettiez stress that ‘13 out of the 24 perpetrators of registered proven terrorist attacks have a criminal delinquency background (former passage through prison or signalling by police and justice), thus constituting indeed a majority of individuals’ (2019: 15). Hecker (2018: 21) analysed the prosecution briefs of 126 individuals sentenced for terrorism and found that 40% had

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3 The offence of ‘conspiring to commit terrorist acts’ (association de malfaiteurs en vue de préparer des actes de terrorisme - Article 421-2-1 of the Penal Code) is the keystone of the fight against terrorism. It relates to a group, or agreement among, persons to act together with intent to commit terrorist acts. This offence makes it possible to open judicial investigations well in advance of the actual act and to punish conduct relating to preparatory acts (recruitment, training, indoctrination, financing, etc.). There is no need for an attack to be committed for it to be considered an offence. The law of 13 November 2014 subsequently introduced an individual terrorist enterprise offence. Another offence specific to terrorism is the financial support of those engaging in terrorist acts. Finally, the provocation or glorification of terrorism or the obstruction of the blocking of jihadist sites are considered offences. See the Ministry of Justice website: [http://www.justice.gouv.fr/publication/lettre_pp_legislation_anti-terro.pdf](http://www.justice.gouv.fr/publication/lettre_pp_legislation_anti-terro.pdf)

4 “Prisons have become one of the places – not the only one, but a major one- of Islamist radicalisation and of recruitment of individuals which may fall into terrorist violence”. These are the words of French MP Guillaume Larrivé in a report on prison administration undertaken in 2014 and requested by the National Assembly.
already been convicted of a criminal offence, whilst 12% had been reported by the police. According to Khosrokhavar, who was one of the first to analyse jihadist trajectories in detention (2004, 2006), there are often high levels of delinquency or criminality among these young people; 80% of the young people who committed jihadist acts between January 2012 and July 2015 had a criminal record and 60% of those had previously transited through prison’ (2019: 51). According to him, prison exacerbates processes already in place outside prison. He emphasises that although prison represents an important element in the jihadist trajectory of the ‘dis-affiliated’ youngsters, it does not represent the sole, or determining factor. Similarly, de Galember who, together with Béraud and Rostaing, studied religion in detention over a ten year period (2016), underline that ‘by exacerbating them, prison extends logics already in place outside the walls’ (de Galember, 2020: 134). The most important studies on the topic stress that detention leads individuals along different paths. It may lead them to question their delinquent practices, to self-moralisation - whereby prison brings appeasement and reconciliation, or, alternatively, to radical violence.

The discussion about the numbers of those radicalising in prison and how to interpret the relationship between radicalisation and prison hides a deeper political and ideological debate going on in France; one that goes back to the migration waves from the Arab and Muslim world. It also relates to questions about the place of Islam in France and to France’s relationship with its colonial past (Dakhli, 2016). This debate raises a series of questions about the causes of Islamist radicalisation and the articulation of subjective, political and religious elements within this process (Conti, 2018). What motivates youngsters to engage in an extremist vision promoting violence as a response to the wrongs of modern society? What is the place of religion and what role does politics play in adherence to radical Islamism? Is religion its root cause or rather stigmatisation, social marginalisation and political exclusion? Are radical youngsters political actors? Or is it, as Roy (2015) suggests, the expression of a new form of nihilism, a youth revolt reflecting generational discontent?

To understand this debate, we need to go back to the 1990s as the links between ‘Islam and prison’, ‘proselytism’ and ‘marginalised youth of poor suburbs’ emerged at that time, as an integral part of the so-called ‘Muslim issue’. The idea that prison is a key site of radicalisation developed in the 1990s, when the consequences of the Algerian civil war – which became known as the ‘Black Decade’6 – spilled over into France as the former colonial power. Over the course of the civil war, 200 individuals linked to Islamist groups, in particular the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), were incarcerated in French prisons. Some intelligence representatives and heads of prisons expressed concern at the concentration of these prisoners in a few prisons located around Paris. However, the phenomenon was assessed as exogenous; an import of the Algerian civil war.

The perception of the phenomenon began to change following the terrorist attacks in France between 1995 and 1996, which resulted in 8 deaths and 200 injuries. Questions were raised, in particular, by the case of Khaled Kelkal, who was born in Algeria but raised in a suburb of Lyon. Although there are still unanswered questions about his trajectory and his engagement with radical Islam, it seems that he met Islamists affiliated to the Algerian GIA while he was detained between 1990-1992 and, during his detention, he found a new Muslim identity through radical Islam. This may have helped him channel his rejection of French society, which he accused of ‘stigmatisation and racism’ (Loch, 1995). After leaving

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5 The Algerian civil war - during which the Algerian government and army were locked in conflict with various Islamist groups - lasted from 1991 to 2002 and hence became known as the ‘Black Decade’. It ended with a victory for the government forces and the defeat of Islamist groups, including the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), but left between 60,000 and 150,000 people dead, as well as thousands of missing persons, a million displaced persons and tens of thousands of exiles.

6 The conflict had major repercussions in France, which is home to a large Algerian community or people of Algerian origin and retains many ties with its former colony (1830 to 1962).
prison, Kelkal went to Algeria where he joined the GIA, returning to France to commit several terrorist attacks before being shot dead on 29 September 1995. It is in tracing Khaled Kelkal’s radicalisation – what Truong (2017:11) calls his path from ‘us’ to ‘them’ – that we see the first animation of the image on prison as a site of ‘proselytism’. ‘It is the notion of “proselytism” which designates the feared evil’, explains de Galembert (2016:56), when she describes the steps culminating in the emergence of the ‘radical individual’ in prison. Media and political attention, as well as that of the intelligence agencies, became focused on the Islamists’ proselyte activities, in particular those of the GIA. At that time, the media played an important role in reporting testimonies describing prisons as controlled by Islamists, who were allowed to recruit French young people, due (among other reasons) to the alleged incapacity of the authorities to answer the religious demands of Muslim detainees (Khosrokhavar, 2004; Beckford et al., 2005). During this period, as after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001, radical Islamism was mainly associated with Algeria or Al-Qaida7. It was perceived in the collective imagination, as well by the authorities, as an exogenous problem. The first academic study of young people and Islam in prison, *Islam in prisons* (Khosrokhavar, 2004), depicts a more complex reality; one in which young French individuals originating from marginalised suburban districts found within Islam a new subjective and collective paradigm. This study was followed by another key publication, ‘*When Al-Qaida talks: testimonies behind bars*’ (2006), in which Khosrokhavar describes a radical vision of Islam behind bars. The testimonies collected by the sociologist testify in particular to how joining radical Islam offered some young French people, particularly those of immigrant origin, a way to struggle against French society. However, this vision of a radical Islam as a means of distancing oneself from the French Republic was, according to Khosrokhavar, still marginal in the suburbs where most young people of Muslim background ‘frame their activities differently, through religion or ‘laicité’ and do not identify themselves with radical Islamism’ (Khosrokhavar, 1997: 248).

The case of Khaled Kelkal thus raises two ‘problems’: the Islamist proselytism in prisons; and young people of migrant background living in the French suburbs, who are the targets of religious proselytism. As Khosrokhavar (1997: 256) recognises, Kelkal’s Islamism is the product of the combination of ‘transnational terrorist networks recruiting within the most fragile segments of French society’ and the experience of that part of the French population, confined to the suburbs (‘banlieue’) characterised by exclusion, marginalisation and stigmatisation. This conundrum is also faced by the intelligence services whose understanding of the issue oscillates between focusing on an exogenous (agents of foreign networks) and endogenous (French young people with a migration background) interpretation of terrorism (Boneilli, 2005). Khaled Kelkal becomes the symbol of this hybrid youth, systematically pictured as ‘torn’ between two cultures and ‘suffering from a lack of integration’. Is he French or Algerian? Is he a ‘simple delinquent’ from the suburb or an international ‘Islamist terrorist’? (Deltombe, 2005). The figure of Khaled Kelkal has become ‘the emblematic incarnation of the poisonous consequences Islam in prison has had on some marginalised youngsters of the French suburbs’ (Béraud et al., 2016: 67).

This brings us to the final dimension of this phenomenon, that is the emergence of ‘prison Islam’ as a reflection of a wider Islamisation taking place among an alienated and stigmatised segment of youth growing up in the French suburbs. Since the 1980s, social sciences, and even French society as a whole, have been interested in what has been entitled ‘God’s revenge’ (Kepel, 1991) or ‘the return of Islam’ (Lewis, 1985). Attention is increasingly given to the reasons and modalities of a return to Islam made by young people of Maghreb origin, and of the phenomenon of the conversion of non-Muslims. These - often marginalised - and ‘twice disenfranchised’ (Sayyad, 1999; Roy, 2002) young people envisage religion, and Islam in particular, as a ‘refuge’, a new identity and/or a path to subjectivation (Khosrokhavar, 1997; Göle, 1997; Roy, 2002). These phenomena are also visible in prison, where Islam

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has become the most prevalent religion. In 2004, in the first academic study on the subject, Khosrokhavar wrote: ‘Muslims form the majority of the prison population, often above 50%, sometimes close to 70% and even 80% in some prisons located near the “suburbs”, which represents 8 out of 10 prisoners’ (2004: 11). Although these figures are only estimates, based on informal and uncertain data (number of people doing Ramadan or asking for halal meals or joining the list to go to the prayer room on Fridays, etc.)\(^8\), this study is the first to point out the demographic and religious transformation of the prison population. Khosrokhavar questions the way in which Islam can become a resource for re-self-definition in prison and stresses the diversity of its manifestations. He underlines that in prison, Islam can be envisaged as either an ethical code of substitution, or as the religion of the oppressed, in particular for those who perceive themselves as victims of racism, marginalisation and discrimination (Khosrokhavar, 2004; Beckford et al., 2005). Khosrokhavar also denounces discrimination against Muslim detainees and the failures of the prison as an institution, which has been unable to respond to the demands of the changing population. The prison population is predominantly made up of young immigrants, particularly from the suburbs\(^9\), who have been living on the margins of society. Khosrokhavar emphasises how racism, stigmatisation and discrimination, especially in comparison to other religions, strengthen the narratives and actions of a very small minority of individuals, who possess a strong radical vision of Islam and who benefit from the vacuum left by institutions dealing with the constraints of ‘laïcité’, which is not always helpful in responding to the demands of Muslim detainees. The percentage of Muslims in prison quoted by Khosrokhavar, and others, to criticise discrimination against specific minorities, takes on a highly symbolic value with political repercussions. The ban on statistics on ethnicity does not preclude their existence outside the legal framework or their gathering on an informal basis. Counting Muslims in prison has been a growing practice since the 1990s, with numbers presented as valid although the methodology and sources of measurement are shaky. De Galembert (2020), who has published the only study which openly brings up the counting issue, describes how, over the years, numbers - often simple estimates with no validity - have been used inappropriately. She concludes that ‘no available quantitative data allows measuring with certainty, the proportion of Muslims in prison’ (2020: 31). In addition, if Islam is the predominant religion in prison, the numbers still do not tell us much about religiosity, the way Islam is lived and perceived, the number of individuals who practice Islam or those who are secularised, or have even become atheist. Despite this uncertainty, numbers are not verified but rather largely accepted as correct and cited by the media and politicians\(^10\). However, numbers have a strong symbolic value, with important political and social consequences. In particular, numbers allow for the development of two opposing arguments. On the one hand, they are used to show the criminogenic nature of certain minorities, in particular Arabo-Muslim, within an essentialist and racialised classic narrative. De Galembert underlines that ‘this rhetoric of numbers’ which designates the majority of the prison population as being religiously

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\(^8\) The French ‘data protection act’ of 6 January 1978 forbids ‘the collection or the treatment of personal data presenting directly or indirectly racial or ethnic origins, political, philosophical, religious opinions as well as membership of a union, or which relate to people’s health or sexual life’.

\(^9\) The number of Muslims in prison is much higher than in society more generally: respectively between 50% to 60% versus 5% and 7%. De Galembert (2020: 28) explains this difference through three characteristics of detainees: the high proportion with a migration background; the relatively young age of the prison population; and the fact that Muslims mainly belong to the working class.

\(^10\) The issue of unsubstantiated numbers brings the issue of the agents of categorisation: who’s counting? One may wonder whether the label “Muslim” does not also include those who are not, as the ‘Muslim’ category is indeed often associated with the categories ‘suburban’ and ‘delinquency’, thus leading to an essentialist association linking Islam to criminality, specific to migrant populations, to Muslim populations. Despite it being forbidden to count ethnicity or religious beliefs, as stated by Beckford et al. (2005), in prison, officers are in charge of counting this. These same officers, mostly associate the Muslim problem with the young people coming from the suburbs (Khosrokhavar, 2016). These two terms become almost intrinsic and become even often interchangeable.
affiliated – although this is mostly assumed – contributes to the racialisation of Muslims. By suggesting an existing link between Islam, delinquency and terrorist criminality, the weight given to religion stems from a culturalist reductionism: whether through choice or allocation, the Muslim is assigned an almost ontological potential for criminality’ (2020: 27)\(^{11}\). On the other hand, numbers are used to demonstrate that prisons are designed on the assumption they will house the most socioeconomically disadvantaged groups and for ethno-racial minorities (Wacquant, 2008; Fassin, 2015 and 2017). They demonstrate the discriminatory policies, the exclusion Muslims are facing, the link between poverty, exclusion, marginalisation and Islam. Prison is a place for the management of the working class similarly to the mass incarceration going on in the United States (Simon, 2014; Plat, 2019). This translates into a growing feeling in prison (as observed during our research) that ‘we are in prison because of who we are, not because of what we did’.

‘Proselytism’, ‘marginalised young people who struggle to integrate’ and ‘Islam in prison’ are consequently the three terms that have facilitated the construction of the idea of prison as a place of radicalisation and which have influenced the French debate for the past two decades. This image has emerged in conjunction with the media (Deltombe, 2005) and socio-political construction of the so-called ‘Muslim problem’ (Hajjat and Marwan, 2013). As de Galember says, ‘the overrepresentation of presumed Muslims in the prison population becomes a new element of the Muslim problem’ (2016: 56). In this way, the notion of prison as a place of ‘proselytism’ used by fundamentalists, a place for recruitment of non-integrated suburban youngsters, and even a breeding ground of terrorism, draws on, and feeds into, a long tradition of depicting prison as a place of physical and moral contagion; today the virus of radical Islam has simply replaced that of the plague.

### 3.2 Contemporary context

If Kelkal, like Al-Qaeda, is seen as an exogenous threat, Mohamed Merah (who committed the terrorist attacks in Toulouse in 2012) made this threat endogenous. In 2012, the Home Affairs Minister Manuel Valls declared: ‘the terrorist threat in France (...) does not originate from terrorist networks located outside the country. These are networks present in our districts. This is about converted French, French Muslims’ (Sèze, 2019:23). Thus Mohamed Merah can be considered the most important figure of French jihadism for three reasons. First, after Kelkal, he was the first individual from a long list of French young people who – according to media and political actors, and more generally to French society - became radicalised in prison during the 2000s and 2010s and who went on to commit terrorist attacks in France. Secondly, as a consequence of his violent actions, French security and criminal policy changed and prisons became the principal target in the fight against radicalisation. Finally, as Mohamed Merah sought his own death in action, any ethical restraint on the use of violence became redundant. Merah initiated the period of the armed Jihad and rapidly became a model to follow as demonstrated by the detection, a few months later, of the ‘Cannes-Torcy’ terrorist cell. This cell is the link between Mohammed Merah and the 2015 terrorist attacks and presages the subsequent shift in French terrorism. Three features of contemporary terrorism are already present in Merah’s attacks: targeting Unbelievers (specifically Jews); targeting the state (notably the military); and departures to Syria (Conti, 2018).

During the 2010s, a new phenomenon – unprecedented in scale – emerged; the departure of an increasing number of French youngsters to the Iraqi-Syrian battlefield. Some were ‘political radicals’, claiming to be the successors of the most extreme fringes of the classic extremist groups, the so-called

\(^{11}\) The category ‘Muslims’ is used in public debate as a neo-ethnic category: ‘the ethnicisation of the Muslim comes from a Western prism where religion is separated from the rest of social activity, and then becomes “objectivised”, defined as being a culture in itself, and considered as an explanation for the full social activity of the Muslim” (Roy, 2002: 65). The main consequence of using the term ‘Muslims’ as a neo-ethnic category lies in the overlap between culture and religion, and, ultimately, the lack of distinction between the two terms.
‘al-Qaeda generation’ (Khosrokhavar, 2006; Roy, 2007e) but others were youngsters without political and religious knowledge - the ‘Daesh generation’ (Coolsaet, 2016; Conti, 2018). There were also individuals who had not managed to reach the battlefield but who were fascinated by the Islamic State narrative and were identified as ‘radicalised’ or ‘radicalising individuals’. From 2014, French institutions have had to deal with the considerable challenge of the ‘returnees’ from these battlefields (Thompson, 2014, 2016). Following the 2015 attacks, in the context of heightened anxiety, prison became the main target of the fight against radicalisation as the prison administration was suddenly confronted with jihadism in significantly higher than previously\textsuperscript{12}. French institutions hastily put in place policies to combat radicalisation, which involved drastic changes to the existing legal framework (Benbassa and Troendlé, 2017; Bui-Xuan, 2018; Sèze, 2019; Besnier and Weill, 2019). Between 2014 and 2018, three action plans were devised, each having a particular focus on prisons. From 2015, authorities were faced with many complex issues. Should jihadists be detained together or separately? And, in either case, how and with what purpose? When considering whether to bring the jihadists together or to keep them separate, the influence such detainees would have on others had to be assessed – would they be able to proselytise or to dissimulate? And such decisions were complicated by considerations of whether punishment or rehabilitation, detection or care, were the priorities? Indeed, how could young people who had struggled to feel part of the society in which they had grown up and lived, and to recognise its institutions, be reintegrated?

The fight against radicalisation has begun in a context of heightened anxiety with the public becoming increasingly worried about the growing threat of terrorism. Prevention has been a key response, not only in prison, but also in society as a whole. Practices and policies have become more and more diversified and the targets of the fight against radicalisation have become wider: from the fight against the proselyte to the radical individual, from the radical individual to the radicalising individual, and even to the potential radical.

3.3 Locating the milieu

Prison is a place where conflict increases, caused by a dis-humanising mistrust, as this place of confinement increases de-socialisation rather than repairing social relationships. As Beccaria put it in his famous book \textit{On Crimes and Punishments} (first published 1764), prison seems to be a place where ‘a man may cease to be a person, and become a thing’ (Beccaria, 1872: 77)\textsuperscript{12}. The depersonalisation of the detainee may lead to mistrust of everything and everyone, affecting any subject and penetrating every relationship including the canteen food and medicine (requested or received), the relationship with the guards and other detainees, and even the relationship with family members visiting the prison. The progressive rupture of any trusted link becomes complete when distrust becomes extended to themselves at which point self-hatred and suicidal thoughts may occur and any form of alterity may cause suspicion and trigger extreme violence.

Before presenting the impact of the fight against radicalisation in prison, it is important to emphasise that prison ‘reflects society and is also the mirror in which this society reflects itself’ (Fassin, 2015: 39). This becomes even more relevant in a context in which information and people flow and there is a continuous exchange between inside and outside that erodes the borders between them (Chantraine and Delcourt, 2019). As described by this prison guard: ‘They [detainees] are not afraid of prison as there is a continuity between inside and outside. Prison is part of their delinquency path’. In a way – and

\begin{itemize}
  \item Known by the French acronym ‘TIS’, there were considered to be 90 radical Islamists in 2014, 390 in 2017 and 509 in 2019. In addition, the government reported there to be 1,329 ‘Common detainees vulnerable to radicalisation’ (DCSR) in 2017 and 1,000 in 2019.
  \item The full quote is, ‘Liberty is at an end, whenever the laws permit, that, in certain cases, a man may cease to be a person, and become a thing’ (Beccaria, 1872: 77).
\end{itemize}
as sociological studies in prison and the number of imprisonments show\textsuperscript{14} - re-offending is common and prison becomes simply an extension of the district. Prison becomes ‘a place of learning and a crossing point for some young men’ (Truong, 2017: 76); it is the ‘university of criminality’. Similar logics and dynamics observed inside the prison are also at play outside. The borders between inside and outside are thus, slowly fading. In prison, therefore, we can observe the lack of trust experienced in contemporary societies more widely.

4. Key Findings

While most European states began to design public policies in order to fight radicalisation in the mid-2000s, France did not follow until 2014 (Sèze, 2014). The main objective of the ‘plan to fight violent radicalisation and terrorist networks’, set up in 2014, was to prevent the departure of jihadists and to support the families of the youngsters who went to Syria. The only people targeted by this policy were jihadists. Following the 2015 attacks, further public policies to fight radicalisation were developed, including a ban on French nationals leaving France in order to join jihadist groups abroad. An intent is now almost as criminalised as a fact. This is the case with intent to travel to war zones, which becomes an individual offence, thus considerably widening the list of terrorist offences (Besnier and Weill, 2019).

As the judge Garapon warns, ‘today, anyone can go to Syria for many reasons and is often heavily sentenced for this; no one knows what he intended to do, and he probably does not know it himself. This is a real issue; this is a judgement on intentions’ (Esprit, 2016: 69). Following the 13 November 2015 attacks, a state of emergency was declared. A few months later, on 9 May 2019, a new action plan to combat radicalisation and terrorism was developed with new stated objectives to ‘detect radicalisation trajectories and terrorist networks as soon as possible’ and ‘enhance measures to prevent radicalisation to ensure that each citizen is taken care of on an individual basis’. The focus was now on prevention, which translates into detecting ‘radicalising individuals’. This paved the way to widening the space of the fight against radicalisation which now encompassed, not only individual jihadists or ‘radicals’, but also ‘radicalising individuals’ (personnes en voie de radicalisation) or those who may potentially become radicalised (les radicalisables).

The plan aimed to detect ‘changes in behaviour’ which could be interpreted as first signs of a radicalisation trajectory, as early as possible. To this end, the Prime Minister’s circular dated 13 May 2016 states that ‘All the state’s departments [shall be] prepared for the detection of radicalisation cases (...) and for the importance of signalling these persons’. In his 2019 speech, commemorating the victims killed by a civil servant of the police headquarters in the Police prefecture, President Macron called for the ‘whole nation’s’ vigilance, encouraging everyone to develop a ‘good listening attitude towards the other’ in order to ‘know how to detect weaknesses, deviations, whether at school, at work, in places of worship. These small moves signalling a drift away from the values of the Republics...these little things which become huge tragedies’. He was thus inviting everyone to take responsibility for detecting the signs of radicalisation, widening the scope of prevention to the entire population. According to Raggi, ‘the fight against terrorism is in the hands of security professionals (intelligence, police, attorneys, judges), while policies preventing terrorism seek to mobilise society at large to counter radicalisation processes’ (2016: 153).

\textsuperscript{14} Even if the most worrying types of criminality are decreasing, the increase of the prison population is staggering in France, but even more widely in Western countries. In France, 700 651 persons were imprisoned by 1st January 2020 (https://oip.org/decrypter/thematiques/surpopulation-carcerale) compared to 20.000 in 1957 and 37.000 in 1980. This increase is due to two fundamental factors of French society: “The French society being sensitivised to illegality and deviances; the public discourse and action focusing on the security challenge” (Fassin, 2017:10). Imprisonment becomes normalised (CGLPL, 2018), thus contributing to reinforcing the detainees’ sense of injustice and fate.
4.1 Detection in prison

The French state started to be mobilised in 2014 and encouraged civil society to become vigilant after the attacks. However, the prison administration had already been taking initiatives since 2000, with the intention of identifying ‘proselytes’ and reducing their capacities. The prison intelligence service was created in 2002 and the first mechanism for detecting and identifying proselytes was in place by 2005. At that time, de Galembert says, ‘the degree of proselytism goes in hand with the intensity and visibility of religious practice’ (2020: 73). It was about detecting individuals according to visible indicators, notably through religious practice (participation in ceremonies of worship, beard, clothes, etc.), the reading of specific books or the pressure put on other detainees (collective prayer, calls to prayer, reminders of the need to observe religious rules, etc.), or attitudes towards the prison staff (gatherings, collective claims, etc.). These tools, which identified proselytism according to the intensity and visibility of religious practice, would soon be proven to be ineffective, not least because this type of detection tended to focus on devout Muslims, the fundamentalists, which increased the feeling of persecution and victimisation already existing among a large number of Muslim detainees. The paradigm shifted in 2008 when the term ‘radicalisation’ was introduced, which shifted the focus from the detection of a ‘proselyte’ – which requires the definition of a state – to the detection of detainees who are radicalising, which ‘is based on catching an on-going process thanks to the interpretation of signs’ (De Galembert, 2020:74). The detection tools, the interpretive guides produced by the prison administration, nevertheless continue to assign an overdetermining role to religion, since a fundamentalist practice is still one of the main criteria for determining a detainee’s level of ‘radicalisation’. Such practice is deemed even more concerning when combined with actions and narratives contesting the penitentiary order, socialising with detainees categorised as Islamist Terrorist (TIS) or narratives not conforming to the values of the Republic15. This exacerbates the feeling of stigmatisation felt by Muslim detainees, especially the fundamentalist ones. Along this line, Khosrokhavār was one of the first to denounce the inefficiency of the detection tools. Based on new research in prisons, in 2013, he argued that the focus on devout religious practice, or outwardly visible signs of such, failed to capture what he called ‘the new paradigm of radicalisation in prison’, which is now based on ‘concealment’16. Khosrokhavār’s findings helped to partially reduce the suspicion of professionals, researchers and the prison administration at large towards fundamentalists. However, a consequence of the new focus on concealment proved to be that the scope of suspicion was then widened to a larger number of detainees. By relying upon detection tools, the fight against radicalisation has led to the targeting of categories considered ‘at risk’: Muslims, and more specifically fundamentalists, young individuals from the suburbs, and anyone sharing a narrative, or demonstrating behaviour, against the prison staff or the penitentiary institution. It is precisely around the discrimination and stigmatisation of Muslim prisoners and the propagation of a culture of suspicion and mistrust, that a reactive co-radicalisation takes place. These cumulative effects of the fight against radicalisation will be examined under the prism of the two following dynamics: firstly the gap between the perception of Islam, which is viewed as an asset by Muslims but as a threat by prison staff, leading to a feeling of discrimination and stigmatisation among Muslim detainees; secondly the shift towards securitisation, reducing or even abolishing spaces and practices of trust, thus encouraging dehumanisation of the ‘other’ and the perception of one another enemy, according to a Manichean vision.

15 This was noticed during the research/action ‘Detection and supervision of detainees’ Islamist religious radicalisation’ (Conti, 2019). See also Benbassa and Troendlé (2017).
16 Concealment is common to anybody involved in illegal and clandestine activities but takes on another dimension in radical Islam with the concept of Taqya, now part of everyday language and symbolising the culture of suspicion. Taqya is the idea that the ‘real radical’ is not the one who shows but who hides this, who puts his religiosity ‘on hold’, for strategic reasons. The scope of individuals who might be suspected becomes so wide that any Muslim – devout or not – may be put under surveillance and suspected, in a context of inflated suspicion. This relates to the well-established orientalist approach that no Muslim can be trusted (Said, 1978).
4.2 Clash of perceptions: discrimination against Muslims

Prison sociology has widely underlined the importance of religion in coping with what can be called the ‘prison hardship’. The experience of going to prison is an ordeal in many ways, which differs from one individual to another, from one place and context to another, but which is specific to this totalising institution (Foucault, 1975; Goffman, 1979). The ‘prison hit’ is the shock of the abrupt rupture to an individual’s life when entering prison and faced with the experience of being incarcerated, positioning the individual under constraint, spatially and temporally. Delarue defines the ‘prison hit’ as ‘the effect on someone’s conscience of the abrupt shift from the existence outside to the one inside: being disconnected from closed relatives, space being reduced, the loss of intimacy, being deprived of his/her own belongings, the confrontation with a physical, constrained and even sordid universe, orders, the noise, solitude, violence...’ (2012: 76). Going to prison is often an event that exacerbates an individual’s already precarious situation, and can be deeply socially and personally destabilising. Prison hardship is for some individuals ‘one step - among others – into a trajectory of disaffiliation, exclusion and poverty’ (Chantraine and Delcourt, 2019: 54). The uncertainty around the length of the sentence is a further factor in this ordeal and is well depicted by the proverb, common in prison: ‘You know when you enter prison, you don’t know when you will come out’. The absence or the weakness of reintegration policy should also be considered, as shown by the 2017 data of the Ministry of Justice on recidivism, which shows 61% of those released from prison re-offend and return to prison within five years. This also plays a part in building a sense of powerlessness and fate, and a source of a widespread mistrust among detainees.

4.2.1 Religion as a resource

Religion is described by detainees as a resource that helps them manage the conditions summarised above – it is a ‘refuge’, ‘helping them to get out of it’ and ‘the only resort’ enabling them to confront the ‘prison hit’ and the uncertainty of the sentence.

‘Islam enabled me to feel good, to find a balance.’ (Detainee)

‘At the end of the day you are alone anyway (in prison). What has really helped me here is my religion... Even if you are alone, you are never alone. It helps.’ (Detainee)

Religion calms me, a lot, a lot, a lot. Without devotion, I would have been hateful and even a borderline case. I would have probably reacted differently. Surely. But religion really, really calms me. Islam really appeases me.’ (Detainee)

What does it bring me? Well first forgiving the pain which was caused... You ask for forgiveness to God but also to people, because you also hurt people... (Detainee)

When analysing the role and use of religion in prison, Sarg and Lamine detail three ways in which religion is used: ‘it helps structure the detainee’s life. It plays a therapeutic part (pacification, sense of self and self-rehabilitation). It is also a way for detainees to meet other detainees, to communicate with their relatives or also to challenge the institution’ (2011: 86). Religion is above all a tool to rebuild oneself, either during prison time, or when preparing to leave it. The structured nature of religion can help in justifying the sentence and provide a tool for reintegration. Religion also takes an ethical dimension and may provide an opportunity for a new departure, but may also help in questioning oneself so as to prepare for reintegration into society. Religion can also provide a meaning to incarceration, especially for detainees who perceive their sentence as unjust. It can also help detainees

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17 Suicides (about 115 per year) or suicide attempts (ten times more) committed in detention take place especially during the first days of imprisonment and a good half of the cases are committed by individuals in preventive detention. See the numbers produced by the l’Observatoire International des prisons (https://oip.org/decrypter/thematiques/deces-en-detention-et-suicides/)
to manage their sense of guilt or can be a tool to rehabilitate through forgiveness, offering a transcendental forgiveness that a detainee may perceive as more indulgent (and easier to reach) than human in(justice). Additionally, religion can be strategic in helping detainees accept the prison vacuum, joining groups, improving everyday life, but also in challenging the institution. In that sense Islam – even more than other religions – may be envisaged as a source of challenge, especially for those who perceive themselves as victims of racism, marginalisation and discrimination. As a religion of the ‘oppressed’ (Khosrokhavar 2004), Islam may be a source of dignity for those who feel oppressed, which reverses the effect of stigmatisation (Goffman, 1963). Even if prison is an institution of the Republic, that is to say ‘laïque’18, religion plays a central role, especially in providing a pool of resources for the detainees to help them reconstruct themselves. The idea that religion appeases and calms detention is largely shared by the prison staff, who recognise the role it can play in pacifying and managing detention. Even if ‘laïcité’ brings limitations to religion, the latter has always been legitimised in prison as a source of comfort, healing, repentance, so much so that ‘nothing better than prison shows the many aspects of French “laïcité”, constantly fluctuating between a legal fiction of being blind to religion and a de-facto recognition as the State must also fulfil its obligations vis-à-vis worship and religious matters’ (Béraud et al., 2013: 28).

4.2.2 Islam considered as a danger

Islam - as other religions - may be a mobilising source for detainees to address prison and to envisage an ‘upcoming trajectory’ (Yuval-Davis, 2006: 202). However, contrary to other religions, Islam is perceived as a threat, even more so inside the prison walls than outside. To put it simply, Islam is an issue, not only outside prison, but also inside.

First, Islam is considered as a ‘new’ religion, compared to other religions, which has become the predominant one in prison but has remained discriminated against, for a long time, just as Muslim detainees have also been treated unequally. Since the 1990s, Muslim detainees have been criticising the unequal treatment towards them compared to detainees of other faiths (Beckford et al., 2005). They have faced discrimination daily with regard to access to places of worship, a Muslim chaplaincy, halal food and permission to use prayer mats in their cells. Throughout the 1990s, prison directors found ways to either accommodate detainees’ requests at a local level, or to challenge them by invoking the ‘laïcité’ of the institution. Prison policy thus varies from one place to another, from one director to another, which in a way reinforces the feeling of discrimination. In the first ever published study on the issue, Khosrokhavar (2004) criticised the lack of response from the prison administration to the detainees’ requests. In 2004, he was already highlighting the risk caused by the sense of vacuum and of inequality felt by Muslim detainees: ‘in principle – or in theory – and in the framework of the French regime of ‘laïcité’, Muslims shall be treated equally with other religions. In reality, the way Islam is managed by the prison system is clearly unequal’ (2004: 13). In 2003, the Stasi Committee also drew attention to the need to respond to the detainees’ spiritual needs, in particular when recruiting chaplains19. In the mid-2000s, this resulted in the prison administration recruiting new chaplains, who

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18 The concept of French ‘laïcité’ is legally defined in the 9 December 1905 law of separation of the churches and the State in France: ‘The Republic is ‘laïque’ and respects all beliefs. Many legal obligations derive from this founding principle and apply to users and public services. Contrary to other countries, in the French concept of ‘laïcité’, the relationship between religion and the State does not strictly confine religion to the private sphere. This results in an on-going debate on defining the limits of the State’s response and on excluding religion from the public sphere. To get clarifications on the different concepts of ‘laïcité, refer to the publications of Jean Baubérot (2015).

19 President Jacques Chirac set up the Stasi Committee in 2003 to reflect on the implementation of the principle of ‘laïcité’. While it confirms that ‘the Republic is ‘laïque’ and respects all beliefs’ the Committee also underlines the key role of this principle in public institutions. Concerning the prison, it suggests, among others, the recruitment of Muslim chaplains.
would facilitate the access to places of worship, (Béraud et al., 2013). However, the response by the prison administration, even when significant, proved to be insufficient and the feeling of being the victim of racism and discrimination in prison continued, as confirmed during our different studies conducted within prisons:

I applied for a training. Three girls showed up, two of them had arrived 2 weeks ago, the other a month ago. I had been here for 9 months. They were accepted and I was not. This is not OK. I don’t know if it is me...or that no Arab participates in the training... No Arab in the training, there are only French. (Detainee)

To tell you the truth, life here is difficult...From a religious point of view as well as because you have the finger pointed at you. I sometimes feel I am perceived as someone I am not. As someone being radicalised...But this is not how I behave at all...If you want to pray it is very difficult, I have to hide. You cannot speak about religion with other detainees. There are so many difficult things, detention is very difficult for me. (Detainee)

I don’t need their shit, they think detainees are...They only want to help White people here, they do not treat people the same way. The system is against Muslims. (Detainee)

In addition to the discriminatory treatment and the inequality faced by Muslims in the prison system, they also lack access to places of worship and often have difficult relationships with prison staff (Béraud et al., 2013; Khosrokhavar 2016). There is indeed a clash between the detainees’ positive perception and their necessity to practise religion as a part of their daily life and the institutional discourse and practices that consider Islam as a threat and as a religion to be put under surveillance. These conflicting views lead to the breakdown of trust in the relationship between the detained and prison administration. Seen as part of ‘the Muslim issue’ (‘le problème musulman’) in France, Islam in prison has progressively become a subject of mistrust, suspicion, led by the media, politics and society, as more and more terrorist acts are committed by individuals who went through prison and as more and more young Europeans are attracted by jihadism. The fight against radicalisation has rendered religion suspicious in itself, or at least made it the subject of specific control measures. Those practising Islam can become suspicious nurturing the feeling of persecution, stigmatisation and rejection, reinforced by narratives and practices openly discriminatory and stigmatising. Islam is perceived by most Muslim detainees as a resource, which is a source of comfort, appeasement and repentance, a help in confronting prison and a means towards redemption, however, narratives and policies which have been constructed in the fight against radicalisation have made religion an obstacle and a source of suspicion and problems. The interactions between inside and outside and the anxiogenic public debate infiltrating prison short-circuits the correlation between Islam and radicalisation. The fear of proselytism, of contagion, of Islamist ideas and practices has broadened into questioning Islam as a whole, so ‘Islam in prison’ has become an issue. The feeling of being discriminated against for being Muslim, reinforces the construction of conspiracy discourses as well as narratives of victimhood, which are already present due to the punitive and constraining nature of prison.

These feeling of injustice and discrimination lend legitimacy to detainees’ talk of rupture with society, which they accuse of being racist and discriminatory. The binary logics and narratives established in prison provide an explanation the ordinary detainee can relate to. A peaceful religiosity cannot easily exist next to a combative Islam, supported by radical Islamists whose narratives are reinforced by

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20 The numbers of Muslim chaplains in 2000 characterises this discrimination towards Islam as there were then only 44 in France, while Islam was becoming the most-practised religion in prison. The numbers reached 142 and 231 in 2009 and 2018 respectively, in a perspective of secularisation to counter the “abuses” of Islam. The major attention given to Muslim chaplaincy is mainly based on security matters, to supervise Islam in prisons, rather than to guarantee the freedom of worship (de Galembert, 2020).
perceived or real discrimination and stigmatisation faced by Muslim detainees and, more widely, by young migrants living in deprived urban areas. The discourse of a radical Islam can be very meaningful for young people at odds with society and for those suffering discrimination and stigmatisation or in search of an ‘upcoming trajectory’. As Khosrokhavar says, the more ‘you exclude “tamed” religion, the more you plant the seeds of a feral and violent religion’ (Esprit, 2016: 58).

4.3 An enforced logic of surveillance

Public discourse and common sense consider trust as something desirable; a basic virtue of social life, necessary for the proper functioning of the institutions in a democratic state. Quéré writes that ‘communication and cooperation are only possible if we can assume that we share a set of common truths which give us obligations’ (2018: 7). Trusting means recognising one’s own vulnerability, the impossibility of knowing everything, the impossibility of controlling everything; trusting means accepting the delegation of authority to someone else or to an institution, which acts on our behalf and for our sake and has the power to search and to establish ‘truths’ on our behalf or in other words to organise chaos, to master uncertainty (Luhmann, 2007). According to Simmel, ‘Trusting one another has the same moral value as not betraying this trust’ (1999: 382). Trust is based on a reciprocal commitment, as much as trust creates the conditions for society to exist; we think of ourselves as being linked to the others, with whom we share a set of common ‘truths’, constituting the basis of our co-existence.

Prison is regarded as a place of heightened conflict, based on a totalising mistrust. As Chauvenet describes, prison is:

> the material and legal translation of the ‘fight’ or the ‘war’ by the public order against the enemies from within, that is to say against delinquents... Physical violence thus becomes the solution; the objective is to impose our will onto the enemy, and disarmament is by nature the intention of war operations. Neutralising delinquents, keeping them unarmed, daily, constitutes the main task of prison staff and of its hierarchy. The objectives of social preservation and of security dominate and supercede any other considerations or objectives (1998: 91).

In this space of ‘war’, dominated by the binary logic friend/enemy, relationships, nonetheless, will develop. Prison, says Khosrokhavar ‘should be considered not only as a system of domination but also as an ensemble with vague contours, in which each of them [detainees and guards] compose a variety of narratives which constitute altogether incarceration as the theatre of erosion, and eventually of mutual destruction, through interactions neither always mastered nor standardised” (2016: 25). In a gift/counter-gift dynamic, where detainees are not passive, prison is a space where relationships are developed on the basis of permanent negotiations, provocations, verbal and physical confrontations, which are sometimes violent (Chauvenet et al., 2008), but importantly, relationships based on respect, listening, even trust, allowing ‘to speak to one another’ are also developed. In this way, prison professionals move between, on the one hand, the use of mistrust, on security grounds, giving too much weight to detention logics and, on the other hand, the will to defend a professional ethos (Melchior and Zanna, 2019: 12). This is based on ‘working with people’ and ‘creating a relationship of mutual listening and trust’ to achieve their purpose. The professional ethos, the will ‘to help’, ‘to support’ and ‘to reconnect’ is not aligned with the order to detect and report.

As teachers, as is the case for others too, we are more and more confronted with an ethical question. We are requested to play a role in detecting risky behaviours, linked to radicalisation in particular, which may change our purpose and impact the relationship of trust we have developed with detainees. (Teacher)

I wanted to work in prison because it is a place where you can work with individuals more globally and more deeply. Time is needed to reflect on oneself; there is time in prison, even
if the detainee is only thinking about when they will get out. Some detainees manage to question themselves. (Probation Officer)

Following the 2015 terrorist attacks, prison became the centre of attention for the media, politicians and society as a whole. The combination of emotional pressure from public opinion and institutional imperative led to the prison staff feeling responsible for providing intelligence, on an individual or collective basis. In doing this, some staff members jeopardised their relationship of trust with detainees, on which their purpose and duties are based. Different actors were requested to provide any feedback that might help detect ‘risky behaviour’. The separation which had existed between the intelligence staff and those caring for detainees became blurred (Ragazzi, 2016). People from different departments (medical, psychologist, SPIP, school, sport) were increasingly relied upon to provide information and to detect radicalisation; this extended security concerns into the social domain. Professionals were confronted with two issues. Firstly, the peace negotiated in prison is undermined by a job which becomes more and more anxiogenic, due to the vagueness of the concepts around ‘radicalisation’ i.e. ‘radical’, ‘radicalised’, ‘potential radical’, the lack of coherence of instructions and the uncertain effectiveness of the detection tools and of the type of support provided to the detected ‘radicalised’ individuals (Conti, 2019). Violent attacks on prison guards, conducted by individuals accused of terrorism or suspected of radicalisation, increase the atmosphere of mistrust and of war at play in French prisons. The second issue is ethical. The work ethics shared by teachers, psychologists, prison advisers of probation and rehabilitation (CPIP), as well as prison guards, are called into question when they are asked to act as informants. Professionals are confronted with a difficult choice: the respect for their professional code and the relationship they have built with detainees on the one hand, and their support for the detection of radicalisation on the other hand. The demand to inform, puts at risk the relationship of trust between the detainee and professionals, which has often taken time and patience to build.

The scope of intelligence gathering has been widened beyond the prison staff to even include Muslim chaplains, who are seen as an asset in the fight against radicalisation, reinforcing the conflation between religion and radicalisation (de Galembert, 2020). For the chaplain, participating in intelligence efforts or promoting a counter narrative focused on the ‘values of the Republic’ may jeopardise the trust with detainees who may also undermine the chaplains’ narrative, if they are suspected of serving the state:

The chaplain must be well equipped, otherwise he is targeted by the ones who seek to undermine him. You always need knowledge to be able to argue. They only use a couple of concepts, always the same ones such as the Unbelief. (Chaplain)

I do not need to see an imam, I know a lot of people, who know a hundred times better than the imam. And I get informed everyday about my religion. On what should be done and not... I don’t necessarily need to see an imam. It is not because he is an imam that he knows better... I have known imams, they were engaging their daughters in prostitution. They would put them on the street. I have known imams who told me that fornication is not an issue. They are not always a reference. That’s why I am telling you all this. I don’t say it just for free... (Detainee)

Detection can be extended also to include detainees, who can be required by prison intelligence to ‘listen’ to other detainees, to keep ‘their eyes open’ and inform on what is happening in prison. This arouses fear of denunciation while the ‘informer’ (the one disclosing information to the intelligence services) becomes the symbol of betrayal, attracting the detainees’ contempt. Thus, prison increasingly becomes a place of mistrust and suspicion, a place where the inmate can trust no one. This culture of
suspicion is symbolised by the fear of being recorded on the state security watch list ‘Fichier S’\(^1\). The fear of being listed has become so acute that some detainees do not demonstrate any sign of devout practice for fear of being accused; others try to avoid places of worship, halal food and the chaplain. This situation goes hand in hand with an increasing feeling of frustration and stigmatisation. Relationships with other detainees, the daily practice of religion, the participation (or refusal to participate) in collective activities and manner of dressing are all affected by the fear of being registered on this list. Some detainees even claim they are listed when they are not - demonstrating an ambivalent mix of victimisation (‘I am listed even when I have done nothing’) as proof of the perversity of the institution and hierarchising of prison relationships by framing oneself through the prism of the institution’s categories. This general climate of mistrust encourages attitudes of victimhood and conspiracy, where each decision of the prison administration, such as a refusal or a delay, is viewed through the lens of belonging to a discriminated and stigmatised category (Muslim, Arab, Black, suburban). Exogenous categories, such as the proselyte, or the radical, are appropriated by the detainees themselves, who use them to explain any decision of the prison administration or any attitude of the prison guards. Detainees explain access to places of worship, to workshops, to work, visits and transfers through the alleged ‘labelling’ (the result of their supposed registration on the list).

By exERTing such increasing control over these suspected individuals, particularly those who are visibly devout, the fight against radicalisation, according to Khosrokhavar, may lead to ‘what social sciences call the self-fulfilling prophecy, the suspicion of radicalism may even lead certain fundamentalists in that direction. At a certain point, for some, this suspicion directed towards them will appear to be proof that society is against Islam and may act as grounds to engage in violence as a legitimate way to counter it’ (2014: 171). This effect goes beyond the fundamentalists; in this paranoid environment, some detainees find comfort only within the network of ‘brothers’ - the very brothers who have rhetorical arguments explaining prison conditions and how to reverse the stigmas.

4.4 Districts of Evaluation of Radicalisation: a specific system?

The issues raised about the programme of fighting radicalisation in prison, and the move towards a society of surveillance, can be seen in microcosm in the debate over prison districts where radicalisation is assessed - ‘Districts of Evaluation of Radicalisation’ (QER). Specifically, this debate brings to the fore questions around the perverse effects of the fight against radicalisation in prison, its cumulative effects and the risks of the escalation of mistrust, dehumanisation, binary logics and violence. As symbols of the policy of prevention and fight against radicalisation, QER were created to respond to the complex dilemma of what should be done with jihadists, radicals and people suspected of being in the process of radicalisation. Should they mix with ordinary prisoners and risk political and religious contamination? Or should they be isolated and risk collusion? These are two different logics, well-grounded in prison history, namely the split between the desire to correct and the will to neutralise. For ‘radicalised’ individuals these logics may be experienced as in stark opposition; on the one hand looking towards their reintegration and potential for reconnection with social, family and other affected relationships whilst, on the other, seeking to punish and render them harmless and ‘to make them suffer’ (Fassin, 2017). Rarely does one of these logics prevail over the other – they are usually articulated in combination, often producing negotiated solutions. This is certainly the case with the management of the TISs and has led to a system that might be best described as ‘mixed’ (Chantraine et al., 2018).

4.4.1 The creation of QER

A few days after the attacks on 12 January 2015, the French government decided to expand a pilot

\(^{1}\) According to the decree n. 2010-569 dated 28 May 2010, ‘anyone who is the subject of a search to prevent serious threats to public safety or the security of the State, is registered on the watch list ‘Fichier S’, on the basis of intelligence reports’.
project, undertaken in the prison of Fresnes from October 2014, where detainees considered to be ‘proselytes’ had been detained together (Benbassa and Troendlé, 2017). In the framework of the ‘plan to fight terrorism’ (PLAT)\(^2\), five dedicated units (UD) were set up, on the one hand to avoid pressures and propagation of the radical Islamist proselytism, and on the other hand, to encourage the care of the so-called ‘radicalised’ individuals. The aim of grouping them together was to ‘preserve the balance of detentions, protect other detainees from potential proselyte actions’ and also ‘to provide effective care to these categories of detainee’. Individuals imprisoned ‘for terrorist acts linked to violent radical Islamism’, as well as individuals identified as radicalised but not imprisoned for acts of terrorism, were both directed towards these UD. The initial objectives of the UD were, thus, ambitious; evaluating and caring for ‘radicalised’ detainees in only a few weeks. Designed in an emergency situation and implemented in a hurry, UD were, from the start, highly criticised, both from a legal and ethical point of view\(^2\). When the complexity of ‘de-radicalising’ became clear (Conti, 2018; IPEV, 2019), these ‘dedicated units’ were turned into ‘units of the prevention of radicalisation’ (UPRA). Here, the focus was evaluation, following the principle ‘evaluate to provide better treatment’. However, the violent assault of prison guards by a TIS detainee in the prison of Osny in September 2016 led to the sudden closure of UPRA and the development of a new system, the Districts of Evaluation of Radicalisation (QER) which had two operating principles: evaluation and securitisation. The ‘plan for penitentiary security and action against violent radicalisation’\(^2\), was presented by the Justice Minister on 25 October 2016 and made evaluation the cornerstone of policies fighting terrorism in prison, along with security and intelligence. The notion of care became secondary. In the ‘QER system’, detainees are evaluated by a multidisciplinary team in the course of successive sessions over 17 weeks, thereby involving the entire prison service in the detection and evaluation of radicalisation (Cénat, 2016). The primary function of this evaluation period is to assign the detainee to an appropriate prison. Some are transferred to ordinary detention whereas others, considered to be a risk to other prisoners, are transferred to prisons designed for specifically violent or dangerous detainees.

### 4.4.2 Between the logic of war and professional ethos

It is illuminating here to consider more closely the relationships between professionals and detainees assigned to QERs. The *Sociological investigation of ‘Districts of Evaluation of Radicalisation’ in French prisons* (Chantraine et al., 2018) revealed this relationship to be a battle ground in which the prison guards, representing the ‘French State’, are pitted against the detainees, who are fighting the institution of the State of ‘France’ (Khosrokhar, 2006 and 2017). This climate of war is more present than in ordinary detention and rooted in an ‘us and them’ divide arising from the reciprocal mistrust which can develop between detainees and prison staff over time. The perception among prison guards of TIS as ‘enemies’ can lead to reciprocal stigmatisation:

> With them (detainees) it’s dead. There is no possible coming back. Their objective is destruction. In one way or another: they want to destroy us, our aim is to destroy them (Prison guard cited in Chantraine et al. 2018).

In recent years, assaults against prison guards committed by TIS detainees\(^2\) have reinforced the

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\(^2\) For further details see: [https://radical.hypotheses.org/13661](https://radical.hypotheses.org/13661)

\(^2\) See the two reports written by the Controller-General of prisons: *Handling Islamist radicalisation in prison* (2015); and *The launch of the Dedicated Units* (2016). See also the criticisms expressed by the International Prisons Observatory ([https://oip.org](https://oip.org)) and the parliamentary report of Benbassa and Troendlé (2017).


\(^2\) Violence constitutes an integral part of life in prison and assaults against prison guards are not a new phenomenon (Chauvenet et al., 2008). However, in recent years, guards have become a prime target of imprisoned Islamist radicals. Several assaults, re-categorised as ‘terrorist assaults’, were committed and claimed as
perception of a war relationship between prison guards and TIS detainees, ‘radicalised’ or ‘radicalising’ individuals. However, other relationships also take place amidst this climate of war and mistrust. Some professionals attempt to build ‘mutual respect’ between detainees and themselves. According to Chantraine et al. (2018: 104), while some prison professionals approach detainees as ‘enemies’ or, alternatively, engage in a ‘pacifying mission’ based on an assumption of religious faith, others adopt a dialogic and listening approach to them designed to jolt detainees out of their ‘logic of war’.

Mistrust is not only affecting prison guards’ work but also that of other professionals (psychologists, CPIP, educators), who describe their relationships with detainees as increasingly contradictory. Torn between security challenges and the ethical requirements of their profession, some professionals seek to resist the pressures of informing on detainees, that is to resist the security system constituted by the prison, which ‘works to considerably reinforce their otherness, and constructs them day after day as a destructive force’ (Chauvenet 2010: 42). They try to avoid building relationships based on ‘mistrust’, arguing that the ethical requirements of their profession prevent them from complying with securitisation. Within the QER, or in proven cases of radicalisation within ordinary detention, professionals generally consider reporting to the authorities to be legitimate and this does not provoke any major conflict of values. In more ambiguous cases however, ‘the transmission – not compulsory but strongly recommended - to the institution of indicators may create ethical discomfort’ (Melchior and Zanna, 2019: 12). For instance, many psychologists see a legal and ethical incompatibility between, on the one hand, the ‘shared confidentiality’, expected by the institution in the framework of the multi-disciplinary work, and on the other hand the ‘medical confidentiality’ upon which their work is built and safeguarded. Others see it as essential to establish trust relationships, to work ‘on behalf ‘ of detainees to help their reintegration, rather than to work for intelligence purposes.

Considering the role, the QER draws our attention, again, to the wider challenges of the fight against radicalisation and, in particular, to the purpose of evaluation. For whom is the evaluation conducted? It might be designed to benefit the detainee, leading them to question their violent engagement and facilitate possible reintegration. However, in practice, evaluation conducted in line with the operational logics of QER is designed to provide the intelligence services with information and becomes evidence against the detainee to help define their criminal penalty. There is, as Chantraine et al. (2018) point out, ‘a structural tension between the security challenges and the challenges linked to the care of the detainees’. The system of evaluation has been developed around the needs of the intelligence service, which attaches greatest importance to security issues. Professionals, whether they are prison guards, psychologists, educators or CPIP, end up working in the interests of security, or, as Ragazzi puts it, ‘the right hand’:

[… the fight against radicalisation leads, above all, to the introduction of a rationale of suspicion, which has a detrimental effect in the social sphere, which operates on the basis of relationships of trust. When he studies the State, Bourdieu uses metaphors to explain how the State acts with both hands: the right hand punishes, while the left one comforts and provides welfare to society’ (Ragazzi, 2016: 157).

The concept of ‘evaluation’, according to Chantraine et al., ‘conflicts with the frameworks CPIP, educators, psychologists traditionally use in theory and practice such as: ‘assisting’, ‘caring’, ‘listening’, ‘sharing’, ‘humanising’, etc.’ (Chantraine et al., 2018: 144). The professional ethical requirements and the attempts to build a trusted relationship with detainees may be under threat, or even violated, by security logic, which takes over the professionals’ work and the wider functioning of the QERs. Prison
staff from various departments, including healthcare, end up being engaged in collecting information that will end up with intelligence services.

Of course, detection is one of the tasks assigned to prison staff and is important as it includes detection of individuals at risk of committing suicide, those involved in setting up criminal networks, those who have abused other detainees and so on. Thus detection per se is not the problem but its objectives – what is the purpose of detection and for whom is it conducted? Within the framework of the fight against radicalisation, detection appears to be aimed not at assisting the detainee but at providing information to intelligence services and helping the process of criminal judgement. Concerns about taqya (dissimulation) and thus the possibility of ‘missing’ a threat, mean that the imperative to ‘reduce the risks’ prevails and the work of professionals is torn between the security approach (oriented towards reducing risk) and the social approach, which aims to establish a relationship of trust with the detainee, to help social reintegration and, in the specific case of TIS, to help with their disengagement. Ragazzi argues that these two imperatives cannot be mixed:

... the work of the right hand – in this case, the intelligence agent, the policeman/woman, the attorney, the border guard – is based on a mistrust relationship with the public. If a police man/woman does not use suspicion he/she does not do his/her job properly. On the contrary, the work of the left hand is only possible if based on a trusting relationship. Students must trust their professors enough to make mistakes, to explore new ideas – including political ones. Worshippers must trust their priest or imam enough to speak and ask for advice. Troubled youngsters must trust their educators to share their problems and their questions [...] (2016: 157)

As intelligence is now at the heart of QERs, and prisons more widely, the security approach based on the necessity to detect, overemphasises the work of the professionals whose priority is to ‘uncover’, ‘trap’ and ‘reveal’ individuals who are hiding. This approach of mistrust has become widespread despite attempts to resist it and respect professional ethical requirements and infuses all relationships with the detainees:

For prison staff, either you are different from the others (from the radical ones), which means you are trying to hide, or you are not different and it means you are a radical (cited in Chantraine et al., 2018: 168).

You cannot remain yourself when you are observed 24 hours a day. All my actions are interpreted. If I run during the exercise period, I am preparing myself for combat. If I clean my cell, I am a potential radical searching for purity. And if I pray, I cannot even describe it... (cited in Chantraine et al., 2018: 168).

I am afraid of being suspected of radicalisation so I am trying to avoid things I would normally do such as praying in my cell... I am even afraid of praying in my cell sometimes because of the guard who may see me and then... (Detainee).

In this way, all relationships can be reduced to a charade in which both parties are acting out roles, where each seeks to ‘trap’ the other or hide behind ‘careful’ wording. This warlike relationship based on mistrust and pretence contributes to the ‘prison unease’ as Khosrokhavar (2016) describes it. This sense of being subject to injustice is felt among both guards and detainees and becomes mutually reinforcing.

The application of these approaches also means that the specificity of each case may become lost even though most professionals and detainees agree that QER detainees have different trajectories, roots into radical Islam and relationships to violence. This leads all professionals to concur that the concept of ‘radicalisation’ is problematic (Melchior and Zanna, 2019), especially because it does not distinguish between theory and action, between cognitive and behavioural radicalisation (Crettiez and Sèze, 2017)
and leads to the conflation of ‘radicalism’ (religious radicalism, radicalism in lifestyle, etc.) and violence. Detainees are critical of the fact that they are judged (detected and evaluated) more for their ideas and beliefs than for committing acts or for the threat they present. Again, the feeling of being targeted for being Muslim reinforces the feeling of stigmatisation and discrimination that exists already in ordinary detention and more widely in society. Garapon (cited in Esprit, 2016) describes this as ‘a judgement of intentions’, or the frequently expressed belief that ‘you are in prison for who you are and not for what you have done’. This feeling of judgement based on ‘the ideas we stand up for’ or ‘for who we are’ reinforces the interpretative framework of those who function on binary approaches - war logics - based on mistrust.

4.5 Labelling

The final consequence of the fight against radicalisation in prison which it is important to consider is that of the negative impact of labelling (Becker, 1985; Desrosières, 1993; Martiniello and Simon, 2005) on the possibility of rehabilitation, or even of simply imagining rehabilitation. In other words, once labelled ‘Islamist terrorist’, (TIS), ‘Radical Islamist individual’ (PRI) or ‘Common detainees vulnerable to radicalisation’ (DCSR), as well as ‘terro’ or ‘Daesh’ or ‘radicalised’ or ‘in a radicalisation process’, a detainee is locked into a category that has psychological, social and practical consequences. These labels are built on the interactions between a plurality of actors, either inside or outside prison. The state is the main actor in this categorisation while the labelling is applied to the detainees and becomes used to differentiate themselves from one another and to build relationships inside the social space of the prison.

The labelling, whether in ordinary detention or in a QER, will have a significant impact on the relationships with professionals as well as with other detainees. Prison guards change their working habits with the detainees identified as ‘terro’ or as ‘radicalised’ (Khosrokhabar, 2016; Conti, 2019). The relationship is often characterised by an increased mistrust, shaped around very limited contact and built on the perception of ‘otherness’ (Chauvenet 2010). Sometimes it takes the form of overtly discriminatory practices, such as insults, extensive searches, being woken at night, electricity cuts, denial of access to the common room, etc. Guards may also use physical violence, in particular when the detainee does not obey orders. Repeated transfers, often without advance warning, are used also by the administration to prevent the (re)building of stable relationships. Detainees find themselves locked in permanent relational instability, which prevents them from building any trustful relationship. This can lead to the detainee taking an inward-looking attitude and the refusal to accept the everyday routine of prison life. These unequal treatments can lead some detainees to return to narratives of conspiracy and victimhood, leading them to over-interpret any decision or action taken by prison staff as discriminatory.

Labelling also has an impact on relationships with other detainees. In some cases, there is a real opposition to radical Islamism, particularly in prisons where the number of detainee TISs is limited and ‘terrorist’ detainees can be subject to insults and provocations, even to violent assaults. In other cases, detainees diverge over the interpretation of ‘Islam’ with ‘radical’ detainees often claiming the ‘truth’ of their interpretation and seeking to impose it on other Muslims.

Every Friday at the mosque, I see different types of people: the radical, the spiritual, the one who simply wants to talk. And when you talk after prayers, you can see at once they do not agree at all among themselves. I stop it at once otherwise they start fighting. (Chaplain)

In other cases, the fear of being listed ‘S’ prevents TIS detainees forming relationships, as mentioned by the following detainee: ‘When people know I am a ‘terro’, they stop walking with me so as not to get listed “S”’ (Detainee). In one of the prisons where research was undertaken, some detainees would rather give up the football field, for which there is usually a long waiting list, to avoid ‘playing’ with a detainee coming back from Syria and sentenced on terrorist grounds.
We noticed that some detainees would not play football with them. And during the game, (detainee’s name) would just pass unchallenged because no one would dare taking the ball from him. Nobody would go to him and take the ball fearing retaliation. Once, another detainee tackled him and (detainee’s name) got upset, threatened him, and told him he knew who he was and that he would pay for this outside...When observing the exercise yard, it was clear that other detainees would make space around him when they passed him. On the same floor, the fact that they were going to other detainees’ cells was noticeable whereas the other detainees would not enter their cells. (Prison officer)

However, the status ‘TIS’ could also provide advantages such as being granted an individual cell in a highly overpopulated prison, or preferential status for participation in activities (‘to help disengagement’), while other detainees are placed on waiting lists. In some cases, and in particular where the number of accused or sentenced individuals on terrorist grounds is higher, the status ‘TIS’ may also incur respect from other detainees who may admire their ‘courage to stick to their ideas’ or ‘not give in to anything or anyone’, etc. In this respect, the status ‘terro’ can also provide an aura of ‘leader’ or ‘wise man’, that would have been impossible to acquire in any other context. This may raise self-esteem and encourage individuals to appear as the ‘jihadist’.

The labelling may have a further impact which is to homogenise the image of detainees regardless of their profile, trajectory and type of engagement. The labelling, or process of including them in a stigmatising category, contributes to setting the power balance between individuals and also among the different jihadist groups outside prison. Geopolitical issues externally also directly affect prison life and prison relationships; they contribute to the hostile climate and shape affinities and power relationships during gatherings (at collective prayers, during exercise in the yard and sports activities, in the library). Collective dialectics may also be enforced at the individual level, making it more difficult to detach from or exit the ideology or the jihadist affiliation. In other words, the fact that detainees are gathered in QERs, or in ordinary detention, may increase their ideological engagement and the affinities they had already established among themselves before their detention.

5. Conclusions

A diverse range of professionals and researchers are raising questions around the perverse effects of the policies to fight radicalisation in French prisons. We might think of these effects as constituting ‘cumulative radicalisation’ if we move beyond an understanding of that process as a binary process involving movement–countermovement interactions, i.e. a ‘simple’ dynamic between extreme Islamist groups and anti-Muslim/extreme right-wing movements. In fact this case study shows that French institutions may also be an active actor in constructing/building the spiral of radicalisation, both on ideological and legal grounds. Judge Garapon (cited in Esprit, 2016) in this regard talks about ‘a radicalisation of political discourse and of institutions’. The questions raised with regard to the perverse effects of the fight against radicalisation could be formulated around three main criticisms.

Firstly, policies in place to fight against radicalisation in prison, and more widely, in French society, have a substantial impact on Muslims and the Muslim community at large. Whether in detention or outside, Muslims have never felt as stigmatised and excluded as in recent years (Davidshofer et al., 2018; Sèze, 2019). Targeting Muslims as ‘at risk populations’ has contributed to the stigmatisation and exclusion of Muslim communities. Moreover, actions implemented in mosques, schools and prisons to fight radicalisation are inefficient, at best, and counterproductive at worst. In prison, a large number of youngsters we met shared their feelings of discrimination. For some, this lead to the expression of desire to leave the country where they were born and where they grew up because they feel unable to
practice their religion as they wish. Existing research shows how discrimination and exclusion can proved to be powerful drivers of radicalisation (Khosrokhavar, 2014 and 2016; Poli, 2019).

Secondly, there is a deep crisis of trust in prison, as outside. Widening the net of suspicion by suggesting that radicalisation processes should be anticipated has damaged this trust still further. Extending labelling to include those who may be at risk of potentially becoming radicalised has damaged relationships between detainees and professions who work in prisons. The aim of anticipating where radicalisation may take place by observing warning signs and acting accordingly has meant entire sectors of civil society are enrolled in intelligence work to identify and report individuals at risk. However, not only is the attempt to predict the future unlikely to be effective (Ragazzi, 2016) but focusing on ‘premonitory’ signs increases the risk of stereotyping and discriminating and may even lead to detainees becoming mistrustful of all prison professionals and other inmates and of individuals considered at risk outside the prison walls. This focus on surveillance and suspicion, moreover, undermines not only the work of education, social and health services but also of religious and community representatives.

Finally, in the vast majority of cases, the fate of the individuals who have been arrested and convicted on the grounds of terrorism or because they are ‘radicalised’ will not spend their lives in prison. In France, the first ‘returnee’ from Syria was freed on 13 January 2020 (amidst significant media noise and concerns) and others will soon leave prison too. It is difficult to understand what the state has gained by over-criminalising and systematically choosing confinement to prevent terrorist attack. The psychiatrist Guillaume Monot reminds us that ‘the main obstacle when you exit a terrorist radical group...is not how to get out of it but where to go when you get out. Jihad provides a unique and intense life and an exclusive solidarity network that youngsters lacking narcissism will lose when they leave their comrades and fall into an emotional vacuum’ (2019: 294). The absence of future may result in some who are accused of terrorism choosing even more extreme routes, as negative hero, which can be described as a never-say-die attitude. Chantraine et al. (2018) mention in their report on QERs that both professional prison staff and detainees describe the prison experience as leading to the further radicalisation of some detainees, an institutional consolidation of the stigma attached to them and a defensive reaction towards the institution, which increases hostility. In this way, ‘The mechanism set up by the prison to manage “radicalised” detainees, nurtures hatred and more widely the potential violence of the detainees once they have been through a QER’ (2018: 180-182). This risk however goes beyond the QER and the prison, as this securitisation approach may provide legitimacy for young people who feel discriminated against as Muslims to choose a radical break with society from which there is no return. The central issue here is that individuals who should be taken care of, are instead treated in a judicial and hostile fashion.

Beyond the focus on ‘radicals’, the prison system as such requires rethinking. Many reports and studies underline the absence of reintegration programmes available in prison. Numbers on recidivism, show that 61% of detainees who are released go on to reoffend. Therefore, the prison system in France, and also in many other countries, is failing in its duty of reintegration and resocialisation and is only

26 For Muslim prisoners, this desire to go elsewhere finds its legitimacy in the notion of hijira, which means ‘exile’ in Arabic, and indicates the emigration of a believer from a non-Muslim country to a Muslim country. For these young French people, leaving a non-Muslim country such as France to settle in a ‘genuinely Muslim’ country often becomes a kind of dream in which it becomes possible to leave the oppressive and corrupt world to join an imaginary world of virtue where their anxiety, sense of injustice and exclusion are alleviated. While many young people recount their desire to leave for a truly Muslim country, however, few know concretely where to go.


providing punishment (Fassin, 2017). One detainee summarises this as a feeling that, ‘I am not adapted to society...this is not a society for us. As soon as I am out of here, I will leave France as soon as possible... After ten years in prison, it is over’. Prison conditions are poor with overcrowding a major issue. This environment makes prison a place, which promotes radical rupture with the state and society, and even becomes a place of radicalisation, as no alternative future is suggested to young individuals who feel trapped in the vicious circle of imprisonment and violence. For some, the main feeling is that they have nothing to lose as they do not have anything more to give. If you have nothing to lose, why would you invest your trust in building relationships? Such relationships are based on giving a part of oneself, on altruism, which can only take place if you recognise you have something to offer. In ‘Essai sur le don. Forme et raison de l'échange dans les sociétés archaïques’, published in 1924, Marcel Mauss explains that ‘to refuse to give, to fail to invite, just as to refuse to accept, is tantamount to declaring war; it is to reject the bond of alliance and fellowship’. Where there is nothing to give and nothing to receive, nothing to exchange, nothing to share and no trust, what remains is only destruction.
6. References


Observatoire International des Prisons (https://oip.org)


